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| 1 |
ID:
144608
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| Summary/Abstract |
When U.S. President Barack Obama [1] joined other global leaders at the G-20 summit in Turkey [2] in November 2015, the United States was in the final stages of a multiyear effort to secure the approval of a set of important reforms to the International Monetary Fund. The reforms, negotiated in 2010 with strong U.S. leadership, were designed to double the organization’s core financial resources to combat financial crises and to modernize its governance by increasing the voting shares of emerging-market economies [3] while maintaining a decisive U.S. voice. But their implementation had been on hold for several years, awaiting approval from Congress. Christine Lagarde, the IMF’s managing director, spoke for many when she opened the meeting in Turkey by saying she prayed that the United States would approve the reforms by the end of the year. Obama responded with a mix of levity and seriousness. “You don’t have to pray, Christine,” he said. “It will get done.”
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| 2 |
ID:
124092
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In November 2010, the G20 Summit was held in Seoul. The G20 has increasingly replaced the G8 as being the premier forum for international economic cooperation, but in November 2010, it was the first time that a summit was held in country that was not a G8 member. It was by the Korean government seen as evidence of the country finally having achieved the goal of becoming an advanced nation playing, while still constrained by the division of the peninsula, a global role in line with its economic standing. The article argues that this has been a constant theme in Korea's foreign policy since it was originally formulated in 1994 as part of the country's globalization policy. This addition of an intentional dimension, to the objective capabilities created during the previous decades, has increasingly resulted in the type of behavior associated with middle power status.
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| 3 |
ID:
165780
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| 4 |
ID:
181616
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper examines the role of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in enhancing political relations between China and its partner countries. We postulate that an international economic cooperation scheme such as the BRI may facilitate commercial exchanges and increase the participating countries’ economic gains. This should generate incentives for these countries to avoid political tensions that may jeopardize mutually beneficial economic exchanges, and to expand the constellation of domestic coalitions in support of cordial diplomatic and political relations. We test the effect of the BRI on bilateral political relations using data on political relations between China and 91 countries along the BRI route between 2006 and 2018. Treating the promulgation of the BRI in 2013 as a policy shock, our difference-in-difference analysis lends substantial support to our hypotheses. Further analyses of the underlying causal mechanisms suggest that the BRI bolsters political relations by strengthening economic ties with partner countries through trade and investment related to economic cooperation.
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| 5 |
ID:
048561
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| Publication |
Armonk, M. E. Sharpe, 1997.
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| Description |
xiv, 250p.
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| Standard Number |
0765601613
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 040323 | 337.159/HEL 040323 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 6 |
ID:
110103
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The emergence of the G20 leaders' meeting during the recent global financial crisis as the 'premier forum for international economic cooperation' reflects a significant shift of hegemony over global governance towards the emerging economies but does not challenge the authority or objectives of the international financial institutions. On the contrary, successive G20 initiatives, culminating in the adoption of the Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth in November 2010, reveal both a further strengthening of the already close institutional relationship between the G20 and the Bretton Woods institutions and a strong shared commitment to a developmental form of global liberalism. This article charts the ascendancy of emerging economy perspectives through the lens of the G20, maps their ties to the imf and other international organisations, sets out the content of the new global developmental liberalism, and assesses the implications of emerging economy hegemony for the advanced and the emerging economies, respectively.
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| 7 |
ID:
043973
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| Publication |
London, macmillan Press, 1977.
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| Description |
xii, 338p.
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| Standard Number |
0333211286
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 020623 | 337/LUA 020623 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 8 |
ID:
113182
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Over recent years, media, academic, and policy-makers' attention has focused on changes in the global order from a unipolar to a multipolar world. The emergence of the Group of 20 (G20) since 2008 as the 'premier forum for international economic cooperation', which includes a number of developed and developing countries, and its 'eclipse' of the Group of 8 (G8) summit are acknowledged as some of the most salient symptoms of this shift. This article takes the intensive period of 'G' summitry between 2008 and 2011 as a pertinent case study to begin to explore the concrete responses of key protagonists to this reconfiguration of the architecture of global governance specifically and thereby the recent shift in the global order more broadly. In the specific case of Japan, widely assumed to be a declining power, the article highlights both consistency and change in the responses of and strategies employed by Japanese policy-makers within 'G' summitry. Various theoretical positions can account for this to differing degrees which also bring into relief the ultimately contradictory trajectory of Japan's response to the changing global order.
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| 9 |
ID:
101976
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
HIT BY THE WORLD CRISIS, many countries and regional power centers are looking for additional opportunities in the sphere of international economic cooperation. But this same crisis also brings to light problems within familiar integration models, which need further consideration and resolution.
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| 10 |
ID:
159811
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| 11 |
ID:
127475
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
THE ST. PETERSBURG SUMMIT, which took place on September 5-6, became the culmination of the "Russian year" in the life of the G20, the main forum of international economic cooperation between its member states.
On the Eve of the Presidency
THE PROCESS of the formulation of the presidency's priorities and agenda began in the spring of 2012. The experience of our predecessors was closely studied, as was the experience of the Russian presidency at forums similar in scale and profile (the G8 in 2006, the SCO in 2008-2009 and APEC in 2012).
The definition of the presidency's priorities became a serious challenge to the Russian side. A large diversity of multi-vector trends in the development of the global economic and financial system, as well as in the evolution of the positions of the G20 participants had to be taken into consideration. There was also another factor that could not be ignored: The uneven implementation of the G20's previous decisions, which gives cause for periodic talk about the declining effectiveness of that forum and its role as one of the global governance mechanisms.
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