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| 1 |
ID:
046232
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| Edition |
2nd ed.
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| Publication |
London, Sage Publications, 2002.
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| Description |
xliii, 396p.
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| Standard Number |
0761940162
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 046011 | 327.174/GOL 046011 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
158850
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| Summary/Abstract |
The question of international cooperation on nuclear security presents states with a conundrum. While states are wary of the potential for cheating and opportunism that would favor more legalized agreements, highly legalized agreements also create the risk of being constrained in an agreement with which others might not comply, leaving one state vulnerable. How do states balance these competing incentives? Through the study of all arms control agreements concluded, negotiated, and seriously considered since 1945, this analysis finds that at least some aspects of the legalization parameters that would make commitments more credible and sustainable through the future—in particular obligation and to a lesser extent delegation—also make bargaining over the terms of cooperation more difficult, sometimes delaying if not altogether subverting that process. These findings have implications not just for how theories of institutional design and cooperation apply to nuclear issues but also for policies related to the conduct of arms control negotiations.
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| 3 |
ID:
170439
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| Summary/Abstract |
The study of arms control over the past century is replete with hundreds of books and reports which examined the need for, negotiation of, verification of, and continuation of arms control treaties and agreements. The literature is somewhat less voluminous on the study of compliance with arms control treaties, and smaller still with studies that explain why countries or leaders choose not to comply.
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| 4 |
ID:
154181
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| Summary/Abstract |
Prospects for U.S.-Russian arms control look dim. Even extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which is due to expire in February 2021, is in question. If the treaty reaches its end date with nothing to take its place, there will be no mutually agreed, verifiable limitations on strategic nuclear systems between the two countries whose arsenals make up more than 90 percent of the global total.
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| 5 |
ID:
033524
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| Publication |
Geneva, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1985.
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| Description |
viii, 95p.
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| Series |
PSIS occacional paper; no.2/85
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 026778 | 355.03/HAU 026778 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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