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| 1 |
ID:
093562
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the potential impact of U.S. disarmament leadership on the nuclear diplomacy of North Korea and Iran, the "defiant states." The first part of the article introduces the concept of "interaction capacity," which measures a state's integration into international society, based on its physical communication systems and its adoption of shared norms. The theory predicts that lower levels of interaction capacity will generate a greater propensity for nuclear defiance, as the affected states reject and try to resist integration pressures. In the second and third parts of the article, this conceptual framework is applied to the cases of North Korea and Iran. The analysis suggests that efforts to reassert U.S. disarmament leadership could increase the alienation of North Korea and Iran, leading to provocation and escalation of nuclear tensions. The final part of the paper explores the policy implications of this analysis for the potentially defunct six-party talks, for hopes of renewed negotiations with Iran, and for the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
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| 2 |
ID:
093557
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This special section examines the disarmament dynamics being generated by President Barack Obama and other world leaders in their advocacy of a nuclear-weapon-free world. It explores the responses of five groups of states (nuclear weapon states, threshold states, advocacy states, holdout states, and defiant states) to the new disarmament momentum, assessing whether a global consensus on-and concrete progress toward-nuclear elimination is likely. The main goals of this special section are: to generate scholarly debate on this important subject (the literature has tended to focus on understanding proliferation rather than disarmament dynamics); and to examine the potential consequences of reinvigorated disarmament leadership for the upcoming Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which will be held in New York City in May 2010.
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| 3 |
ID:
131602
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2014.
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This article explores whether the IAEA intelligence apparatus is being stymied by divisions between IAEA member states over how to respond to cases of non-compliance. The first part of the paper charts the key developments in the Department of Safeguards since the early 1990s - all of them authorized by the Board of Governors - that have increased the Secretariat's technical ability and legal authority to acquire and analyze evidence of illicit nuclear activities. The second part of the paper explores some of the political difficulties associated with implementing this expanded mandate and using it to hold states to account, drawing primarily on the IAEA Syria file. This case study indicates that however technically proficient and proactive IAEA monitoring becomes, reliable intelligence will not necessarily improve the global nuclear governance unless member states accept IAEA intrusiveness and develop a common understanding of proliferation threats and the need to deal with them decisively.
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| 4 |
ID:
187515
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On 22 January 2021, the first legally binding international agreement to comprehensively prohibit nuclear weapons entered into force. The agreement, known as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, or “Ban Treaty”) is an important step on the long road to the elimination of nuclear weapons, an expression of solidarity toward that goal. But the Treaty has been roundly rejected by the world’s nuclear-armed states, which claim it will never become part of customary international law due to their persistent objector status, and which continue to value nuclear weapons as security providers in a world of changing power dynamics and strategic uncertainties. This rejection severely limits the Treaty’s impact: regardless of the Treaty’s other strengths and weaknesses, for as long as the nuclear weapons possessors and their nuclear-dependent allies refuse to accept its prohibitions, it cannot play a practical role in taking disarmament forward.
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| 5 |
ID:
064927
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| 6 |
ID:
093561
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article assesses the impact of the U.S.-led disarmament agenda on the disarmament diplomacy and policies of the three nuclear-capable states not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)-India, Israel, and Pakistan. These states, often referred to as "NPT holdouts," undermine the application of the NPT obligations on all parties. Universality of the treaty framework has long been considered vital to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime and consolidate non-nuclear norms. But can new U.S.-led disarmament momentum create the necessary dynamics to encourage the holdouts to disarm, or is this wishful thinking? This article argues that sustained disarmament momentum from the Western NWS will not be enough-a more comprehensive approach to disarmament is needed, including a genuine commitment by all NWS to engage in transparency and reductions, and full nuclear compliance and cooperation by Iran.
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| 7 |
ID:
087043
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam recently announced that they are launching nuclear energy programs, and Malaysia and the Philippines soon may follow suit. As a result, by 2020, at least three states in Southeast Asia could possess latent nuclear capabilities-the option to pursue military applications of dual-use nuclear technology. Analysis of the nuclear programs, domestic proliferation pressures, and the external threat environment in Southeast Asia leads the authors to conclude that the nuclear intentions of states in that region are entirely peaceful and the probability of future nuclear breakout there is low. However, this finding does not justify complacency. In the long term, the benign outlook for regional security may change, and in the near term weak regulatory regimes present serious challenges to nuclear safety and create opportunities that non-state actors may exploit. To minimize these risks, the authors recommend creating a "proliferation firewall" around the region, which would combine strong global support for Southeast Asian nuclear energy programs with innovative regional multilateral nuclear arrangements.
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| 8 |
ID:
191946
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Canberra, CNND, 2015.
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| Description |
xxv, 305p.pbk
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| Standard Number |
9780987487919
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 060436 | 327.1747/EVA 060436 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 9 |
ID:
047658
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| Publication |
Great Britain, Royal Institute of international Affairs, 2000.
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| Description |
xii, 124p.
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| Standard Number |
186203110X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 043632 | 355.825119/HOW 043632 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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