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ID:
100982
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| 2 |
ID:
046459
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| Publication |
Washington, D C, Brassey's, 2000.
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| Description |
187p.
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| Standard Number |
157488252X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 045107 | 355.33041/REG 045107 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
122552
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The U.S. Navy has an integrity problem in the ranks of its commanding officers (COs). Consider these headlines: "Cruiser CO Relieved for 'Cruelty.'"1
"CO Fired, Charged with Solicitation."2
"CO of Attack Sub Fired for 'Drunkenness.'"3
These are just a few cases in a recent deluge of early reliefs of "skippers."
In 2010, twenty-three Navy COs were relieved of command and "detached for
cause," an enormous increase over previous years. The trend continues: twentyone commanding officers were fired in 2011 as of the end of October.4
Even more
worrisome is the fact that a large and increasing percentage of those dismissals
are due to personal misconduct, such as sexual harassment, drunkenness, and
fraternization. Although (as far as we can tell) over 97 percent of the Navy's
commanding officers conduct themselves honorably, the increasing number of
those who do not raises concerns that the Navy must address. Alarms should be
sounding at the highest levels of Navy leadership, but
a review of recent literature reveals only a trickle of
discussion on the subject of personal misconduct by
military commanders. Instead of calling the service to
action, a Navy spokesman said in January 2011 that
there was "no indication that the reliefs are the result
of any systemic problem."5
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| 4 |
ID:
115007
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the absence of a credible numbers-based theory of counterinsurgency there
can be no objective, numbers-based assessment for Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM. The U.S. military nonetheless has attempted to conduct a numbersbased assessment process. Thus, when a new commander and staff take over duties as a regional command in Afghanistan, they inherit an operations assessment process riddled with highly visible flaws that emanate from the improper
use of numbers and flawed logic. While no assessment process can be perfect or
free of any criticism, the flaws the author observed during a six-week stint
in-country are sufficiently egregious that they seriously reduce the value those
assessments provide to commanders' decision support. In addition, the visibility of these flaws means
that military assessments, and by association the military commanders, are rightfully distrusted by higher
civilian authority and by other organizations within
the theater. It is therefore imperative that incoming
commanders and staffs taking over responsibilities for
regional commands address these flaws to improve
decision making and to earn the trust of higher civilian authority and organizations with whom they have
to work.
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| 5 |
ID:
076548
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