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| 1 |
ID:
186761
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| 2 |
ID:
159189
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| Summary/Abstract |
Cyberspace is an avenue of approach through which a military force can attain objectives of value. Through these cyber avenues of approach, military forces can engage, vet, organize, and direct human agents to accomplish specific activities. Although the objectives of these activities could differ from traditional military objectives, they still have military relevance. This particular manifestation of cyber conflict is neither a new domain of war nor something outside of warfare. Rather, it can be viewed as an emerging avenue of approach in the larger context of military operations, auguring benefits in the integration of cyber activities with operations.
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| 3 |
ID:
124684
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
When chief of army staff (COAS), General Bikram Singh took over as the head of the 13 lakh strong army on 31 May 2012, he was conscious of the extraordinary circumstances that had preceded his elevation. His predecessor, in his public fight with the government over his age row, had wittingly or unwittingly harmed the army grievously. The manpower, which is the real asset of any professional army, had been compelled to take sides: for or against the army chief, General V.K. Singh. Was their chief working for the army or simply for himself, was the question being discussed, in hushed voices, at all levels, from senior officers' enclaves, to formation and unit messes, junior commissioned officers (JCO) messes, and soldiers' langars. When the senior-most officer becomes suspect, the other officers could no longer remain above board.
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| 4 |
ID:
098732
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| 5 |
ID:
130810
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| 6 |
ID:
160360
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The convergence of telecommunication and computer technologies that has evolved in the field of information and communication technologies (ICT) in the last two decades has had very important effects on new war technologies and the ongoing process of battlefield digitisation. The Stuxnet worm, uncovered in 2010 and responsible for the sabotaging of a uranium enrichment infrastructure in Iran, is a clear example of a digital weapon. The incident shows what is meant by cyber war and what the particular features of this new warfare dimension are compared to the conventional domains of land, sea, air and space, with relevance both at the operational and strategic levels. But cyberspace also extends to the semantic level, within the complimentary field of information warfare involving the content of messages flowing through the Internet for the purposes of propaganda, information, disinformation, consensus building, etc. The overall cyber warfare domain needs to be put into perspective internationally as many countries are developing strong cyber capabilities and an ‘arms race’ is already taking place, showing that these technologies can potentially be used to undermine international stability and security. What is needed is a public debate on the topic and its impact on global stability, and some kind of regulation or international agreement on this new warfare domain, including an approach involving confidence building measures (CBMs).
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| 7 |
ID:
157466
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| 8 |
ID:
138792
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| Summary/Abstract |
When it comes to cyber war, the United States is ambivalent. While persuaded of the utility of offensive cyber operations, it dreads where they might lead. The advantages of cyber war are swamped by the disadvantages if it cannot be kept under control – and there are nagging doubts about whether it can. That computer systems are often interconnected and ultipurpose,
and that there are no sharp ‘firebreaks’ in cyber war, compounds the dangers of escalation to unintended levels and effects, including the disruption of critical civilian services. In a crisis or war, the United States might, despite misgivings, feel compelled to attack computer systems that enable the enemy to strike US forces, only to find itself engaged in cycles of attack and retaliation that produce more pain than gain.
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| 9 |
ID:
113382
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| 10 |
ID:
131942
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| 11 |
ID:
132478
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Nothing remains, neither the state nor wealth nor valour without the security provided by the armed forces. -- S H Ukraniti
Cyber space and the possibility of Cyber war, as it emerged in the late 1980s got mixed up with Information War (IW)/ Electronic War (EW). This led to numerous definitions of lW/EW/cyber war, and most definitions, instead of clarifying the issue, only created further confusion. For the purpose of this paper, the latest definition of cyber space, promulgated in the USA in 2010 being the most comprehensive, has been adopted. It defines cyber space as, "A global domain within the information environment consisting of the inter-dependent network of information technology infrastructure and resident data, including the Internet, tele-communication networks, computer systems and embedded processors and controllers." This indicates that there is a physical domain of hardware, and an information domain of software. How we deal with the information or data resident in this domain to deceive the enemy/cyber criminal becomes part of the third domain-
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| 12 |
ID:
166918
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| Publication |
New York, Harper Collins Publishers, 2010.
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| Description |
xiv, 306p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9780061962240
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 056019 | 355.343/CLA 056019 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 13 |
ID:
112577
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| Publication |
New York, Harper Collins Publishers, 2010.
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| Description |
xiv, 290p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
9780061962233
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 056530 | 355.343/CLA 056530 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 14 |
ID:
129819
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| Publication |
New York, Harper Collins Publishers, 2010.
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| Description |
xiv, 306p.Pbk
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| Standard Number |
9780061962240
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 057703 | 355.343/CLA 057703 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 15 |
ID:
105609
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| 16 |
ID:
133995
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Nuclear deterrence and cyber war are often discussed as separate worlds of research and military-strategic practice. To the contrary, a certain degree of overlap between nuclear deterrence and cyber conflicts is a plausible expectation for several reasons. First, future deterrent challenges will include regional nuclear arms races accompanied by competition in information technology and other aspects of advanced conventional command-control and precision strike systems. Second, cyber-attacks may be used against opposed nuclear command-control systems and weapons platforms as well as against infrastructure for the purpose of mass disruption during a crisis or war. Third, cyber capabilities support escalation dominance or escalation control, depending on the objectives of states and on the transparency of identification for cyber friends and foes.
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| 17 |
ID:
167296
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States must take the lead in reconfiguring nuclear deterrence to withstand cyber war.
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| 18 |
ID:
120288
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The information systems controlling our critical infrastructure are vulnerable to cyber attack. Cyber war is therefore inevitable unless we improve our cyber defenses. The only way to do this is by building security into systems at the design stage.
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| 19 |
ID:
111149
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| Publication |
2012.
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For almost two decades, experts and defense establishments the world over have been predicting that cyber war is coming. But is it? This article argues in three steps that cyber war has never happened in the past, that cyber war does not take place in the present, and that it is unlikely that cyber war will occur in the future. It first outlines what would constitute cyber war: a potentially lethal, instrumental, and political act of force conducted through malicious code. The second part shows what cyber war is not, case-by-case. Not one single cyber offense on record constitutes an act of war on its own. The final part offers a more nuanced terminology to come to terms with cyber attacks. All politically motivated cyber attacks are merely sophisticated versions of three activities that are as old as warfare itself: sabotage, espionage, and subversion.
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| 20 |
ID:
132291
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2013.
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| Description |
xvi, 218p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
9788182747562
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 057804 | 355.343/RID 057804 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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