| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
150097
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| Summary/Abstract |
This report provides an assessment of the U.S. readiness posture to be able to design, develop, and produce new nuclear warheads or warheads with new military capabilities. Such a readiness posture is important to reduce risk over the long term for the United States and its allies. This report does not advocate any specific new nuclear capability. The focus is on a readiness capability and the steps needed to remediate a critical element of the U.S. security posture that, over the past two decades, has been documented repeatedly as being deficient. The report examines the policies of post-Cold War presidential administrations regarding maintaining a nuclear warhead design capability. In addition, it identifies capability shortfalls of the current U.S. nuclear enterprise and offers recommendations to address shortfalls—in particular, the intellectual capital on which the health of the current and future U.S. nuclear deterrent depends. Finally, it provides concrete recommendations to improve and preserve a U.S. nuclear readiness capability for the long term.
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| 2 |
ID:
131078
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| 3 |
ID:
115598
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| 4 |
ID:
154204
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| 5 |
ID:
131087
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| 6 |
ID:
154203
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| 7 |
ID:
141587
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| 8 |
ID:
119025
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| 9 |
ID:
119897
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
President Ronald Reagan proposed in March 1983 that the US scientific community develop the ability to shoot down ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads. He hoped to shift the international security environment away from a balance of terror, which was then commonly referred to as mutual assured destruction, to a more reliable deterrent strategy.
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| 10 |
ID:
127547
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| 11 |
ID:
176972
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| 12 |
ID:
071729
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| 13 |
ID:
123829
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| 14 |
ID:
121724
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
President Barack Obama last month outlined a nuclear arms control agenda for his second term, calling for negotiated arms reductions with Russia, a fourth nuclear security summit, and a renewed push for treaties banning nuclear testing and the production of fissile materials.
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| 15 |
ID:
146752
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| 16 |
ID:
133599
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
On November 5, 2013 Pakistan conducted its fourth test of the Hatf-IX (Nasr) short range battlefield 'nuclear' missile. To date there have been four flight tests of the missile system. After the first three tests (April 19, 2011, May 29, 2012 and February 11, 2013) Pakistan's Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) had put out identical press releases.1 These statements claimed that the missile had a range of 60 km and carried 'nuclear warheads (sic) of appropriate yield'. The ISPR statement following the fourth flight test of Nasr, a salvo firing of four missiles, was worded differently and did not repeat the claim that Nasr carried a nuclear warhead. Curiously, it referred to the missile's nuclear capability in a roundabout sort of way. The statement claimed that the missile 'contributes to the full spectrum deterrence against threats in view of evolving scenarios'.2
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| 17 |
ID:
164685
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| Summary/Abstract |
Before a nuclear warhead is dismantled, the special nuclear material and explosives must be identified and authenticated. This paper proposes a passive method to detect and identify weapons-grade plutonium cores and explosives in nuclear warheads based on neutron analyses techniques. This paper first describes the principles of a passive detection method that calculates the element number ratio (namely the ratio between the nucleus numbers of two different elements) of the element of interest to identify a source and how this method could be applied to the detection of warhead explosives. Second, a simulation of weapons-grade plutonium using JMCT software is described. The simulation assumes the elemental components of the explosives are activated by the production and transport of neutrons from the weapons-grade plutonium core and counted the gamma ray emissions of from the resultant hydrogen, carbon, and nitrogen nuclides with a high-purity germanium detector (HPGe) array. After an hour of counting, the element number ratios of these elements in the simulation were reconstructed and accurately matched the values for the explosives in the warhead. These results suggest that the passive method can be used to identify the presence of weapons-grade plutonium in the warhead. In addition, the simulation showed that the passive method can also discriminate between the various types of explosives in warheads, providing important physical information for the verification process during dismantlement.
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| 18 |
ID:
112021
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| 19 |
ID:
115341
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Soviet Union and its successor state the Russian Federation have consistently violated their arms control obligations since the beginning of modern arms control in 1972. The violations have involved all major nuclear arms control treaties, including those that limit strategic and theater nuclear arms and constrain nuclear testing. This pattern of behavior is certain to continue. As a result, the nuclear warheads on the Russian missiles apparently will have been tested in contravention of a declared nuclear test moratorium and Russia's legal obligations concerning the CTBT. There is almost never any consequence for these violations. These violations have clear military significance, and they should have an impact upon our views of arms control. Regrettably, they do not. The evidence is more often suppressed than provided to the American people and we continue to ignore it in our arms control policy.
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| 20 |
ID:
046136
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| Publication |
New York, Oxford University Press, 2003.
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| Description |
xii, 276p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
0199252424
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 046655 | 621.4833/ZAR 046655 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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