Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
179544
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Summary/Abstract |
This article provides a comprehensive analysis of Ukraine’s adoption of four decommunisation laws in April 2015, their implementation and the controversy they generated. The first section analyses changes in Ukrainian memory politics prior to 2014. In 2006, the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (Ukrainskyi Instytut Natsionalnoi Pamiat—UINP) was established but given meagre resources by President Viktor Yushchenko; pro-Russian political forces were opposed to both the Holodomor recognised as a genocide and official recognition of the Ukrainian resistance movement. The second section provides an analysis of Ukraine’s decommunisation process which was made possible by: the Euromaidan Revolution; collapse of pro-Russian political forces; election of a large pro-European parliamentary coalition; and the impact of Russian military aggression on Ukrainian attitudes to Russia and Ukrainian national identity. Together these four factors reduced opposition and energised those who supported decommunisation. In the third section we argue that six criticisms of Ukraine’s decommunisation raised by Western and Ukrainian scholars were exaggerated and misplaced.
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2 |
ID:
070923
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Publication |
2006.
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Summary/Abstract |
Brussels cannot indefinitely insist that Kiev pursue reforms to prove its commitment to European values without an offer of future EU membership. Thus far, only NATO has offered Ukraine a safe haven in the West, but the EU will only be able to put off a decision until 2008.
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3 |
ID:
019244
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Publication |
April 2001.
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Description |
135-154
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4 |
ID:
170487
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Summary/Abstract |
Information warfare was not invented by Vladimir Putin, but draws on Soviet information and disinformation campaigns. This article adds to the scholarly literature by showing the links between Tsarist, Soviet, and Russian narratives in Moscow’s contemporary information warfare. Messages in Russia’s information warfare are not only traditionally Soviet; they are also Tsarist when referring to Ukrainians. A second addition to the literature analyzes why Russia’s ‘Chekist’ counterintelligence state places Ukraine and Ukrainians at the forefront of Moscow’s information warfare.
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5 |
ID:
121012
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
Since Viktor Yanukovych's election in 2010, Ukraine's politics and national security policies have become increasingly similar to those in Russia under Vladimir Putin. The influence of the siloviki in Ukraine is at its greatest, parliament is marginalized for the first time and the country's democratization is under threat. These policies are a product of the authoritarian neo-Soviet political culture in the Party of Regions and unreformed siloviki, such as the Security Service (SBU), and with the goal of preventing a second Orange Revolution. Ukraine is also different from Russia in terms of the inability of the ruling party to use nationalism, weak national resources and regional diversity.
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6 |
ID:
086085
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7 |
ID:
048066
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Publication |
Hampshirs, macmillan Press, 1994.
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Description |
xiv, 260p.
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Standard Number |
0333579992
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
038356 | 320.54094771/KUZ 038356 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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8 |
ID:
001424
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Publication |
London, Routledge, 1998.
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Description |
xx, 298p.
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Standard Number |
0415171954
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
040961 | 320.94771/KUZ 040961 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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9 |
ID:
048067
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Edition |
2nd ed
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Publication |
Hampshire, macmillan Press, 2000.
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Description |
xiv, 273p.
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Standard Number |
0333738446
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
042336 | 320.54094771/KUZ 042336 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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10 |
ID:
018510
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Publication |
Dec 2000.
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Description |
29-56
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11 |
ID:
148995
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Summary/Abstract |
Ukraine underwent a second democratic revolution in 2013–2014, which led to the overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovych. The article analyzes the sources of the failure since the Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity to reform the rule of law, reduce high-level corruption, and apply justice to Yanukovych and his entourage for massive corruption that bankrupted Ukraine, murder of protestors, and treason.
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12 |
ID:
051434
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13 |
ID:
114213
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that many of Ukraine's problems are long-standing and remain unresolved because government policies are virtual (i.e. do not conform to official documents or statements) thereby reducing the effectiveness of the West's (here understood primarily as NATO and the EU) engagement with Ukraine and the ability of Kyiv to pursue its declared foreign policy objectives. The article discusses Ukraine's relations with the West through cycles of Disinterest, Partnership and Disillusionment. Under Presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma three cycles equated to Kravchuk's presidency (Disinterest, 1991-94), Kuchma's first term (Partnership, 1994-99) and second term (Disillusionment, 2000-04). Three cycles partially repeated itself during Viktor Yushchenko's presidency with Partnership (2005-06) after the Orange Revolution followed by Disillusionment (2007-09), often described as 'Ukraine fatigue'. US Disinterest in Ukraine from 2009 is an outgrowth of the Barrack Obama administrations 're-set' policies with Russia resembling the 'Russia-first' policies of the early 1990s George W. Bush administration. US Disinterest covers the late Yushchenko era and continued into the Yanukovych presidency. The West held out a hope of Partnership for Viktor Yanukovych following his February 2010 election after taking at face value his claim of becoming a more democratic leader, compared with during the 2004 elections, coupled with an expectation he would bring political stability to Ukraine. Partnership quickly evaporated into Disillusionment the following year.
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14 |
ID:
075246
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Publication |
2006.
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Summary/Abstract |
Kuzio instead focuses on the foreign policy in post-revolution Ukraine. The centre of Kuzio's analysis is Ukraine's EU and NATO trajectories. He first analyses Yushchenko's EU and NATO orientations and commitments, which marked a decisive shift from the ambiguous stance of the previous regime. He then surveys the respective positions within the political party system and the public at large on these two foreign policy questions. He concludes that NATO's "open-door policy" as opposed to the EU's policy of passivity and reticence has produced a difference in Ukraine's move towards the former as opposed to the latter. However, the Ukrainian political system and public remain far more reluctant and uncertain about the desirability of NATO with respect to EU membership, casting the country's foreign policy in a potential state of flux.
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