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| 1 |
ID:
057156
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| 2 |
ID:
052756
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| Publication |
London, routledgeCurzon, 2004.
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| Description |
x, 212p.
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| Series |
RoutledgeCurzon security in Asia series
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| Standard Number |
041530671X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 048359 | 306.095/BUS 048359 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
076583
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| 4 |
ID:
074428
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russia's President Vladimir Putin has centralized decision making in Moscow and has reduced the role of domestic actors. He has demonstrated his own personal management of foreign policy in relation to China and Japan. He has used negotiations over oil and territory to place Russia in a more favourable position between them. In relation to oil, he has overruled the oil company Yukos and others within his own government and decided in favour of the Japanese pipeline route, which includes a branch line to China. Putin decided on the Japanese route because it promised access to wider markets in the Asia Pacific, besides China. It also entailed deeper Japanese involvement in Russia's development and reduced Russian dependence upon China. In terms of territory, Putin undermined the power of local opposition and offered territorial settlements to both China and Japan, to remove sources of future tension. With China he compromised over the river islands which had been left outstanding since the main border agreement was signed in 1991. To Japan he again offered a compromise over the disputed islands based on the 1956 agreement to improve relations. Russians may hope that energy dependence would induce the Japanese to become more willing to compromise over the territorial issue. The Japanese, however, expect that Russia's need for funding for the pipeline would allow them to resist that pressure and to demand a return of all disputed islands. If Russia emerges as an energy supplier to both China and Japan its influence and its regional role would be enhanced. Much depends upon the prospects for the oil pipeline and its branch line, whose feasibility has been questioned.
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| 5 |
ID:
092504
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| 6 |
ID:
074736
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russia has been struggling to develop a relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and to be included in Asia-Pacific regionalism. The rebirth of Russia after the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991 brought with it a repudiation of superpower ambitions and outlying areas such as Southeast Asia dropped in terms of priorities. It was only after Putin emerged as president in April 2000 that Russias interest in Southeast Asia rekindled, and there were two reasons for this. The first was the recognition of the importance of Asia-Pacific regionalism for Russias development and that the economic development of Siberia and the Russian Far East required closer integration with Asian regional institutions. Under Putin, Russia moved to forge closer ties with ASEAN and to stake a claim in an emerging East Asian regionalism, a claim that was supported by Malaysia. Moreover, Putin became Russias major arms salesman and sought to expand arms sales with ASEAN actors: Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. When the East Asian Summit (EAS) was held in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 Russia was poised to assume a new role in Southeast Asia.
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| 7 |
ID:
050882
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| Publication |
Jan-Feb 2004.
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| 8 |
ID:
059494
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| Publication |
Jan-Feb 2003.
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| 9 |
ID:
048854
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| Publication |
Westport, Praeger Publishers, 1996.
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| Description |
xiv, 243p.
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| Standard Number |
0275955850
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 039680 | 327.47/BUS 039680 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 10 |
ID:
066257
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| Publication |
2005.
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| Description |
p546-565
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| 11 |
ID:
087190
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Rivalry within interdependence is possible. Trade and investment ties alone are not sufficient to bring peace and security to a relationship, the responsiveness of the political leadership to economic interdependence is critical. Responsiveness can be influenced by a history of conflict in a relationship, national ambitions or by a military which espouses expansionist plans. Britain and Germany before 1914 demonstrated that interdependence and rivalry can coexist and may degenerate into war. This can happen when one side under the influence of a dominant military falsely assumes that the other would be constrained by interdependence from responding to its military action. Both Japan and China have become bound by a tight economic interdependence despite their historical animosities. These animosities could be exacerbated by military modernization and China's plans to develop a naval capability to protect its sealanes. Japan would be prompted to respond to the development of Chinese naval power which would aggravate existing rivalry with Beijing. To reduce the impact of this rivalry both ASEAN and the United States should clearly signal to Beijing that military action over Taiwan or naval expansion without transparency would be unacceptable. Otherwise false assumptions would arise in Beijing that interdependence would constrain responses to China's risk taking.
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| 12 |
ID:
113125
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| 13 |
ID:
028249
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| Publication |
London, Croom Helm, 1986.
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| Description |
303p.
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| Standard Number |
0709932219
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 026939 | 327.47059/BUS 026939 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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