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ID:
047732
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| Publication |
Dhaka, Academic Press and Publishers Limited, 2000.
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| Description |
xvi, 207p.
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| Standard Number |
9840801597
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 043930 | 303.690959/SAB 043930 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
133774
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
U.S. politicians often work the topic of oil import independence into their campaign rhetoric as an ideal that would help separate U.S. economic prosperity and military responsibility from the volatility of Middle Eastern politics. In theory, oil independence would mean that events such as the Iranian revolution or internal political unrest in key Arab oil producers would have much less direct impact on the flow of oil to the United States, and thus U.S. prosperity (even if, in a global market for oil, the price impact of any supply disruption is shared by all consuming countries). More importantly, intra-state conflicts such as the Iraq-Iran war or the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait would not necessarily require large-scale U.S. military involvement to ensure oil production and exports to the United States and its allies. This linkage between U.S. oil import dependence and military commitment to the Gulf region has given rise to a myth favored by policymakers, markets, and the public that if the United States could attain oil independence, we could also reduce our military responsibilities around the world. Recent and ongoing changes in both the oil sector and in political-military strategy are for the first time in forty years combining in a manner that is leading some to believe this story could come true.
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| 3 |
ID:
058548
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ID:
082142
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the motivations that push individuals to join and remain in insurgent groups. Though I consider the Colombian guerrillas, these findings are not necessarily case-specific. I argue that socio-psychological motivations at the individual level may be the most significant reason for joining, surpassing in importance grievance-based, ideological and even economic motivations. Moreover, I find that the lack of cohesion inside the Colombian guerrillas may boost economic motivations, further weakening insurgents' commitment to the pursuit of political power, and to the improvement of the socio-political position of those they claim to represent. This type of research contributes to a greater understanding of those in armed groups and it provides insights for developing focused recruitment prevention programs. It also contributes to the growing literature that explores the meaning and character of insurgencies, and possibly terrorist organizations
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