| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
047119
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 2001.
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| Description |
341p.
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| Standard Number |
817304366X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 044364 | 355.0209546/KRI 044364 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
047266
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| Publication |
London, routledgeCurzon, 2003.
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| Description |
ix, 173p.
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| Standard Number |
041530797X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 047099 | 327.5405491/CHA 047099 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
088509
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Kargil conflict can be categorized as a 'limited war'. It was initiated by Pakistan to achieve mixed military and political objectives, but made important misjudgments that doomed the enterprise to failure. The questions discussed in this article are: why was India surprised; why did both countries observe such great restraint; did the Kargil conflict have a nuclear dimension; and is 'limited war' a viable concept with nuclear deterrence obtaining in South Asia. It also argues that the Kargil conflict was an exception, in some dimensions, to the 'stability-instability paradox'.
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| 4 |
ID:
046569
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| Publication |
Colombo, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, 2001.
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| Description |
218p.
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| Standard Number |
8173044058
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 045050 | 327.5405491/CHA 045050 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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