| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
061991
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| 2 |
ID:
107575
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article summarizes the conclusions of the articles comprising this special issue. The findings and recommendations of the contributing authors are organized according to the three questions that they were asked to address regarding the implications of the life sciences revolution for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the appropriate venue to address various issues, and the steps needed to enhance the viability of the regime. For consideration at the Seventh BWC Review Conference and beyond, the contributing authors articulate an impressive number of pragmatic, constructive proposals to strengthen the norm against the misuse of biology and to reinforce the disarmament imperative that is embodied in the treaty.
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| 3 |
ID:
107567
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This introductory article first provides an overview of key historical developments pertaining to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), exposing the roots of the assertion that the treaty is unverifiable. The article also reviews the factors that have changed since the BWC's negotiation, including those that loom over the BWC's effective implementation today, with special emphasis on the challenges posed by the advancement and global diffusion of life sciences know-how, technologies, equipment, and capabilities. The narrative concludes with a description of the methodology behind this special issue of the Nonproliferation Review, introducing the contributing authors and the common questions they address in the context of their topics.
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| 4 |
ID:
048235
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| Publication |
Sweden, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2003.
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| Description |
v, 50p.
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 047190 | 358.3/ZAN 047190 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
128056
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Preventing further use of chemical weapons in Syria will be achieved by their elimination rather than punitive airstrikes. Selective airstrikes, as repeatedly threatened by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, would not have altered the military situation in the civil war, as the Syrian opposition forces and their backers had hoped.The airstrikes would most certainly not have degraded Syria's chemical weapons capacity to the point it would have become useless, and further chemical attacks would have remained a distinct possibility. Targeting chemical weapons storage sites risked releasing toxic clouds affecting combatants and noncombatants alike. Destroying other types of targets would have just added to the tally of conventional weapons casualties
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| 6 |
ID:
008568
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| Publication |
April 1995.
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| Description |
84-110
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