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ID:
049237
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| Publication |
Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
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| Description |
ix, 278p.
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| Series |
Cold War history series
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| Standard Number |
033396831X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 047238 | 327.41073/MAR 047238 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
114169
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 1949-1950, Britain rejected ideas of being a third force between the post-war Superpowers and adopted instead an approach that has been the keystone of British foreign policy from that point onwards: "hugging America close." The aspiration was to establish a position closely related to the United States yet sufficiently independent, effectively to harness American power to British ends. This now familiar position has been much-debated recently in the context of post-9/11 military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan especially. However, this analysis examines three crises immediately following the British decision in 1949-1950 to give priority to the Anglo-American "special relationship" to demonstrate that, for Britain, this policy from the onset was both advantageous and potentially difficult. The outcomes of crises over NATO's Atlantic Command, Iranian oil, and ANZUS demonstrate how expansion of United States influence benefitted Britain but sometimes also required painful British adjustment and loss of prestige.
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| 3 |
ID:
068854
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| 4 |
ID:
129910
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States can ill afford to lose the loyalty of proven allies. Yet it risks currently weakening one of its most important and enduring friendships. British popular support for America has been shaken and elite commitment to the special relationship faces a potentially formidable array of contrary strategic and partisan arguments. Some of these are overstated but there is a further danger that is little mentioned but just as corrosive-American benign neglect. If in the pursuit of new allies and objectives America is not to squander extant assets, then it must do more to nurture the reflexive British Atlanticism that has helped sustain Anglo-American relations through their numerous crises.
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| 5 |
ID:
085470
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Kremlin's change of leadership on 7 May 2008 and growing international fears of Russia's resurgence, especially in the aftermath of the Georgian conflict, make this an interesting time to reflect upon EU-Russia security relations. This article does so by examining closely the Survey of Russian Federation Foreign Policy and, one year on from its approval, drawing upon subsequent developments as preliminary corollary or otherwise of its bearing on policy. On balance, it seems that the Kremlin's evolving perception of Russia and international relations has encouraged revised priorities and objectives and a more forceful foreign policy that not only slow progress in filling the Common Spaces, but also increase the likelihood of Russia-EU competition especially in their shared neighbourhood.
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| 6 |
ID:
085655
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Kremlin's change of leadership on 7 May 2008 and growing international fears of Russia's resurgence, especially in the aftermath of the Georgian conflict, make this an interesting time to reflect upon EU-Russia security relations. This article does so by examining closely the Survey of Russian Federation Foreign Policy and, one year on from its approval, drawing upon subsequent developments as preliminary corollary or otherwise of its bearing on policy. On balance, it seems that the Kremlin's evolving perception of Russia and international relations has encouraged revised priorities and objectives and a more forceful foreign policy that not only slow progress in filling the Common Spaces, but also increase the likelihood of Russia-EU competition especially in their shared neighbourhood.
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| 7 |
ID:
087490
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
2009 is the thirtieth anniversary of the Iranian Revolution. In 2006 the Bush administration ranked Iran as posing arguably the greatest single threat to America. And throughout 2008 that administration insisted all options were open in dealing with Iran, including preventative strikes. Yet, unlike its decisive intervention to establish Iran as a client state in the 1950s, the US has thus far been unable to force the changes it desires in and from Iran's leadership. This article argues that to help understand this situation it is important to recognize that the Iranian Revolution was and remains nurtured by a contemporaneous "silent revolution" in the international oil industry, even if the Ahmadinejad regime's economic policies especially threaten currently to squander some of the potential afforded by it.
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| 8 |
ID:
164913
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Macmillan government's dilemma over whether to grant diplomatic recognition to the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) following a coup in 1962 was finely balanced. Hitherto, though, the literature on this specific issue has neither reflected the complexity of issues with which the British government was confronted nor offered a satisfactory explanation of its ultimate non-recognition of the YAR. Some scholars suggest that London was immediately and consistently opposed to granting recognition; others attribute the decision to fear of Nasserism and a determination to maintain Britain's colonial interests in the Persian Gulf. This article contends differently. Drawing upon newly declassified information it first reveals in fuller detail the array of issues and interests that the Macmillan government was confronted by and sought to balance. It then proceeds to demonstrate that the Macmillan government was not unwaveringly against according recognition to the YAR and that whilst important, the influence of the Aden Group and its sympathisers in government was not decisive. Instead, irresolution within the government resulted in an event-driven policy that arrived ultimately at non-recognition of the YAR by default rather than by design.
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