| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
094904
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2010.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This paper illustrates a new method to create supply curves for pollution abatement using boiler-level data that explicitly accounts for technology cost and performance. The Coal Utility Environmental Cost (CUECost) model is used to estimate retrofit costs for five different NOx control configurations on a large subset of the existing coal-fired, utility-owned boilers in the US. The resultant data are used to create technology-specific marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs) and also serve as input to an integer linear program, which minimizes system-wide control costs by finding the optimal distribution of NOx controls across the modeled boilers under an emission constraint. The result is a single optimized MACC that accounts for detailed, boiler-specific information related to NOx retrofits. Because the resultant MACCs do not take into account regional differences in air-quality standards or pre-existing NOx controls, the results should not be interpreted as a policy prescription. The general method as well as NOx-specific results presented here should be of significant value to modelers and policy analysts who must estimate the costs of pollution reduction.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
046276
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2003.
|
| Description |
xii, 204p.
|
| Series |
Issues in environmental politics
|
| Standard Number |
0719063868
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 046512 | 344.046/HON 046512 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
184086
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Using the concept of ‘hedging’, we explore how local cadres in China deviate from central policies in order to serve local interests and, while doing so, avoid being called to account by their superiors. Political signals enable cadres to decide when to invest more resources into the implementation of certain policies. In this way, they optimize their performance and avoid the political risks involved in failing to carry out their designated tasks. This article uses county Y as an example in a discussion of county-level implementation of policies related to economic growth and air pollution control. We find that local cadres weaken the functions of the superior ‘special inspection team’ (专项督察组, hereafter inspection team), treating them as political instruments used by the central and local authorities to ensure a greater level of responsiveness at the grass roots. Information concerning the imminent arrival of an inspection team in their locality acts as a signal for cadres to allocate more resources to the enforcement of air pollution control measures, thus maximizing their performance in this area. Through this research, we have endeavoured to provide a deeper understanding of the operating logic of Chinese local governments and the behaviour of county cadres.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|