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1 |
ID:
039409
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Publication |
London, Croom Hilm, 1978.
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Description |
210p.
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Standard Number |
085664417x
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
017788 | 320.12/PRE 017788 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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2 |
ID:
139879
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Summary/Abstract |
India shares land and maritime boundaries with eight countries – Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Apart from China, which is not situated in South Asia,India is overwhelmingly superior compared to her South Asian neighbours in military and economic terms.India's predominant position in the sub-continent has given rise to a great deal of fear and insecurity among its neighbours creating one of the rare instances in the realist theory that calls for "bandwagoing" rather than balancing behaviour.
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3 |
ID:
130877
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
Governments detain asylum seekers on islands across the Indian Ocean region, including Australia's Christmas Island, Papua New Guinea's Manus Island, Nauru, and across the Indonesian archipelago. Scholars and advocates alike have shown that the ambiguous jurisdiction and complex legal migration statuses that emerge in these areas, as well as their remote location and isolation, contribute to their popularity as sites of migrant detention. The negative effects of isolation and remoteness on migrants' physical and mental health, as well as their legal outcomes, have been well documented. We argue, however, that detainees and others are countering the effects of isolation with the use of technology. Ethnographic research conducted on the islands within Australian and Indonesian migrant detention networks suggests that asylum seekers detained in remote sites across the region are combating the isolation of detention with the use of mobile phones, internet access, and social media networks. They communicate with friends, relatives, legal representatives, advocates, activists, and members of the public beyond prison walls to transmit information, facilitate advocacy inside and outside of detention facilities, and construct transnational support networks. In turn, punitive policies to discipline asylum seekers by limiting methods of communication threaten these efforts.
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4 |
ID:
133068
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
While important differences exist, the first decade of the twenty-first century paralleled the 1970s for the Department of Defense and the U.S. Navy. U.S. armed forces were embroiled in extended and expensive counterinsurgency wars. American military equipment was growing old, budgets were tight, and extended projections called for significant decreases in the nation's armed forces, just as the main prospective military adversary was both rapidly modernizing and expanding its forces, particularly its navy. "From 1962 to 1972, the navy had programmed the construction of 42 ships per year, but between 1968 and 1975 only 12 ships, or less than a third as many per year, were programmed. In 1975, given the age of ships already at sea, and the navy-expected service life for a warship of 25-30 years, the service anticipated retiring about 4 percent of the active fleet each year."1 The Soviets were extending their defensive perimeter from two to three thousand kilometers.2 Today, the Chinese suggest extending their defensive perimeter from the "first island chain," enclosing the East and South China Seas, to the second, bounded by the Marianas, three thousand kilometers from the Chinese coast.3 In the 1970s, the United States questioned its own ability to fight forward, defend allies, and achieve objectives -as many defense analysts and many in the Navy do now.
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5 |
ID:
130875
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
The fisheries statistics systems of many countries are performing poorly, often failing to report on small-scale catches, particularly from subsistence and recreational fisheries. These deficiencies, which lead to the underestimation of catches, are particularly evident in overseas territories of developed countries. This study is an attempt to remedy this for the years 1950-2010 for the Australia Indian Ocean Territories, an area from which little reporting is done. The results suggest that the Cocos (Keeling) Islands had a catch of approximately 80 t·year?1 in the 1950s (essentially subsistence based), which increased, starting in the mid-1980s to reach 250 t·year?1 in recent years, mainly due to the introduction of recreational and later commercial fishing, with signs of overexploitation since 2000. The coastal catch from Christmas Island was tentatively assessed as being higher (40-70 t·year?1) in the 1950s and 1960s than in the 2000s (<30 t·year?1). Fisheries managers in these areas should focus on determining primary target species and their vulnerability to overfishing, as well as developing island specific recreational fishing management plans.
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6 |
ID:
133953
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
This article recounts the negotiations and emergence of Article 234 concerning ice-covered areas in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. As Arctic shipping increases, more vessels and flag states may be subject to the provisions of Article 234, which permit coastal states to both prescribe and enforce special measures to protect the marine environment in ice-covered areas. The history of the Article 234, disclosed partially through declassified U.S. government documents, provides context for implementation of the provision by Arctic coastal states and flag states.
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7 |
ID:
122120
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
The Spratly Islands-not so long ago known primarily as a rich fishing ground-have turned into an international flashpoint as Chinese leaders insist with increasing truculence that the islands, rocks, and reefs have been, in the words of Premier Wen Jiabao, "China's historical territory since ancient times." Normally, the overlapping territorial claims to sovereignty and maritime boundaries ought to be resolved through a combination of customary international law, adjudication before the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, or arbitration under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). While China has ratified UNCLOS, the treaty by and large rejects "historically based" claims, which are precisely the type Beijing periodically asserts. On September 4, 2012, China's foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, told US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that there is "plenty of historical and jurisprudence evidence to show that China has sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters."
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8 |
ID:
125239
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
Contemporary Indian foreign policy focuses on the promotion of her economic interests for which she believes that securing security within her immediate neighbourhood is extremely important. Further economic and military security combined together can only aid in India's rise in the game of international power politics. India not only shares land and maritime boundaries with eight countries- Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, the Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, but also shares close historical, linguistic, religious, ethnic and cultural relationships. Hence, one of the cornerstones of India's stated foreign policy, though not a notably successful one to date, has been to build a strategically secure, politically stable, harmonious and economically cooperative neighbourhood. Moreover in the present era improving connectivity linkages with the neighbouring countries has assumed a singular dimension in India's neighbourhood diplomacy.
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9 |
ID:
171876
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Summary/Abstract |
This article examines some of the issues relating to maritime boundaries which have arisen among the Arab states of the Middle East and between those states and their non-Arab neighbours. Geographically, the bodies of water concerned are the Persian Gulf, the eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea.
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10 |
ID:
118010
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
This article summarizes the rules for maritime boundary delimitation and the United States practice in delimiting maritime boundaries. The article concludes with summaries of several problem areas involving maritime boundaries, or the lack thereof, in which the United States has a particular interest.
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11 |
ID:
131140
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
Since 2002, the Republic of Cyprus, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Turkey and Greece have been embroiled in disputes over the delimitation of maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean. Geopolitically and geostrategically important, the area's rich oil and natural-gas reserves have made Exclusive Economic Zones all the more relevant. Eric R Eissler and Gözde Arasýl analyse the latest developments, military postures, and the political and legal positions of the parties involved, concluding that, even though a military clash remains a remote possibility, the stalemate is likely to persist.
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12 |
ID:
145032
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Publication |
New York, Oxford University Press, 2016.
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Description |
viii, 247p.pbk
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Standard Number |
9780199301034
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
058660 | 327.172/GOE 058660 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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13 |
ID:
130874
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
Maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has become a paramount consideration; a range of traditional and non-traditional security challenges largely converge at sea. Risk-based processes offer the potential to engage in a positive, constructive and non-confrontational approach that will help to identify collective and cooperative security strategies. Analysing the evolving maritime security risk context provides a powerful tool for understanding common risks and vulnerabilities that affect regional and extra-regional actors with interests in the IOR. This can provide the impetus for diverse actors, primarily states, to cooperate to advance common objectives and protect shared interests without significantly compromising territorial integrity or sovereignty, against a range of risks that no single actor has the ability to mitigate. Commissioning a multinational, multi-disciplinary team of experts to conduct a regional strategic risk assessment, with a specific focus upon maritime security, should be a priority. Maritime security cooperation in the IOR could, if managed astutely and prudently, bind a diverse and largely disaggregated region
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14 |
ID:
053977
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15 |
ID:
083062
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Publication |
New Delhi, National Maritime Foundation, 2005.
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Description |
xv, 98p.
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Standard Number |
9788188342761
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
053735 | 341.44209165/NAT 053735 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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16 |
ID:
139193
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Summary/Abstract |
After the strange water cannon duel in September 2012 between Taiwanese and Japanese petrol boats, the dispute over a group of islets called the Senkakus in Japan (Diaoyus in China, and Tiaoyutas in Taiwan) seemed to simmer down for a few weeks. However, a month later, China sent fishing and patrol boats to the vicinity of the disputed islands.
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17 |
ID:
130890
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
India covers a total geographical territory of 2,87240 Sq. Lm (12,69,210 Sq, Mile) and according to the census conducted in 2011, the population of India is 1,210,193,422 that strategically makes it the seventh largest and the 2nd most populated country in the world. Geographically it is bounded by the Indian Ocean in the south, the Arabian sea on the west, the Bay of Bengal in the east and sharing land borders with Pakistan, on the west, China, Nepal and Bhutan in the north and the northeast, and Bangladesh and Burma in the east. in shares maritime boundaries with Pakistan in the west, Sri Lanka in south and Bangladesh in east and its islands of Andaman and Nicobar share with the Thailand and Indonesia.
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18 |
ID:
124105
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
The article focuses on the comprehensive maritime domain awareness (MDA) that according to the presidential directive is the effective understanding or anything associated with the global maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the U.S. Comments on the need for the requirement of green MDA for the continuous and real-time surveillance of U.S. protected or fragile ocean space for non-defense, environmental security, are also included.
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19 |
ID:
160414
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Summary/Abstract |
The year 2017 dawned in Timor-Leste with positive promises. Diplomatic efforts to secure a new maritime boundary and improve access to natural resources ended in a favorable deal. Elections let people have a voice on disputes of the previous year. But the returns took many by surprise, and instability returned to the arena.
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20 |
ID:
153312
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Summary/Abstract |
Over recent years, Australia and Timor-Leste’s bilateral relationship has been consumed by contested maritime boundary claims in the resource-rich Timor Sea. Intractable disagreements over the right to build a petroleum export pipeline have led Timor-Leste to reinvigorate its pursuit of permanent maritime boundaries as ‘a national priority’. This article examines Timor-Leste’s interests in the Timor Sea and assesses its strategies for achieving its foreign policy goals. It argues that Timor-Leste’s attainment of its stated goals relies on Australia shifting its Timor Sea policy, which has been largely consistent since the 1970s. Timor-Leste’s key strategy is a public diplomacy campaign that positions permanent maritime boundaries as the final stage of its independence struggle, and presents Timor-Leste as owning the disputed Greater Sunrise gas field under international law. While the public diplomacy campaign aims to win enough Australian ‘hearts and minds’ to put pressure on the Australian government, it ultimately fails to negotiate the strategic and historical realities of the interests that define Australia’s realpolitik approach to the Timor Sea.
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