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| 1 |
ID:
046015
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| Publication |
New Delhi, India Research Press, 2003.
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| Description |
xiii, 204p.
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| Standard Number |
8187943386
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 047024 | 327.54051/SID 047024 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
100346
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In June 2001, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). While the immediate focus of the organization was to combat the so-called 'three evils'-ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and international terrorism-the SCO's long-term viability and effectiveness in promoting regional stability and economic development depend on how member states build up common identity and cooperate on issues of mutual concern. This article looks at China's role in initiating the Shanghai-5/SCO structure within the broader framework of Beijing's foreign and security policy interests and priorities in Central Asia and seeks to examine both the prospects for and the potential obstacles to its efforts in achieving key objectives for this new regional organization: management of ethnic and religious unrest, including the fight against terrorism and separatism; maintenance of stable borders; development of energy resources; and promotion of economic prosperity. In addition, the article will also examine the extent to which Beijing has used the opportunity to exercise leadership and whether or not China can extend its influence to Central Asia using the SCO as a vehicle.
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| 3 |
ID:
065036
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| 4 |
ID:
076846
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2007.
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Despite unresolved territorial disputes, mutual suspicions over each other’s military buildup and strategic intent, potential economic competition, and the changing balance of power and realignments, China and India have enjoyed 10 years of mostly uninterrupted progress in their political, economic, and security relationship. President Hu Jintao’s November 2006 visit to India, the first such visit by a Chinese head of state in a decade, marked an important milestone in the bilateral relationship. During Hu’s visit, the two governments issued a joint statement highlighting a 10-point strategy to elevate the relationship and signed more than a dozen agreements to strengthen cooperation in trade, investment, energy, and cultural and educational exchanges.
Hu’s visit to India injected optimism and high expectations for Chinese-Indian relations, but the challenges ahead remain daunting. They include unresolved territorial disputes, mutual suspicions of each other’s intentions, and power realignments at the global and regional levels. The substance and consolidation of the bilateral relationship will depend on how the world’s most populous and fastest-growing states manage these challenges as they continue their ascent to great-power status. Moreover, as the world becomes increasingly affected by the rise of these two Asian powers’ phenomenal economic growth and political influence, how Beijing and New Delhi handle their bilateral relationship will be critical for regional and global peace and prosperity in the coming years
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| 5 |
ID:
077794
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Chinese nuclear doctrine is guided by the no-first-use (NFU) principle and strives to maintain an effective reliable and deterrent. For Beijing, the concept of deterrence has more of a qualitative rather than quantitative connotation. Labels such as minimum or limited deterrence do not capture the essence of Chinese doctrine, which is not defined by any numerical threshold, but by the level of sufficiency that guarantees a survivable, credible, and effective counter-deterrence and second-strike capabilities. Accordingly, China continues to regard nuclear weapons as largely political and psychological instruments, rather than for actual war fighting. The foundation of Chinese nuclear doctrine is increasingly being challenged, however, by growing U.S. nuclear primacy, the U.S. commanding lead in conventional weapons, especially precision-guided munitions, and the deployment of ballistic missile defenses. These developments threaten China's limited nuclear deterrence capabilities and raise questions about the viability of the NFU principle. How Beijing responds to such challenges will determine the future of its nuclear force modernization, the role of its nuclear weapons, and the prospects for nuclear disarmament.
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| 6 |
ID:
001555
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| Publication |
Kingston, Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1994.
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| Description |
xi, 112p.
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| Series |
Martello Papers; 7
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| Standard Number |
0889116792
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 036311 | 327.174/YUA 036311 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 7 |
ID:
072430
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| 8 |
ID:
055530
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