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ID:
106561
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2 |
ID:
140664
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Edition |
1st ed.
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Publication |
Hampshire, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1985.
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Description |
xii, 429p.: tables, mapshbk
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Contents |
Vol. II: Struggle for South-East Asia 1961-65
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Standard Number |
0333339576
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
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Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
028396 | 959.7043/SMI 028396 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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3 |
ID:
143849
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Summary/Abstract |
This is a transnational history of the ways that the Cuban Missile Crisis affected national politics and international relations in the Americas. It argues that Latin American governments and citizens tried to take advantage of the crisis to change both local balances of power and relations with the United States.
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4 |
ID:
039560
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Publication |
Baltimore, The Johns Hopkings University Press, 1976.
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Description |
xii, 302p.
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Standard Number |
0801817889
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
016183 | 327.1/DIN 016183 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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5 |
ID:
089620
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
The Cuban Missile Crisis is by this point well known to all scholars of international politics. Yet, although it has yielded countless lessons over the years, one critical aspect of the case has remained unexamined: the failure of estimation prior to the crisis that led US officials to discount the possibility of a missile deployment in Cuba. This article re-examines US intelligence estimates of the Soviet Union prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis in light of the concept of 'mirroring risk', introduced in this article. I present a framework for understanding a class of intelligence failures that are caused by the mis-assessment of how an adversary frames a decision and the risks that they are willing to take. I also present a new two-stage process for understanding how individuals assess the risk-propensity of adversaries in international politics.
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6 |
ID:
156313
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7 |
ID:
124116
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
Excerpts from the book "The Reminiscences of Admiral George W. Anderson," published by the U.S. Naval Institute are presented including an excerpt on the former U.S. President John F. Kennedy taking office in 1961 and his relations with the Former Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, replacement of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Director Allen Dulles with John McCone and Cuban Missile Crisis.
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8 |
ID:
038660
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Publication |
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972.
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Description |
x, 380p.Hbk
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Standard Number |
0520021827
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
011337 | 923.17291/HAL 011337 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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9 |
ID:
133395
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
The Cuban missile crisis was a defining moment in the career of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) at the time, Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr. His leadership of the Navy during the crisis has become the most prominent role accorded to him in history. Yet his relationship during the crisis with the Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, has been cited as the factor that brought to a premature end his tour as CNO and his naval career. Among the events that affected the admiral's relationship with the secretary during the crisis were those that took place on 23-24 October 1962 in CNO's Intelligence Plot (IP)-part
of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), located adjacent to but separate from CNO's operational Flag Plot and charged with providing all-source intelligence to the CNO, cleared Navy staff, and others.
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10 |
ID:
073632
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