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| 1 |
ID:
087835
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The scholarly discussion of Israel's nuclear programme has reached a
degree of maturity, which allows some basics to become indisputable. As in
any other field of intense political-moral and strategic deliberations, the
role of Israel's nuclear programme, at first its very existence, were matters
of dispute or of different interpretations.1 Thus, this article will start with a
description and analysis of David Ben-Gurion's security policy based upon
his lessons learned from the Holocaust and Israel's War of Independence
combined and the ensuing deviations from it.
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| 2 |
ID:
086177
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article analyzes David Ben-Gurion's lessons from the Holocaust and from Israel's War of Independence and deviations from his strategy. The lessons of the Holocaust were three-fold: First, that Israel, Zionism and Jews as well were a unique historical phenomenon, and therefore could expect to be alone and remain alone for decades to come. That Zionism, having lost its European backbone in the Holocaust, would have problems of legitimacy unless the Jewish state would accept the partition of Western Palestine and avoid ruling over a large number of Arabs, especially in the politically sensitive West Bank. Second, that every Israeli-initiated war will not be accepted by the Arabs as final, since they would recover and get ready for a new round, whereas Israel could not sustain one crucial defeat. Third, that the longer range solution to the total imbalance between Arabs and Jews in conventional terms, such as numbers, political and strategic clout, oil and vast territories, must be counterbalanced by invoking unconventional deterrence. The ensuing, even if limited to the elite, discussion of alternatives to this strategy was coined in terms of conventional preemption and acquisition of more territory, especially in the West Bank. The demise of Ben-Gurion's leadership in the early 1960s, and the emergence of security alternatives to his, in addition to role of the US in making the unconventional option illegitimate, would explain the road to the Six-Day War of 1967 and its ramifications until today.
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| 3 |
ID:
116184
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The purpose of this article is to outline and analyse David Ben-Gurion's security policy and alternatives to it offered by others and their role from the run up to the Six Day War of 1967 to this day. The differences are to be sought in Ben-Gurion's emphasis on deterrence, primarily nuclear deterrence, and on the American efforts to thwart this option, which contributed to his resignation in 1963; yet BG's security policy also entailed minimal territorial expansion in the West Bank as a result of renewed Arab aggression, while his successors adopted a preventive conventional war including territorial changes in the West Bank, East Jerusalem included. The ramifications of the Six Day War for the 1973 round of hostilities and for further conventional hostilities all the way to the shadow of the Iranian bomb are discussed.
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| 4 |
ID:
048338
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| Publication |
Albany, State University of New York press, 1992.
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| Description |
xiii, 398p.
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| Standard Number |
0791412083
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 041375 | 355.82511905694/ARO 041375 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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