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1 |
ID:
169334
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Summary/Abstract |
Armed conflict in outer space could happen in two scenarios: first, a state may rely on relevant data obtained from the satellites to strengthen the effectiveness of its military action and second, a state may use either space-based or ground-based space weapons to attack a military target. Legally speaking, the above two scenarios constitute the use of force as defined in international law rules. From jurisprudential point of view, the extension of the right to self-defense to armed conflict in outer space provides a potential legitimate basis for the use of force in outer space, which is indirectly confirmed in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. In view of the potentially serious consequences arising from armed conflicts in outer space, general principles and rules in international humanitarian law (including the limitation principle, the distinction principle, and the proportionality principle), together with the soft law rules and draft conventions arising from the ongoing regulatory efforts, shall provide a basic regulatory framework for armed conflict in outer space.
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2 |
ID:
118871
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3 |
ID:
137582
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4 |
ID:
154508
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Publication |
Geneva, ICRC, 2016.
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Description |
94p.pbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
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Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
059138 | 355.8/SWI 059138 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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5 |
ID:
161340
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Summary/Abstract |
In so far as the nuclear-weapons possessors do not accept the Ban Treaty, practically it will not reduce nuclear weapons nor abolish them as a matter of law. However, if the treaty is accepted by an overwhelming majority of states, it will significantly strengthen the norm against the nuclear weapons. A norm binds everybody irrespective of legal acceptance of a treaty. Thus, it exposes any violator to the risk of international punishment. The Ban Treaty will help bring the movement towards nuclear abolition forward and reduce incentives to own nuclear weapons. The international humanitarian law that was the main basis for the Ban Treaty needs to be upheld firmly. The set of norms under international humanitarian law will serve to limit the justifiable cases where nuclear weapons can ever be used. The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation must be sustained even after the Ban Treaty comes into force.
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6 |
ID:
146671
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Contents |
This article examines the approach and relationship of the ICRC to International Criminal Law. It argues that the International Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC) position navigates between normative support, collusion and institutional restraint. The ICRC has shaped some of the foundations of contemporary criminal justice, through its early focus on the implementation of International Humanitarian Law (e.g., through implementation and prosecution of “grave breaches”) and its role as “gentle modernizer” of the law. But it has at the same time kept a critical distance towards International Criminal Law. Its approach is marked by three cardinal principles: structural independence, strategic engagement and systemic support. It is grounded in the distinct roles of the ICRC (guardianship, protection, advocacy and dissemination) and deeper structural challenges in the relationship between International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law. This contribution argues for a re-conceptualization of some of the existing approaches. It claims that it is unhelpful to theorize on the relationship between the ICRC and International Criminal Courts and Tribunals (ICCTs) on the basis of the premise that International Humanitarian Law provides a set of primary rules that are enforced through criminal institutions, or complemented by secondary rules under International Criminal Law (e.g., war crimes law). It may be more appropriate to view the ICRC and ICCTs as part of a polycentric legal system that is built on a plurality of interactive normative structures and governed by certain checks and balances.
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7 |
ID:
104796
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Publication |
Frankfurt, Peace Research Insititute Frankfurt (PRIF), 2010.
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Description |
38p.
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Series |
PRIF report no.95
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Standard Number |
9783942532051
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
056057 | 341.481/HER 056057 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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8 |
ID:
184199
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Summary/Abstract |
Can armed groups socialize combatants to norms of restraint – in essence, train soldiers to adopt norms of international humanitarian law on the battlefield? How can social scientists accurately measure such socialization? Despite being the central focus of organizational and ideational theories of conflict, studies to date have not engaged in systematic, survey-based examination of this central socialization mechanism theorized to influence military conduct.
This study advances scholarly understanding by providing the first comparative, survey-based examination of combatant socialization to norms of restraint, using surveys and interviews with US Army cadets at the US Military Academy (USMA), Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and active duty Army combatants. Additionally, to better understand ‘restraint’ from combatants’ perspective, this study introduces the concept of the ‘combatant’s trilemma’ under which combatants conceptualize civilian protection as part of a costly trade-off with the values of military advantage and force protection.
Survey results hold both positive and negative implications for socialization to law of war norms: military socialization can shift combatants’ preferences for battlefield conduct. However, intensive norm socialization may be required to shift combatants’ preferences from force protection to civilian protection norms. Study findings hold significant implications for understanding violence against civilians in conflict and for policies to disseminate civilian protection norms in armed groups worldwide.
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9 |
ID:
125059
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
The paper analyzes the principal provisions of the effective legislation in the field of international humanitarian law, and outlines the trends that ensure compliance with legal regulations in this area during armed conflicts.
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10 |
ID:
102379
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Publication |
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010.
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Description |
xi, 219p.
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Standard Number |
9780521760485, hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
055799 | 341.67/CUL 055799 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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11 |
ID:
110906
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
It is sometimes suggested that even if certain measures in self-defense violate jus in bello (international humanitarian law), such measures can be continued by justifying them on the basis of jus ad bellum (international law regulating the resort to force), in particular by justifying that the measures were necessary and proportionate in relation to the initial armed attack. However, State practice, decisions of international courts and arbitration, and opinions of experts indicate the contrary, that if the measures in self-defense violate jus in bello, those violations cannot be ignored or nullified by justifying the measures as necessary and proportionate self-defense. Once the measures in self-defense violate jus in bello, they must be ceased immediately.
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12 |
ID:
149648
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Summary/Abstract |
Since its emergence in 2003 Anonymous has become an increasingly prominent actor on the international stage. Anonymous is an online collective comprising like-minded individuals that commit cyber-attacks against state and non-state actors that are allegedly involved in the abuse of fundamental human rights. In recent years Anonymous has demonstrated a preparedness to commit cyber-attacks against parties to an armed conflict and the cyber-attacks launched against Israel during its 2014 armed conflict with Hamas are such an example. Using Anonymous’s cyber-attacks against Israel as a lens, this article evaluates the status of online groups under international humanitarian law when they become embroiled in armed conflict and in particular under what circumstances members of these groups can be made the object of attack under the laws of targeting.
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13 |
ID:
125956
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
LANKIEN, South Sudan-The wounded started arriving in the evening. A rusted-out pick-up truck dropped off four young men with gunshot wounds, two with life-threatening wounds to the abdomen and the others with leg injuries, at the 100-bed Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital here. Just hours earlier, the hospital's team and local residents had been playing volleyball as the sun began to set on a 106-degree day.
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14 |
ID:
090360
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
This article investigates how - by breaking with the historical double standards regarding civilian protection in conflicts - by the end of the twentieth century, US warfare has come to comply with International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Yet, civilians are still being killed. This has sparked controversies over what constitutes legitimate targeting practices and as to whether higher levels of civilian protection could be achieved. Through an engagement with these debates, including an exploration of the evolution of the norm of non-combatant immunity with specific reference to US warfare, the article argues that IHL does not provide fully satisfactory answers to these issues as it is too permissive in relation to the killing of civilians. The article proposes that more stringent moral guidelines, such as those underpinning the idea of 'due care', have the potential to go much further in providing protection for the innocent in war.
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15 |
ID:
104797
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16 |
ID:
095605
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17 |
ID:
178270
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Summary/Abstract |
Advanced surveillance systems can autonomously identify military targets. A consequent automated decision to attack without human assessment and authorisation of the action will almost certainly be in breach of international law. Separating decisions and actions identifies the role of machine-made decisions and the human ability to assess them and to authorise action. High autonomy levels in a weapon system place new responsibilities on organisations and personnel at all stages of procurement and use. In this article, Tony Gillespie builds on recent UN expert discussions to propose that detailed legal reviews at all procurement stages, including pre-development, are needed to ensure compliance with international law. Similar reviews are also needed for automated systems in the decision-making process.
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18 |
ID:
114001
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Publication |
New York, Oxford University Press, 2010.
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Description |
xxviii, 657p.Pbk
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Standard Number |
9780199641215
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
056687 | 343.01/GIL 056687 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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19 |
ID:
120599
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Publication |
Geneva, International Committee Of the Red Cross, 2011.
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Description |
3vol.set; 508p.Hbk
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Contents |
Vol.1: Part I-Outline of International Humanitarian Law
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Standard Number |
9782940396122
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:1,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
057313 | 341.6/SAS 057313 | Main | On Shelf | Reference books | |
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20 |
ID:
120600
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Publication |
Geneva, International Committee Of the Red Cross, 2011.
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Description |
3vol.set; 511p.-1623p.Hbk
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Contents |
Vol 2: PartII-Cases and Documents
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Standard Number |
9782940396122
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:1,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
057314 | 341.6/SAS 057314 | Main | On Shelf | Reference books | |
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