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| 1 |
ID:
181815
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although the popular protests that swept across the Middle East and North Africa in 2011 were short-lived, their long-term consequences are still resonating through the region a decade after their outbreak. Islamist movements have been affected in different ways by the drastic change in the political, social and geographical contexts in which they historically operated, highlighting the need for a renewed examination of these changed circumstances. Based on the case study of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, we argue that three key factors need to be accounted for when studying Islamist movements in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings. These are the dimension of exile; the increased role played by women and youth; and the emergence of cross-generational and cross-ideological alliances. The article analyzes these three factors through a comparative study of responses by Muslim Brotherhood and Muslim Sisterhood members to repression across Egypt, Turkey and the UK.
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| 2 |
ID:
096522
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| 3 |
ID:
118266
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although Islamism is helping to shape political transitions in the Arab world, this does not foreclose the possibilities of democratization.
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| 4 |
ID:
163069
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| Summary/Abstract |
In recent years, several observers of Turkey have recognised a novel development in Turkish politics: the rise of Erdoganism. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s personality and style have come to embody the Turkish nation, the state and its economic, social and political institutions. But what is Erdoganism? What are its main attributes? Is it a mere ideology or the name of the emerging political regime in Turkey? While commentators have provided several observations of Erdoganism, it has not been duly examined on its own in the academic literature. This paper’s main premise is that in Turkey, a new political regime has emerged in recent years which can best be defined as Erdoganism. Erdoganism has four main dimensions: electoral authoritarianism as the electoral system, neopatrimonialism as the economic system, populism as the political strategy and Islamism as the political ideology. We first explain why we think Erdoganism is a better concept to define the emerging political regime in Turkey. We briefly discuss Sultanism, Khomeinism and Kemalism in order to produce a set of references for our discussion of Erdoganism. We then provide a thorough analysis, explaining the ways in which Erdoganism manifests itself through electoral authoritarianism, neopatrimonialism, populism and Islamism.
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| 5 |
ID:
190813
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002 with the promise of reforms to further democratic consolidation in Turkey. At that time, the AKP represented a rainbow coalition of individuals from the previous Islamist parties and many liberal democrats who were fed up with the failures of old secular political parties. The Turkish public shared their frustrations and overwhelmingly supported the AKP. Unfortunately, these reforms did not last. Today, it is indisputable that under the rule of the AKP, and more specifically, President Recep T. Erdoğan, Turkey has become an authoritarian state defined and shaped by one person. This article explores what these developments mean for the future of Turkish democracy as the country celebrates its centenary, and it includes an examination of whether Turkish political culture is supportive of such changes.
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| 6 |
ID:
106379
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
On 9/11, the global jihadist movement burst into the world's consciousness, but a decade later, thanks in part to the Arab Spring and the killing of Osama bin Laden, it is in crisis. With Western-backed dictators falling, al Qaeda might seem closer than ever to its goal of building Islamic states. But the revolutions have empowered the group's chief rivals instead: Islamist parliamentarians, who are willing to use ballots, not bombs.This article appears in the Foreign Affairs eBook, "The U.S. vs. al Qaeda: A History of the War on Terror." Now available for purchase.
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| 7 |
ID:
122410
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Militant Islamist Sayyid Imam's legal critique of Al Qaeda's anti-U.S. mass casualty terrorism holds great potential utility for counterterrorist messaging strategy. In this article, a jihad-realist Islamist theological-jurisprudential methodology is first defended as the means most productive for delegitimizing Al Qaeda among high value, religiously motivated recruits. Second, Sayyid Imam's specific allegations and detailed Sharia proofs against Al Qaeda are presented. Finally, implications are drawn for U.S. counterterrorist messaging focusing especially on the utility of wielding this theological-juridical approach as compared to other "counternarrative" approaches, and the vital need to accurately characterize Islamism and its relation to terrorism.
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| 8 |
ID:
175065
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This article analyzes counterterrorism (CT) measures that have been developed and implemented since the 2002 Bali attacks, paying special attention to the presidencies of Yudhoyono and Widodo. On the basis of anti-terrorism concepts, current findings of anti-terrorism research will be applied to the case of Indonesia, whereby we will distinguish between reactive and preventive measures and will show how they interact. Here, the revision of existing anti-terror laws carried out by the Indonesian Parliament in May 2018 will receive particular attention. As will be documented, in spite of the initially quite promising short-term effects of CT measures, the already strained relationship between the police and the military regarding jurisdiction has become even more critical in recent years. Since only a few religious or civil authorities have been included to a large extent in attempts to prevent terrorism, these measures are not likely to be as effective and lasting as they might have been.
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| 9 |
ID:
188970
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Milli Görüş political Islamic movement and the first political parties under its banner were founded and dominated by the Naqshbandis. Numerous scholars have so far suggested that political participation has led these groups to transform and moderate their former Islamist views over time. This study examines this possibility by scrutinising how Naqshbandi and Milli Görüş leadership perceive the state, essential political institutions such as the legislature, political parties, opposition, elections, and independent media, together with some defining issues in Islam such as jihad, excommunication, and al-wala’ wa-lbara’ (loyalty and disavowal). In particular, the study seeks to uncover how the Naqshbandi theological background has been turned into a political Islamist ideology through the influence of two important Naqshbandi shaykhs, Mehmed Zahid Kotku (1952–1980) and Mahmud Es’ad Coşan (1980–2001), and two leading Naqshbandi-affiliated Milli Görüş leaders Necmettin Erbakan and R. Tayyip Erdoğan to reveal if/to what extent Islamists’ participation in politics has transformed their Islamist views. As a methodology, content analysis and political discourse analysis have been used. The findings demonstrate a continuity of Islamist Naqshbandi thought in Milli Görüş leadership and that political participation has neither ‘democratised’ nor ‘moderated’ these parties and their radical Islamist thoughts.
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| 10 |
ID:
133705
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that the 'Arab Spring' has ended the long-standing US-Israeli common strategy of supporting pro-Western and semi-secular autocracies in the Arab world. During these tumultuous events Washington chose to support the rebellions to varying degrees, thus exacerbating Israel's concerns regarding the adverse regional implications attending this shift (notably the ascendance of Islamist regimes and the diversion of world attention from Iran's nuclear quest). By way of ameliorating such threats, the US needs to pursue a policy of supporting pro-democracy groups in the region while formulating a clear policy to deal with the threats from Iran and radical Islamist groups. All in all, the 'Arab Spring' has created a highly volatile strategic environment thus making Israel an even more valuable strategic ally for the US
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| 11 |
ID:
184173
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One of the most widely used and influential ways of creating foundational myths for authoritarian legitimation is to construct a necropolitical narrative around the significance of dying for the nation, homeland, state and the leader, i.e. martyrdom. Mbembe’s concept ‘necropolitics’ (the right of the sovereign to determine who shall live and who shall die) has been expanded to include the pollical instrumentalization of martyrdom narratives. However, the literature has not analyzed the necropolitical martyr-icons. This paper aims to address this gap by looking at two historical episodes in Turkey, one in the 1930s dominated by secularists and post-2016 dominated by Islamists.
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| 12 |
ID:
152021
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| Summary/Abstract |
Bangladesh is currently facing an incremental growth of radicalization. This radicalization can be traced back to the country’s early post-Independence years. Over time, political violence, ideological clashes between secular and right-wing ideologies, and weak governance have created conditions for the growth of radical Islam. The public rhetoric on corruption, weakening of democratic institutions, inadequate law enforcement agencies, fragile justice delivery system, fledgling educational and social institutions and growing unemployment provides further space for alternative narratives by extremist ideologues. Home-grown extremist outfits have received ideological and tactical supports from transnational terrorist network such as Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), but only in a limited manner. The supply and demand side of radicalization in Bangladesh has not yet been addressed by actors such as the government, private sector, civil society and media. The failures in multiple sectors in the state governance have led to a situation where IS and AQIS now see Bangladesh as a potential ground for exerting their supremacy as flag bearers of radical forms of Islam.
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| 13 |
ID:
172447
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| Summary/Abstract |
When the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was banned in Egypt in 1954, many of its followers and leaders found refuge and support in conservative Islamic countries, most notably in Saudi Arabia and Jordan. In the late 1950s, a Saudi diplomat approached the Swiss authorities with plans to open an Islamic Center in Geneva. From the beginning, the Swiss authorities welcomed the project, because it was supported by several pro-Western Arab countries, which opposed Egypt under Nasser. Swiss-Egyptian relations had been strained for some years because of Nasser’s socialist policies and Egypt’s espionage and propaganda operations in Switzerland. The Islamic Center eventually opened in 1960, and was headed by Said Ramadan, an exiled leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. Egyptian officials tried to thwart the Center’s activity and competed with it over influence on the small Arab student body then residing in Switzerland. As a politically active foreigner, the Swiss looked with suspicion on Ramadan. Still, they felt sympathy for his anti-Nasserist and anti-Communist stance, ignoring internal reports revealing the anti-Western and anti-Semitic nature upon his ideology. After 1966, the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs believed Nasser’s Arab nationalism to be in terminal decline, expecting that Islamists might soon come to power in the Middle East. As a result, they decided to allow Ramadan and his family to remain in Switzerland despite overstaying their residence permits. This article sheds light on the founding years of the MB in Europe, a development still largely unchartered by historians, and the reaction of the Swiss to the appearance of a new phenomenon in Europe: political Islam. It argues that the context of Swiss-Egyptian relations is essential for understanding Swiss actions toward the Muslim Brotherhood.
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| 14 |
ID:
118661
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The history of Gulf donorship, its trajectory and underlying motivations, continues to be an understudied aspect of foreign aid. While the Gulf Arab states are not new donors, their manner of regional coordination, branding, and aid management are distinct. Often helping fellow countries of the South, particularly Arab and Muslim countries, these countries have moved towards stronger private sector involvement and into social spending programmes. Owing to their oil wealth, Gulf Arab states' are increasingly generous and yet they are also cautious after 9/11 about how and by whom their aid is channelled. Nevertheless, with oscillations in oil prices, continued controversy over rising Islamism post-Arab-Spring, the future of Gulf aid remains a valuable subject of study.
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| 15 |
ID:
187045
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article aims to demonstrate the tension inherent within the Turkish opposition between those favoring technocratic anti-populism and/or pragmatic politics and those calling for a passionate and resolute anti-AKP platform seeking revenge. These competing inclinations offer alternate anti-populist platforms and ‘styles.’ The article asks whehter opposition to a populist regime inherently generates an anti-populist platform that ideologically confronts it. The article examines three contenders to President Erdoğan as representatives of three alternative anti-populist styles. It also reflects on the debates among various public intellectuals around the ways to electorally defeat populism.
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| 16 |
ID:
095295
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2010.
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The development of radical Islamist strategic thinking and the impact of post-modern, Western styles of thought upon the ideology that informs that strategy is often overlooked in conventional discussions of homegrown threats from jihadist militants. The propensity to discount the ideology informing both al-Qaeda and nominally non-violent Islamist movements with an analogous political philosophy like Hizb ut-Tahrir neglects the influence that critical Western modes of thought exercise upon their strategic thinking especially in the context of homegrown radicalization. Drawing selectively on non-liberal tendencies in the Western ideological canon has, in fact, endowed Khilaafaism (caliphism) with both a distinctive theoretical style and strategic practice. In particular, it derives intellectual sustenance from a post-Marxist Frankfurt School of critical thinking that in combination with an "English" School of international relations idealism holds that epistemological claims are socially determined, subjective, and serve the interests of dominant power relations. This critical, normative, and constructivist approach to international relations seeks not only to explain the historical emergence of the global order, but also to transcend it. This transformative agenda bears comparison with radical Islamist critiques of Western ontology and is of interest to Islamism's political and strategic thinking. In this regard, the relativist and critical approaches that have come to dominate the academic social sciences since the 1990s not only reflect a loss of faith in Western values in a way that undermines the prospects for a liberal and pluralist polity, but also, through a critical process facilitated by much international relations orthodoxy, promotes the strategic and ideological agenda of radical Islam. It is this curious strategic and ideological evolution that this paper explores.
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| 17 |
ID:
113241
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Concerned with a rising tide of religious radicalism within Pakistan, many observers have wondered why moderates do not speak out against militancy. This article explores that question, arguing that the term 'moderate' as used in Pakistan has conflicting meanings and is both more complicated and less useful as a tool of analysis than it once seemed. In particular, the inadequacy of extant definitions is best reflected in the reassertion of a radical Sunni Barelvi subculture and in the growing rift between some leading Islamist parties and the Pakistani Taliban. This article argues in conclusion that ideological factors are typically given undue weight in explaining why and when Pakistanis choose to 'speak out' against militancy and that a narrow, minimalist rendering of 'moderate' provides the most useful definition for those trying to understand the new fault lines emerging within Pakistani Islam.
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| 18 |
ID:
097323
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| 19 |
ID:
153872
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This article explores how Islamists and jihadists have framed issues pertaining to sovereignty, borders, as well as political and religious identity, over the last century. At a time when the territorial delimitations of several Arab countries seem more fickle than ever, it is necessary to address how Islamists and jihadists view the historical and contemporary aspects of borders and sovereignty. The Islamists, on the one hand—whose aim is creating a caliphate—have had to deal with unexpected realities, turning inevitably to some extent of reform of their original revolutionary ambition. The jihadists, on the other hand, while remaining committed to an armed struggle to unify Muslims worldwide, do not advocate for any action other than global insurrection. By focusing on the writings and discourses of major Islamist and jihadist leaders, it thus appears that the study of borders and sovereignty is indispensable to understanding the similarities and differences between the two ideologies. In addition, the study of borders and sovereignty allows for predicting developments in the region that largely pertain to the desire to achieve (jihadists) or amend (modern Islamists) the original revisionist design. It appears that borders, territory and sovereignty prove to be significant constraints for both Islamists and jihadists. Evidently, both Islamists and jihadists have reacted in diverging ways to the political and cultural realities that stand against their founding ideology—with certain Islamist movements having thus nationalized their doctrine, while jihadists still remain eager to achieve their original ambition.
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| 20 |
ID:
178561
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Terrorism connected to the North Caucasus has been pervasive in Russia between 1992 and 2018. Based on an original dataset, this article presents statistics on rates of terrorist attacks outside of the North Caucasus, their geography and targets, and the tactics used. It argues that terrorism by North Caucasian insurgents has long retained a strategic logic despite their conversion to radical Islamism. Accordingly, the end of North Caucasian terrorism was determined by the erosion of its strategic character as an increasingly vague ideological project replaced concrete political goals among the insurgents.
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