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| 1 |
ID:
004179
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| Edition |
2nd ed
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| Publication |
Essex, Longman, 1987.
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| Description |
x, 462p.; maps
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| Standard Number |
0582009871
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 031035 | R 341.42/DAY 031035 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
140082
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| Summary/Abstract |
Many studies have examined the formation of interstate rivalries, but few provide a theoretical mechanism capable of explaining why some neighboring states experience protracted conflict while others do not. To address this question, we theoretically link bargaining theories of conflict with issue-based explanations of conflict to offer a novel application of the commitment problem mechanism. We argue that when neighboring states disagree over border territory endowed with a potential source of power (i.e. strategic or economic value), it is difficult for either side to commit credibly in the future to comply with agreements made today. Consequently, neighboring states may be reluctant to make concessions that could enhance their adversary’s future bargaining power. This reluctance, in turn, increases the likelihood of bargaining failure, thereby also increasing the likelihood that the dispute festers and the relationship evolves into a rivalry. Using recently reported data on border settlement and three measures of rivalry, we find systematic evidence for our theoretical expectations. Unsettled borders increase the likelihood of rivalry onset. This relationship, however, seems driven by border territory containing strategic and economic endowments – the exact type of territory that theoretically drives commitment problems. We therefore conclude that not all territory matters for the onset of contiguous rivalries.
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| 3 |
ID:
120633
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
China has rapidly developed a sophisticated regionalism strategy in East Asia. Minimising the region's "China threat" perception has been a significant consideration in this strategy. Unfortunately, the ongoing escalation of tension concerning territorial disputes over the Diaoyutai / Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea, initiated by a series of high-profile naval exercises in the latter half of 2010, has reinforced the "China threat" perception and bolstered the hedging strategies of countries in the region. China is aware of its relative disadvantage, and it has been keeping its options open while allowing ASEAN to maintain the initiative.
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| 4 |
ID:
157016
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New Delhi, KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, 2016.
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| Description |
xxiii, 260p.: ill.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9789383649891
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059265 | 327.51/HAS 059265 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
108559
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| 6 |
ID:
087275
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite a longstanding focus on the systemic distribution of power in the study of international relations, scholarship during the past 20 years increasingly emphasizes the role of domestic politics in foreign-policy-decision making. This simulation enables participants to experience negotiating an international issue-a territorial dispute between two fictitious states, Chinazambia and Boliviafranca-in the context of this "two-level game" between domestic and international environments. The simulation furnishes a vantage point from which students can assess realist, liberal, and alternative theoretical perspectives on international relations as they affect policy making. The simulation is flexible and can be executed under a variety course contexts, as well as time and participation constraints. Additionally, the simulation provides ample opportunity for a number of enriching postsimulation activities.
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| 7 |
ID:
103938
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Social network analysis is used to show that underlying systemic structure made war more likely to spread in 1914 than earlier in the century. The changing network density of three diffusion processes is seen as crucial-alliances, interstate rivalries, and territorial disputes. The findings show that the density of each of these factors increased in the system in varying degrees from 1900 to the end of 1913. How the three diffusion processes interacted with contiguity to make the local war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia spread to become a world war is explained both theoretically and historically.
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| 8 |
ID:
177821
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The prospect of U.S. military involvement in a regional war looms large in Chinese naval strategy. This article examines the Chinese Navy’s evolving role in countering U.S. military intervention in a conflict over Chinese-claimed offshore islands. This role has both wartime and peacetime aspects. In peacetime, the PLA Navy serves a deterrence function, demonstrating China’s ability and resolve to fight the U.S. military if the U.S. were to intervene. In wartime, the operations of the PLA Navy would sit at the heart of any maritime campaign, helping to achieve China’s territorial objectives in spite of U.S. involvement.
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| 9 |
ID:
132468
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Putin's exploitation of the tension between the principles of non-intervention and self-determination is in the tradition of great-power interaction with international law. But Russia's interpretation sets dangerous precedents.
Crimea is Russia's. The March 2014 referendum and Russia's subsequent annexation of Crimea are now events of history, even while the territorial borders and political future of the rest of Ukraine remain contested. Yet, as international attention has moved from Sevastopol to Kiev and more recent crises elsewhere, a key balance between two of the most fundamental principles of the post-Second World War international legal and political order remains at stake.
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| 10 |
ID:
046403
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| Publication |
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002.
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| Description |
xvii, 488p.
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| Series |
Cambridge studies in international relations; no.82
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| Standard Number |
052180115X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 046464 | 341.42/HUT 046464 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 11 |
ID:
127771
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2014.
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Fresh water has no substitute, and its availability has been declining sharply around the globe. In Asia, China's role as a multidirectional and transborder water provider is unmatched. Analysis of China's behavior towards its transboundary rivers is therefore pivotal. By examining three different case studies-the Mekong River in Southeast Asia, the Brahmaputra River in South Asia and the Irtysh and Ili Rivers in Central Asia-this article seeks to lay the theoretical groundwork for understanding China's behavior. It pits previously applied realist rationales against the more recent notion of desecuritization strategies and makes a case for the latter. While desecuritization implies non- or de-escalation, it does not necessarily mean genuine long-term cooperation. The future of Asia's shared waters may thus be a contentious one.
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| 12 |
ID:
183446
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| Summary/Abstract |
The author considers the development of Taiwan's position on historical claims to the waters, islands, skerries, and resources of the South China Sea under international law. The article compares the approaches of Taiwan's two leading political parties (Nationalist and Democratic Progressive) to substantiating the country's claims on the natural resources and adjacent waters. The reasons for the emergence and disappearance of the concept in Taiwanese law of "historic waters" to which the jurisdiction of the Republic of China (Nationalist China) should presumably extend are discussed in detail. Special attention is given to Taiwan's measures for the "effective occupation" of two islands (Taiping and Pratas) in the South China Sea. Changes in Taiwan's official position under different administrations are analyzed. While agreeing on everything where Taiping Island is concerned, the Nationalist and Democratic Progressive parties differ over all other pieces of land in the South China Sea. De facto correspondence of the foreign policy positions of Mainland China and the Nationalists, stemming from ideas of a common Chinese identity, is revealed in examining approaches to interpreting the notorious "U-shaped line." The Progressive Democrat-ic Party's attitude toward the South China Sea is due to the Taiwanese identity of its supporters. An obvious contradiction is noted: On the one hand, the Progressive Democrats proclaim the sovereignty of Taiwan (the Republic of China) over all islands in the South China Sea while supporting the unity of the "two shores of the Strait" on the issue of China's territorial integrity. On the other, it pragmatically recognizes the impossibility of actually exercising its nominal sovereignty over the disputed territories, and its doubtfulness from the viewpoint of international law. Nuances in Taiwan's attitude toward the Hague Tribunal's verdict on the Philippines' suit against China, reflected in a number of government statements, are examined in detail. Reasons for the Tribunal's refusal to recognize Taiping Island, the largest in the Pratas group, are identified.
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| 13 |
ID:
183958
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| Summary/Abstract |
The literature on ethnic kin-groups primarily focuses on their role in perpetuating conflict. Less attention has been devoted to how ethnic kin-groups might encourage mediation in disputes affecting their kin in other nations. We argue that transborder kin-groups’ collective concern for the welfare of their fellow members in other states can motivate interstate mediation efforts. Utilizing the Ethnic Power Relations and the Issue Correlates of War datasets, we examine how transborder kin-group connections shape the likelihood of mediation, as well as who provides it. Our findings suggest that the deeper the network of transborder kin-group connections among target states of territorial disputes, the more likely mediation is to occur. Alternatively, challenger transborder kin-group connections reduce the likelihood of mediation. While transborder kin-group connections help explain the likelihood of mediation, mediation is often not provided by the connected third-party state. Instead, these connections promote mediation from international organizations, particularly regional organizations.
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| 14 |
ID:
171228
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| Summary/Abstract |
Sovereignty over territory is the founding principle of international legal order and essential for the implementation of the sovereign rights of a State. Territorial disputes become commonplace among countries, mainly when bilateral agreements do not explicitly demarcate them. India and China are two Asian giants when it comes to population and economy. The recent cross-border tension between India and China has at its vortex the issue of the Doklam plateau region which shares borders with three countries namely India, Bhutan, and China and is popularly known as the “Tri-Junction.”
The present article re-visits the history of the Indo-China border dispute and tries to explain the legal aspects of border disputes under international law. It closely analyzes the principles applicable to these disputes and the decisions of various international institutions that are relevant. Furthermore, the article examines bilateral agreements to understand the possible violations and consequences under international law. It is argued that the peaceful co-existence between India and China must be of paramount importance to ensure Asian security and well-being. Keywords: India, China, Bhutan, Doklam, Territorial Disputes.
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| 15 |
ID:
153608
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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), more popularly known as “drones,” have become emblematic of twenty-first century military technologies but scholars have yet to convincingly explain the drivers of UAV proliferation. Using the first systematic data set of UAV proliferation, this research note examines the spread of UAVs in the context of scholarly debates about interests versus capacity in explaining policy adoption. The results yield important insights for both IR scholarship and the policy-making community. While countries that experience security threats—including territorial disputes and terrorism—are more likely to seek UAVs, drone proliferation is not simply a function of the threat environment. We find evidence that democracies and autocracies are more likely than mixed regimes to develop armed UAV programs, and suggest that autocracies and democracies have their own unique incentives to acquire this technology. Moreover, supply-side factors play a role in the UAV proliferation process: a state's technological capacity is a strong predictor of whether it will obtain the most sophisticated UAVs. The theories and evidence we present challenge emerging views about UAV proliferation and shed useful light on how and why drones spread.
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| 16 |
ID:
092203
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2009-2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
How is East Asia responding to the rising China? Pertinent literature suggests that explicit balancing or containment has been rare and engagement, if not appeasement, appears to be East Asia's modus operandi. Yet, this study argues that certain, though subtle, variations are nevertheless discernible among the regional states in their responses to China's ascent. Focusing on 15 East Asian states for the period of 2004-2007, the article first presents a bird's-eye view of East Asia's responses to the rise of China. More specifically, inter-state variations are empirically demonstrated and four principal patterns-bandwagoning, hesitant hedging, active hedging and balancing-are distilled from the key responses of these 15 nations. The article then examines the sources of these inter-state variations, and argues that they are conditioned largely by three factors: alliances with the United States, regime characteristics and territorial disputes with China. The article concludes with some observations as to East Asia's complex responses to the rise of China and their security implications for the region as a whole.
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| 17 |
ID:
131257
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2014.
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The dispute over ownership of islands, maritime boundaries, jurisdiction, perhaps as much as 100 billion barrels of oil equivalent, and other nonliving and living marine resources in the East China Sea continues to bedevil China-Japan relations. Historical and cultural factors, such as the legacy of World War II and burgeoning nationalism, are significant factors in the dispute. Indeed, the dispute seems to have become a contest between national identities. The approach to the issue has been a political dance by the two countries: one step forward, two steps back. In this article I explain the East China Sea dispute, explore its effect on China-Japan relations, and suggest ways forward.
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| 18 |
ID:
015440
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Winter/Spring 1993.
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| Description |
261-320
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| 19 |
ID:
122013
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Maritime disputes in Eastern Asia have been sending odd ripples of excitement through Western Europe for the past few years. Experts and policymakers claim that Europe cannot stay aloof. Some speculate that China might cut off trade routes in the event of a conflict and that Europe needs to collaborate with the United States to keep them open. A few go so far as to say that Europe's credibility as a security actor hinges upon the ability to send gunboats to the Pacific, and that it should build on the grand maritime tradition of member states such as the United Kingdom. Others assume that the European model of regional integration could be a way of settling the wrangling over the South China Sea. Maritime disputes in the East are, to be sure, a source of much uncertainty, and could escalate. But is this a reason for Europe to dive into the play pool of the Pacific powers?
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| 20 |
ID:
148238
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study assumes that the EU can contribute to a constructive transformation of regional conflicts in the South China Sea. To prove this assumption, the author investigates the process of the EU’s influence inside and outside the regional cooperation and integration frameworks and also examines three different pathways of influence on regional integration and conflict transformation, i.e., compulsion, social learning and changing context, and model-setting effects. The South China Sea case illustrates that the current frameworks of regional cooperation and integration in East Asia are not likely to offer possible solutions to manage the present regional security threats. Even though the EU is hardly a determinant actor at the moment, the author concludes that a long-term prospect of spillover effects through growing economic interdependence, coupled with a certain level of social learning, may legitimize further interaction and thus the EU could have a positive role to play in the future.
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