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| 1 |
ID:
189731
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| Summary/Abstract |
NATO has reaffirmed crisis management as one of its ‘core tasks’, even as it strengthens collective defence amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and specifically refers to the need to learn from Afghanistan. Henrik Larsen argues that NATO needs to face the uncomfortable realities that can explain the failure of its most ambitious and deadliest operation in its history. Given that the Afghanistan experience makes a strong case against crisis management, he argues that NATO should refine its definition: ‘crisis’ synonymous with the prevention of inter-state conflict rather than diffuse threats such as global terrorism; and ‘management’ synonymous with over-the-horizon rather than open-ended operations or the supply of weapons like the case of Ukraine.
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| 2 |
ID:
100624
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| 3 |
ID:
138790
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russia’s annexation of Crimea, invasion of Donbas, and continued threats to Ukraine and other European countries not only menace the stability of the post-Cold War order in Europe, but also pose a fundamental challenge to the assumptions about the strategic environment that have undergirded the NATO alliance for the past quarter of a century.
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| 4 |
ID:
104705
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| 5 |
ID:
106794
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
From the late 1970s and until the end of the Cold War, the 'High North' constituted a central theatre for military forces. Extensive NATO preparations were made, a solid infrastructure developed in northern Norway, and frequent and large-scale exercises were carried out. These developments, from the late 1970s, were much discussed by scholars and strategists. However, the change of perception, laying the foundation for the military build-up, had actually occurred a decade earlier, in the late 1960s. This change has not yet been given its rightful attention, partly because the relevant documents have only recently become available. This essay takes the chronology of events back into the 1960s and to NATO's secret discussions between the national Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Staff. The most significant turning-points were the Flexible Response strategy of 1967; SACLANT's concern over increased Soviet naval activity and his 'Maritime Strategy' studies of 1965 and 1967; NATO's awakening to the Soviet SSBN threat in 1967; and the concept of 'External Reinforcement of the Flanks' of 1968 - finally followed by the 'Brosio Study' (named after the then NATO Secretary-General) of 1969. As a consequence of these developments NATO's 'tactical northern flank' was set to become an independent strategic theatre.
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| 6 |
ID:
053961
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| Publication |
Frankfurt, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), 1991.
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| Description |
57p.
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| Series |
PRIF Report;22
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 041441 | 355.031/SCH 041441 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 7 |
ID:
047314
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| Publication |
Oxford, Clio Press, 1994.
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| Description |
v8 (xxxv, 283p.)
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| Standard Number |
1851091556
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 044743 | 016.355031/WIL 044743 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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