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ID:
126202
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ID:
154088
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| Summary/Abstract |
No one would dispute that power in Russia today lies firmly in the hands of President Vladimir Putin. But his command over the political system was not always so sweeping. When Putin assumed power after Boris Yeltsin's resignation in 1999, Freedom House ranked Russia as “partly free.”
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ID:
172846
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| Summary/Abstract |
A wave of recent research challenges the role of regime type in international relations. One striking takeaway is that democratic and autocratic leaders can often achieve similar levels of domestic constraint, which in many issue areas results in similar international outcomes—leading many to question traditional views of democracies as distinctive in their international relations. In this review essay, we use recent contributions in the field to build what we call a “malleable constraints” framework, in which all governments have an institutionally defined default level of domestic audience constraint that is generally higher in democracies, but leaders maintain some agency within these institutions and can strategically increase their exposure to or insulation from this constraint. Using this framework, we argue that regime type is still a crucial differentiator in international affairs even if, as recent studies suggest, democratic and autocratic leaders can sometimes be similarly constrained by domestic audiences and thus achieve similar international outcomes. This framework helps reconcile many competing claims in recent scholarship, including the puzzle of why autocracies do not strategically increase domestic audience constraint more often. Just because autocracies can engage audience constraints and democracies can escape them does not mean that they can do so with equal ease, frequency, or risk.
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| 4 |
ID:
146164
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| Summary/Abstract |
What happens to autocratic leaders who hold competitive elections? Autocrats gain a key benefit by holding competitive elections: a better post-tenure fate. According to my argument, autocrats who introduce competitive elections receive implicit or explicit assurances that they will be able to leave office and retire peacefully. By contrast, failing to hold a competitive election is more likely to result in a violent removal such as execution, prosecution and/or foreign intervention. The paper tests the argument by analyzing a cross-national data set of autocrats’ fates between 1960 and 2004, and the results provide evidence that autocratic leaders who hold competitive elections are more likely to lose power peacefully, and the result holds regardless of regime types.
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| 5 |
ID:
048760
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| Publication |
London, Frank Cass and Company, 1992.
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| Description |
viii, 232p.
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| Standard Number |
0714634522
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 039064 | 355.02/AND 039064 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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