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| 1 |
ID:
020645
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| Publication |
2001.
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| Description |
113-142
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| 2 |
ID:
087044
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
From 1961 to 1963, an interagency debate took place within the Kennedy administration as to whether to use persuasion or more coercive means in order to multilateralize nuclear safeguards, that is, to make the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the administrator of safeguards on bilateral nuclear exports from the United States. Persuasion as a general rule was deemed preferable, in order to make the many states that had misgivings about IAEA safeguards accept multilateralization. The coercion-persuasion debate followed years of trying to establish a "common front" among Western nuclear suppliers with regard to nuclear safeguards. Disagreement about the intrusiveness of the system proved a major obstacle, but eventually a common position reflecting the need to take international opinion into consideration was agreed. The adoption of the first IAEA safeguards document in 1961 created for the first time a common standard for the application of safeguards. This was a prerequisite to the U.S. policy of transferring to the IAEA the administration of safeguards on bilateral nuclear agreements. The resulting multilateralization of safeguards laid the groundwork for the IAEA to become the universal safeguarder in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons-an unforeseen outcome, since at the outset, IAEA safeguards were perceived as a "holding operation" while waiting for a disarmament agreement.
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| 3 |
ID:
010639
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| Publication |
April 1995.
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| Description |
13-16
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| 4 |
ID:
016459
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| Publication |
July-Aug 1993.
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| Description |
39-42
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| 5 |
ID:
077378
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Centrifuges used to enrich uranium utilize an electric motor to spin the rotors to high speeds. The current flowing in these motors emits electromagnetic radiation. This article presents a model that estimates the strength of the radiation as a function of distance from the centrifuge plant. It discusses the dependence of the radiative power on the size of the plant, the noise sources at the frequencies at which the motors operate, and means of detecting the signal from a centrifuge enrichment facility. According to the findings, a plant running 1,000 P-2 type centrifuges emits electromagnetic radiation that should be detectable in a 0.5-3 kilometer range in the absence of shielding.
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| 6 |
ID:
004324
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| Publication |
Houndmills, Macmillan, 1990.
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| Description |
xi, 272p.
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| Standard Number |
0333471261
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 035085 | 355.825119/HOW 035085 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 7 |
ID:
010234
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| Publication |
Dec 1995.
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| Description |
12-15
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| 8 |
ID:
149602
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article presents a novel application of an inspection game to find optimally efficient nuclear safeguard strategies. It describes a methodology that allocates resources at and across nuclear fuel cycle facilities for a cost-constrained inspectorate seeking to detect a state-facilitated diversion or misuse. The methodology couples a simultaneous-play game theoretic solver with a probabilistic model for simulating state violation scenarios at a gas centrifuge enrichment plant. The simulation model features a suite of defender options based on current International Atomic Energy Agency practices and an analogous menu of attacker proliferation pathway options. The simulation informs the game theoretic solver by calculating the detection probability for a given inspector-proliferator strategy pair. To generate a scenario payoff, it weights the detection probability by the quantity and quality of material obtained. Using a modified fictitious play algorithm, the game iteratively calls the simulation model until Nash equilibrium is reached and outputs the optimal inspection and proliferation strategies. The value the attacker places on material quantity and quality is varied to generate results representative of states with different capabilities and goals. Sample model results are shown to illustrate the sensitivity of defender and attacker strategy to attacker characteristics.
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| 9 |
ID:
012693
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| Publication |
Oct 1997.
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| Description |
1087-1106
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| 10 |
ID:
013709
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| Publication |
1992.
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| Description |
33-46
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| 11 |
ID:
009426
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| Publication |
Fall 1995.
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| Description |
43-48
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| 12 |
ID:
067589
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| 13 |
ID:
062871
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| 14 |
ID:
166464
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| Summary/Abstract |
One of the first pieces of legislation addressing the UK's departure from the EU/Euratom to complete its passage through Parliament is the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018, which will enable the government to establish a domestic nuclear safeguards regime. This was driven by the need to prevent vulnerability to a vital energy system and indicates the short to medium term approach the UK has to its policymaking post-Brexit: dealing with issues immediately impacted, such as ensuring the continued supply of nuclear fuel. The contribution of this paper is the examination of two particular areas under the responsibility of Euratom – nuclear safeguards and radiation protection – that are presented to indicate the wider impact Brexit has in other areas currently the responsibility of the EU, for example, chemical safety. It shows that the UK has significant gaps in responsibility currently undertaken by Euratom (or other EU institutions) that need to be filled by UK bodies. Which bodies will assume these responsibilities and what resources will be available remain open questions. This case study highlights the need for systematic prioritisation by the UK government when filling the void of EU/Euratom institutions.
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| 15 |
ID:
020042
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| Publication |
Summer 2001.
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| Description |
102-110
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| 16 |
ID:
057274
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| 17 |
ID:
051485
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| 18 |
ID:
015947
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| Publication |
April 1993.
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| Description |
3-6
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| 19 |
ID:
010456
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| Publication |
Winter 1996.
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| Description |
69-78
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| 20 |
ID:
010232
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| Publication |
Dec 1995.
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| Description |
22-25
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