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| 1 |
ID:
051907
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| 2 |
ID:
113758
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
What determines how US economic sanctions affect the international trade conducted with their targets? This article develops a liberal-based explanation for why economic sanctions increase their targets' trade with some third parties and decrease it with others. It is theorized that the effects of defense pact alliances between sender and third-party states are conditional upon the strength of the third parties' commercial dependence upon the target states. Third parties will cooperate with senders when the costs are low, but use their alliance relationships as cover to sanctions bust when the commercial benefits are high. This suggests that the United States can best gain the support of allies whose cooperation matters the least, while the allies whose support is most important tend to sanctions bust. It is also theorized that a target state's allies trade more with it than its nonallies. An empirical analysis of ninety-six episodes of US-imposed sanctions supports these hypotheses.
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| 3 |
ID:
152050
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ID:
184863
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| 5 |
ID:
179933
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study analyzes the effects of the economic sanctions imposed against North Korea since 2016 on the economic well-being of North Korean cities. As a proxy for economic well-being, we use nighttime light (NTL), which is estimated from 1992 to 2019 through an inter-calibration process for DMSP/OLS and SNPP/VIIRS. We found that the total NTL growth rate of 25 major cities decreased after 2016, but that NTL itself was still getting brighter until 2009. The declines in the NTL growth rates of Pyongyang, the capital city, as well as cities bordering China and self-regenerating cities, were relatively slight. By contrast, the declines in the NTL growth rates of coal-mining cities and inland cities without sufficient production bases were greater than those in other cities. Cities in regions relying on coal-mining have traditionally accounted for a large portion of North Korea’s exports, and since they are heavily affected by sanctions, coal mining could become a vulnerable sector, which would threaten North Korea’s economic well-being.
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| 6 |
ID:
100947
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Nearly every international arms embargo has been systemically violated by arms exporting states. Although much work has been done exploring why states transfer arms, little has been done to answer the question of why states choose to violate arms embargoes. Earlier studies have found that states transfer arms to one another for a variety of economic and strategic reasons. This study constructs a time series cross-section data set to test whether the same interests that drive dyadic arms transfers also influence the likelihood and size of arms embargo violations. Using a two-stage model of dyadic arms transfers, this study finds that measures for arms import dependence and alliance portfolio similarity best predict the likelihood and size of arms embargo violations. These results provide evidence that state decisions to violate embargoes are driven by political interests more than economic interests.
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| 7 |
ID:
170627
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since China’s economic rise, there has been an upsurge of cases demonstrating that the country has translated its increasing economic capabilities into political influence over other states. The focus of this paper is to investigate the case of China’s economic sanctions on South Korea in response to its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) deployment. Its goal is to deepen our understanding of how China has employed economic coercion in order to alter the policies of other states. China’s economic sanctions have included intentional ones like the Hallyu ban, a ban on tourism, non-tariff measures, the shutting down of Lotte Marts, and the fomenting of anti-Korean sentiment in its official media. There is however insufficient evidence to prove that these boycott movements and reductions in direct investment on the part of Chinese companies are government-mandated sanctions and not simply the choice of individual actors. Our findings indicate that due to its asymmetrical interdependence on China, South Korea was more vulnerable to economic sanctions and thus more likely to make political concessions.
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| 8 |
ID:
165347
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There is some consensus in the literature that economic sanctions targeting authoritarian regimes are less effective than those against democratic regimes. This line of research, however, assumes that autocratic regimes are monolithic and that they have similar capacities to resist foreign pressure. This study argues that the success rate of sanctions against dictatorships is contingent on institutional differences across different types of autocracies. I develop a theoretical model indicating that single-party and military regimes are less likely to concede to foreign pressure compared to democracies. This is because they effectively use various repressive tactics and positive inducements to endure the costs of the coercion. Sanctions against personalist regimes, on the other hand, are likely to be as effective as sanctions directed at democracies. Personalist regimes might be inclined to acquiesce to foreign pressure due to their lack of strong institutional capacity to weather the costs of the sanctions. Results from the selection-corrected models show that sanctions against military or single-party regimes are less likely to induce concessions relative to democratic target regimes. The findings also indicate that there is no significant difference in the success rate of sanctions against personalist regimes and democratic governments.
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| 9 |
ID:
085443
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Does economic coercion increase or decrease government respect for human rights in countries targeted with economic sanctions? If economic sanctions weaken the target regime's coercive capacity, human rights violations by the government should be less likely. If, on the contrary, sanctions fail to attenuate the coercive capacity of the target elites and create more economic difficulties and political violence among ordinary citizens, the government will likely commit more human rights violations. Focusing on competing views of why sanctions might improve or deteriorate human rights conditions, this article offers an empirical examination of the effect sanctions have on the physical integrity rights of citizens in target countries.
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| 10 |
ID:
109215
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 2010, Taiwan's president, Ma Ying-jeou, explained the rationale for his country signing a major economic cooperation treaty with mainland China with the following statement: "We can handle diplomatic isolation, but economic isolation is fatal." This essay will make the argument that in the case of North Korea, the opposite is true: Economic isolation appears fairly manageable for Pyongyang, but diplomatic sanctions may in fact enhance a broad coercive strategy significantly.
This argument will be framed within the broader claim that in particular in the case of North Korea, sanctions have been conceptualized too narrowly-they have been viewed as economic coercion only. Instead, the argument is made that sanctioning states should consider the entire spectrum allowed under Chapter VII, Article 41 of the UN Charter.
The discussion in this article will be limited to the case of North Korea for reasons of space and the urgent need to address the deteriorating security situation on the Korean Peninsula, given the country's rise to quasi-nuclear power status. In light of this development, the sanctions regime currently in place needs to be reevaluated. A reorientation towards diplomatic sanctions will allow for a broader coercive strategy that is mindful of nuclear deterrence but goes beyond economic sanctions, which have not been successful in restricting Pyongyang's military-strategic objectives.
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| 11 |
ID:
056593
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| 12 |
ID:
090982
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The question of how to deal with so-called rogue states, especially those trying to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD), is currently of central importance to the world. Advocates of military action, who predominated immediately after 9/11, have lost credibility in recent years. Yet they have claimed one clear success: Libya's decision to renounce WMD in late 2003. The Bush administration believed that this decision was based largely on fears of US military action. This essay, in contrast, argues that other factors were crucial, notably the impact of years of economic sanctions and the lure of economic incentives. Thus the Libyan case, far from supporting a military approach to "rogue states," in fact argues for a patient policy of diplomacy and economic carrots and sticks.
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| 13 |
ID:
062590
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| 14 |
ID:
023111
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Autumn 2002.
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| Description |
647-651
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| 15 |
ID:
139781
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| Summary/Abstract |
The author takes on China's economic diplomacy, a key area of that country's foreign policy in the 21st century that includes economic rewards and coercion. She addresses, in particular, the measures Beijing is taking to make other countries heavily dependent on China. The author also discusses the significance of aid China offers in an effort to advance its foreign policy goals.
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| 16 |
ID:
116492
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article carries a two-fold argument. First, Beijing's economic sanctions against Vietnam during the period 1975-1978 were mainly motivated by its desire to punish Vietnam for an anti-China policy that smacked of ingratitude for the latter's past assistance, fuelled further by Hanoi's closer relations with Moscow. They were also designed to extract Hanoi's accommodation of China's demand for territorial boundary concessions and to halt the persecution of ethnic Chinese residents in Vietnam. Second, the resultant meltdown of Sino-Vietnamese relations, as well as the making of the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance between 1975 and 1978, was gradual and contentious rather than swift and decisive as most existing studies contend. Hanoi's reluctance to forge a formal military alliance with the faraway Soviet Union against China was largely driven by the importance of China's remaining aid and economic potential to Vietnam's post-war economic reconstruction and the uncertainty of the Soviet commitment to aid Vietnam.
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| 17 |
ID:
116619
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
China's opposition to economic sanctions is legendary. Beijing has repeatedly leveraged its permanent seat in the UN Security Council to criticize, ameliorate, and on rare occasions veto UN economic sanctions such as against Myanmar (2007), Zimbabwe (2008), and Syria (2011 and 2012). Unilateral sanctions by the United States come in for particular criticism. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei recently said that "China is against one country putting their domestic laws above international law and placing unilateral sanctions on another country."1 This familiar rhetoric, however, masks a subtle but significant shift in China's own use of economic sanctions. With the world's largest capital surplus and its second largest economy, a highly coveted domestic market, and a currency with growing regional appeal, Chinese strategists are exploring new ways to deploy China's own economic might for strategic benefit.
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| 18 |
ID:
187358
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Though reciprocity is an important aspect of coercive diplomacy, little is known about whether and when sanctioned countries (i.e., targets) respond to foreign pressure with their own counter-sanctions. The purpose of this article is to offer a comprehensive analysis of the conditions under which targets are more likely to employ economic counter-measures against their senders. Analyzing data for sanctions reciprocity episodes in the Threats and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) dataset, we find that targets with wealthier economies, less democratic regimes, or higher trade dependence on their senders are more likely to initiate reciprocal sanctions. Our findings also denote that sanctions reciprocity is more likely when targets are subject to sanctions by senders with poor economies or when the issue that instigates the initial sanctions is less salient. As the first cross-national, quantitative analysis of sanctions reciprocity, our analysis provides a more complete picture of how strategic ties between senders and targets unfold, and why some sanctions are more likely to fail or result in stalemate due to counter-sanctions employed by targets.
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| 19 |
ID:
182558
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Economic sanctions constrain targets’ capacity to maintain essential goods imports from foreign suppliers. This research points out that target states may respond to this adverse effect of sanctions by redirecting the resources invested to secondary goods imports to essential goods imports. In addition, I suggest that the availability of this strategy significantly varies across sanctions instruments. When facing foreign aid sanctions, targets may be able to effectively reallocate their import funding to sustain foreign supply of essential items. However, when they are subject to trade sanctions, such a response is not readily available. In the data analysis with 150 countries from 1974 to 2006, I utilize foodstuffs as a proxy of essential goods and provide evidence that targets under foreign aid sanctions transfer their import funding to maintain adequate amount of food aid. Yet, I find no evidence that targets subject to trade sanctions also respond with the same manner.
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| 20 |
ID:
056735
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