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1 |
ID:
129579
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
This article questions the effectiveness of EU efforts to prevent terrorism and violent radicalization as well as the future prospects of such efforts. Driven by the pressure of attacks, member states have agreed on a comprehensive strategy to prevent radicalization and recruitment into terrorism, but simultaneously the strategy traces the limits of EU authority in member states in this regard. Meanwhile, the European Commission has focused on indirect measures, such as research support, for counter radicalization. However, over time, both flexible cooperation among a subset of member states and new EU initiatives have generated only few or biased policy outputs. The Stockholm Programme renewed the ambition to prevent terrorism at an early stage and underlined the EU's role in evaluation and knowledge exchange. This article questions the resulting proposal to create a network of local or subnational actors for best practice exchange. The article argues that preventive counterterrorism relies on contentious scientific evidence and that authoritative evaluations remain tied to national policy-making. Finally, the EU Commission cannot mobilize sufficient resources to ensure that 'frontline' organizations, such as police services, implement new practices. Taken together, this limits the potential for depoliticizing multilevel governance approaches to terrorism prevention. The conclusions of this article raise further research questions on the use of knowledge and complex governance patterns in EU internal security.
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2 |
ID:
184116
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Summary/Abstract |
In this article, we investigate how the EU mobilises a spatio-temporal imaginary of the “local” in its counter-radicalisation activities as a means of navigating subsidiarity principles and expanding its remit as a “holistic security actor” (cf. Baker-Beall [2016]. The European Union’s fight against terrorism: discourse, policies, identity. Manchester: Manchester University Press). Extant work on the EU’s terrorism prevention efforts has focused on how the organisation constructs transnational terror threats that require supranational, EU-level responses. Our research makes an original contribution to these literatures by demonstrating how the EU also seeks to intervene “below” the level of the nation state. EU counter-radicalisation works directly with subnational actors in municipalities, cities, and frontline public services across Member States. Employing the first systematic analysis of the EU’s Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) outputs, we demonstrate how “the local” frames pre-emptive counter-terrorism interventions as “upstream”. “Closer”, or “localised”, reads as “earlier” in this discourse. We also unpack how EU institutions and Member States have voiced concerns about the circumvention of subsidiarity (through engagement with local actors across the Union), by criticising the “effectiveness” of RAN. While the European Commission has taken steps towards addressing these grievances, its proposals reflect a further renegotiation and repositioning of the EU as a security “facilitator” across spaces deemed simultaneously local and transnational.
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3 |
ID:
062363
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Publication |
New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
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Description |
258p.
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Standard Number |
1403965358
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
049732 | 327.73/ETZ 049732 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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4 |
ID:
045999
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Publication |
New York, Routledge, 2003.
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Description |
xxi, 274p.
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Standard Number |
0415946425
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
047008 | 363.32/GEO 047008 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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5 |
ID:
105170
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Publication |
2011.
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Summary/Abstract |
I develop a game-theoretic model of an interaction between an antiterrorist agency and a terrorist organization to analyze how the probability of a terrorist attack varies when the level of privacy protections changes. I derive two implications. First, privacy and security from terrorism need not be in conflict: when accounting for strategic interactions, reducing privacy protections does not necessarily increase security from terrorism. Second, and more important, the antiterrorist agency will always want less privacy. The very agency whose expertise affords it disproportionate influence on policy making will prefer a reduction in privacy protections even when that reduction harms security from terrorism. The analysis has implications for understanding the relationship between government powers and civil liberties in the context of terrorism prevention and times of emergencies more generally.
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6 |
ID:
132362
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
The article examines law-enforcement activities in 20 cases of terrorism and 38 cases of terrorism prevention, using published records. It proposes a seven-fold classification of police actions and examines which tactics were successful in identifying and apprehending perpetrators. Overall, in capturing those responsible for terrorist attacks, the most successful tactics were routine policing, the use of informers, and information provided by the public. Organized terrorism campaigns were most vulnerable to informers and surveillance, while the most effective tactics against lone wolves were witness identification and information from the public. The most successful terrorist preventions involved informers and surveillance.
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7 |
ID:
080876
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Publication |
2008.
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Summary/Abstract |
This study finds that the issue of preventing terrorist attacks has received surprisingly little attention by decision-makers and the news media, and only sporadic interest by pollsters. When it comes to homeland security, how to protect the nation and its people from actual attacks takes a back seat to press coverage of threats and other aspects of terrorism, particularly the administration's arguments for fighting the "war on terrorism" abroad as a means to prevent further terrorism at home. This inattention to the difficult task of preventing further catastrophic terror attacks by taking measures at home may affect the nation's vigilance as time has passed since 9/11.
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