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| 1 |
ID:
009435
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| 2 |
ID:
192950
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| Summary/Abstract |
How does the phased withdrawal of United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKOs) influence electoral violence? Many PKOs recently ended and peacekeeping personnel numbers are decreasing. Yet, research on peacekeepers’ exit remains in its infancy. We help fill this lacuna and examine how peacekeepers’ withdrawal affects violence during electoral periods. We focus on electoral periods because elections are both often-desired intervention endpoints and violence-prone moments in post-war trajectories. We argue that electoral violence increases shortly after a reduction in PKO troops because shortfalls in external oversight and security assistance reduce costs for organizing violence and open opportunities for pursuing a coercive electoral strategy. However, violence-inducing exit effects are likely short-lived due to adaptation by domestic security forces or peacekeepers who remain in the host country. We examine our argument across electoral periods and first-order administrative units of all African countries hosting a PKO (2001–2017). Controlling for violence trends prior to peacekeepers’ exit, two-way fixed effects models suggest that a local reduction in PKO troops is not associated with subsequent increases in electoral violence. However, withdrawal incidents lead to spikes in political violence more broadly defined. Our results confirm worries that downsizing during election times may endanger security gains in post-war countries.
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| 3 |
ID:
102352
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO has progressively adapted itself
to the new strategic environment. This has meant a shift from a defensive
posture to a more proactive risk management strategy. A key
component of this mandate is contributions to international peacemaking
and peacebuilding operations. In both the Balkans and Afghanistan, NATO
has worked to utilize its military assets to create and maintain peace so
that civilian organizations can administer aid, development programs, and
good governance projects. These multifaceted operations, however, are
complex and rely on well-structured relationships between the different
civilian-led international organizations on the ground and NATO. Sadly, as
the case of Afghanistan illustrates, these organizations have proved woefully
inadequate in terms of providing sustainable peacebuilding. The hypothesis
is that international organizations do not play well on the ground
in conflict or postconflict environments because they were meant to manage
a balance of power, rather than an absence of power. These organizations
are more worried about their bureaucratic turf than they are
sustainable outcomes.
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| 4 |
ID:
087826
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Post-conflict governments and donors prioritize rebuilding the justice sector through state delivered rule of law and access to justice programmes. Misunderstanding the nature of the post-colonial state, such programmes make questionable assumptions. First, that a lack of access to state justice is the same as an overall absence of justice. Second, that the state system that is being built is what people want. Third, that the state system of justice that is being built could provide a sustainable nationwide network in the foreseeable future. Based on interviews conducted with policy designers, practitioners, local people and chiefs at three sites in southern Sudan 2007, this article calls for a rethinking of donor-supported justice and police development and advocates an approach that recognizes the importance of local justice.
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| 5 |
ID:
153268
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| Summary/Abstract |
In March 2016, the United Nations Security Council adopted its first resolution devoted entirely to the prevention of peacekeeper sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) in peace operations. This article examines resolution 2272 by drawing on past practice and the perspective of those at mission sites—namely, Timor-Leste—arguing that the mechanism it establishes—repatriation—is limited in its capacity to prevent SEA and provide justice outcomes. The article demonstrates the pervasive sense of powerlessness regarding SEA and the impunity of those who do perpetrate SEA. The article further situates the issue of SEA by peacekeepers in the post-conflict (gendered) context in which it occurs, arguing that the resolution does not challenge the underlying norms and gendered relations of power that underpin peace operations. Instead, the resolution frames SEA as chiefly an issue of embarrassment for the United Nations and makes scant mention of the populations that peace operations are mandated to protect, as well as the perspectives and needs of victims of SEA.
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| 6 |
ID:
066183
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| 7 |
ID:
151972
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examined the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), assessed its success and drew lessons learned from the experience. The author argued that the mission was successful in restoring peace and stability in Burundi, although the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) component of its mission was not achieved. The willingness of the African Union (AU) to send a peacekeeping mission as a stabilizing force within an ongoing conflict shows that the organization is serious about tackling security issues on the continent. In spite of AU’s endeavours, the article establishes that the AU is being challenged by what is called the ‘triangular area of tension in African peacekeeping (AU’s ambitions versus AU’s peacekeeping capacities versus member states’ political will and agendas). The article concludes with a reflection on lessons learnt from AMIB as a prelude to addressing this area of tension for better future peacekeeping performances in Africa.
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| 8 |
ID:
137191
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| Summary/Abstract |
African states today are strongly encouraged by the United States (US) and other members of the international community to play a more central role in confronting crises on the continent. Indeed, in recent years African armed forces have increasingly served as the backbone supporting various peacekeeping operations in the region. It is important to add that the international community has frequently tried to facilitate the deployment of African armed forces with aid and training. From this reality, the following study goes beyond the current literature by focusing on the international factors behind African participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in Africa. In doing so, this research focuses on US military aid and foreign troop training from 2002 to 2012, and its impact on African deployments into UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. As can be expected, such third-party help appears to be an important motivating factor encouraging African troop deployment into crises on the continent.
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| 9 |
ID:
094701
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the end of the Cold War, sub-Saharan African states have substantially increased their participation in international peacekeeping operations in Africa. Their contributions have become highly valued and even facilitated by major powers. This article examines why certain African states might contribute more than others to peacekeeping. In particular, prominent arguments are considered about the primacy of regime security concerns and the dynamics of warlord politics in the foreign policymaking of African states, the economic incentives of peacekeeping, and the importance of African states' concerns over their state legitimacy and territorial integrity. First, this study investigates the possibility that peacekeeping might be utilized as a diversionary strategy to divert the attention of both an African state's military and major powers from a regime's misrule. Second, this study examines the extent to which financial and material assistance from donor states encourages poorer states to engage in peacekeeping. Third, the study investigates whether states with less legitimate and more arbitrary borders might have greater incentive to contribute to peacekeeping operations to promote the territorial status quo in Africa. Empirical evidence from a quantitative analysis across 47 states of sub-Saharan Africa from 1989 to 2001 suggests that states that are poorer, with lower state legitimacy and lower political repression, participate more often in regional peacekeeping.
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| 10 |
ID:
083244
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article introduces the special issue on `The Aftermath of Civil War' and presents the research project from which the articles in this issue originate. The article presents a few empirical observations that demonstrate the increasing importance of the post-conflict situation for actors that engage to reduce the global incidence of armed conflict. The global incidence of conflict was reduced from 1992 to 2002, since there were more terminations than onsets. Although this trend seems to have halted, a scrutiny of the onsets shows that they increasingly are recurrences of conflicts that have been inactive for a period. In 2005 and 2006, there were no new conflicts. The article then briefly introduces the six contributions to the special issue. The articles investigate the importance of peacekeeping troops, elections, aid, capital flight, and exclusion of parties from peace agreements in post-conflict situations. The articles are also applicable to countries that have not had armed conflicts, as the authors investigate the relationship between ethnic diversity and military spending and the determinants of youths' decisions to participate in rebel groups.
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| 11 |
ID:
004765
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| Publication |
New York, United Nations, 1992.
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| Description |
53p.
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| Contents |
Report of the Secretary General pursuant to the statement adopted by the summit meeting of the Security Council on 31 July 1992
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 035714 | 327.172/BOU 035714 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 12 |
ID:
060723
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| 13 |
ID:
057709
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| 14 |
ID:
097651
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article studies the Darfur conflict from within the African Union (AU) framework for conflict resolution and peacekeeping and critically examines the operational effectiveness of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS).
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| 15 |
ID:
059270
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| 16 |
ID:
165906
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article offers an analysis of the influence of the anti-mercenary norm on the United Nations’ use of services provided by private military and security companies (PMSCs). It follows a constructivist approach which focuses on violations of the anti-mercenary norm within the UN system and on the justifications and condemnations of these violations in official UN documents. The findings suggest that while the anti-mercenary norm is no longer puritanical, two key aspects of the norm—the lack of a proper cause and the lack of control—remain influential within the UN system. Although all parts of the UN system nowadays routinely use a wide variety of services of PMSCs and the UN Secretary-General officially sanctioned security outsourcing in 2011, the UN continues to insist that it is only using PMSCs as a last resort, when no other options are available. The continuing need to justify the use of PMSCs’ services suggests that this practice challenges both the long-established identity of the UN as a key anti-mercenary norm entrepreneur and its ontological security.
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| 17 |
ID:
179552
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| Summary/Abstract |
A prominent anti-mercenary norm entrepreneur in the second half of the twentieth century, the United Nations (UN) has become an equally prominent user of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) services in the twenty-first century. In this article, we explain the gap between UN talk and action on private providers of security as a form of organized hypocrisy. To map the mismatch between UN rhetoric and behaviour in a measurable fashion, we combined official data on the use of PMSCs with an in-depth content analysis of the reports written by the UN Working Group on Mercenaries and an examination of the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) contracting policy. The Working Group’s very negative portrayal of PMSCs and the UNDSS caveat that armed contractors should only be used as a last resort and stands in stark contrast with UN agencies’ widespread use of private security providers. Although a decoupling between talk and action is often inevitable for complex organizations simultaneously pursuing contradictory objectives like the UN, our findings have important implications for peacekeeping. Most notably, organized hypocrisy is in danger of challenging the UN’s credibility as a norm entrepreneur, hindering the effectiveness of its agencies’ outsourcing practices and delaying the reform of UN peacekeeping and crisis management at large.
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| 18 |
ID:
133668
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Washington's current efforts to resolve the conflict in Syria will not break the stalemate. The only way to restore peace without committing U.S. troops is to build a new Syrian army capable of defeating both the Assad regime and the extremists.
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| 19 |
ID:
011639
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| Publication |
1996.
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| Description |
77-91
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| 20 |
ID:
169240
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