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| 1 |
ID:
146943
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| 2 |
ID:
149059
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper explores China’s responses to mega-regional negotiations, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. By examining Chinese elite discourse, the policy-oriented study finds that China’s approach is related to the domestic political debate on a “second WTO accession” and China’s strategy toward the changing regional architecture.
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| 3 |
ID:
089128
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since 1996, China has become a net importer of crude oil, currently the second-largest consumer in the world after the United States and the third-largest importer of oil after the United States and Japan.
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| 4 |
ID:
104566
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| 5 |
ID:
047680
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| Publication |
Huntington, Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2000.
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| Description |
xviii, 303p.
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| Standard Number |
1560728442
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 043714 | 327.73051/YAN 043714 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 6 |
ID:
099671
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| 7 |
ID:
177657
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| Summary/Abstract |
This contribution argues that, without an ethical operational code, scholars’, policymakers’, businesspersons’, and citizens’ policy positions simply become expedient reactions to
perceived problems, opportunities, and interests. Without
ethical footing, policies as a whole will lack coherence, staying power, and persuasive force. Key elements of an ethical
operational code include: philosophical grounding and core
values, concepts of social and historical development, and
rules of thumb derived from an individual’s experience. Providing several examples of China-related policy issues which
would benefit from the ethical operational code approach,
this essay then discusses the analytic elements of an operational code. It concludes by arguing that, in the context of
US-China relations, individuals should develop ethical constructs characterized by patience, more carrots than sticks,
and more open doors than high walls. In what is emerging as
an increasingly ideologically polarized domestic and foreign
policy circumstance in the United States and in U.S.-China
relations, the starting point for an individual needs to be
self-reflection concerning what they believe and why
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| 8 |
ID:
097027
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The author uses content analysis to examine the European Union's (EU's) policy on relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait from 1996 to 2009. During this period, the EU devoted increasing amounts of attention to this flashpoint in East Asia. For geographical reasons, theEU has fewer strategic interests in this region than the United States. Therefore trade and economic interests are high on the EU agenda. Nonetheless,these interests can only be secured if there is peace and stability between the two sides of the Strait. The entry of new member states into the EU since 2004 may have influenced its policy on cross-Strait relations. The firm adherence to democratic values among EU member states is the main reason behind the incessant friction between these states and China. This culminated in the abrupt canceling of the eleventh Sino-EU summit meeting by Beijing in protest at the Dalai Lama's tour of Europe in 2008.Thanks to the change of government in Taipei in May that year, a new era of reconciliation with Beijing has begun. This gives China a free hand to tackle other issues of interest. Also, China has sufferedmuch less from the recent global financial crisis than either the United States or Europe. Yet there is too much at stake for both China and the EU for them to be at odds with each other in the long run.
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| 9 |
ID:
172524
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This article examines Nakasone Yasuhiro’s policy toward China as a politician, including his remarks in the Diet before appointment as prime minister as well as exchanges with Chinese leaders during his prime ministership. Nakasone raised Japan-China relations to a level called a “honeymoon” in the 1980s, at which time the four principles of Japan-China relations were shared and there was the prospect of continued friendly relations into the 21st century. Behind the emergence of this era was not only Japan’s support for China’s economic development through ODA, but also the closeness of the stances that both Japan and China held toward the Cambodia and Korean Peninsula issues at the end of the Cold War. This may have been because there was the possibility for both parties to share information and mutually support each other. Nakasone actively talked not only with Hu Yaobang but also leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang. However, as Nakasone’s partner Hu Yaobang was dismissed and the Cold War approached its end, the “honeymoon” between Japan and China came to an end, and the four principles by Nakasone and Hu gradually became just one frame of history.
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| 10 |
ID:
092712
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| 11 |
ID:
130627
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| 12 |
ID:
141008
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| Edition |
1st ed.
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Lancer Publishers and Distributors, 2015.
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| Description |
x, 428p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9788170623076
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058320 | 327.20954/KAP 058320 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 13 |
ID:
090503
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| 14 |
ID:
152257
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 2016 Prime Minister Najib overcame challenges that many predicted would destroy him. The crisis, however, has helped to deepen many of the fault lines in Malaysian politics and society, and to promote public apprehension. Much will now depend on the resilience of the country’s institutions and economy.
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| 15 |
ID:
187211
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NATO has promised to address China as “an alliance” but struggles to define underpinning principles. This article explores NATO's policy options and prospects. It traces the evolution of NATO China policy from 2017 on; assesses NATO's ability to pull China under its resiliency policy regime; and evaluates NATO's capacity to address wider issues of global order. The article concludes that NATO is not able to develop a politico-military strategy in line with classical alliance policy. Instead, NATO has pursued an incremental alignment policy to nourish its internal consensus and stave off the dire prospect of leadership abdication. Pushed by China's implicit support for the war in Ukraine, NATO must now become more politically explicit about China, global order, and NATO's approach to it.
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| 16 |
ID:
088584
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| 17 |
ID:
140526
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China’s rise poses two broad challenges for U.S. foreign policy: how to deter the People’s Republic from destabilizing East Asia and how to encourage it to contribute to multilateral global governance. Although China is not yet a military peer competitor of the United States, it has become powerful enough to challenge U.S. friends and allies in East Asia and to pose serious problems for U.S. forces operating there. And although China is still a developing country with significant domestic problems, it has become an important enough actor that its cooperation is necessary to solve global problems such as nuclear proliferation, climate change, and international financial instability.
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| 18 |
ID:
152148
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| Summary/Abstract |
The “One China Principle” proclaims that both Taiwan and mainland China are inalienable parts of a single “China”, whereof both governments claim to be the true and legitimate representatives. As both governments are striving for unification of both the territories, both uphold the One China policy, which asks that countries seeking diplomatic relations with the mainland People’s Republic of China must break off diplomatic relations with the Republic of China in Taiwan and vice versa. With the US President Donald Trump first questioning this principle and then retracting from his stated position vis-à-vis Beijing’s blunt and aggressive reaction, the consequent scenario may further push ahead the already declining American power and hegemony in the world and may also aggravate the ongoing Sino-US competitive race towards global hegemony.
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| 19 |
ID:
137784
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| Summary/Abstract |
Why does Ma Ying-jeou pursue a China-tilting policy when US–PRC relations become more competitive after 2010? Indeed, the president's mainland policy has gone far beyond the strategic requirements to satisfy international pressures for a stable cross-strait relationship. According to neoclassical realism, domestic politics acts as ‘intervening variables’ through which systemic imperatives are translated into a state's foreign policy response. Based, in part, on this author's interviews in Taiwan, this paper contends that due to Taiwan's internal political divisions on the ‘one China’ issue, elected leaders strive for their own nation-building projects, which, in turn, generate policies that undermine Taiwan's national security. Since 2008, the KMT tries to reshape Taiwan's identity through the rehabilitation of the ROC as the legitimate ‘one China’. Though Ma's rapprochement with Beijing on the basis of the ‘1992 consensus’ has contributed to cross-strait stability, his embrace of a China-centric national identity has also placed the administration increasingly at odds with Taiwan's public which gave the KMT a resounding electoral defeat in Taiwan's local elections of November 2014. As Taipei becomes more aligned to the PRC, its security ties with America and Japan could be compromised.
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| 20 |
ID:
099593
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