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Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
049475
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Publication |
London, Routledge, 2000.
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Description |
viii, 198p.
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Standard Number |
0415171385
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
043618 | 320.54/BRO 043618 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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2 |
ID:
053888
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Publication |
Spring-Summer 2004.
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3 |
ID:
084904
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4 |
ID:
078819
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Publication |
2007.
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Summary/Abstract |
Ethnic gang violence is often depicted as a clash between criminals pursuing instrumental advantage or as one between ideological fanatics pursuing collective nationalist, ethnolinguistic, or ethnoreligious rights. However, there is an apparent tension between the conceptualization of such violence as the rational self-interest of deprived individuals, and as the irrational fanaticism of anomic communities. The examination of one particular ethnic gang, the Betawi Brotherhood Forum which operates in Jakarta, Indonesia, indicates how both dimensions of violence coexist and interweave. The apparent analytical tension between individualistic pragmatism and collectivist moral absolutism is resolved by showing how the gang responds to their disillusionment with the state by constructing for themselves a "state proxy" role. This response is portrayed as based upon "ressentiment" - the "faulty rationality" which marginalized individuals adopt so as to translate their clashes of material self-interests into the moral conflict between stereotyped communities - the virtuous ethnic Us against the demonized ethnic Other
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5 |
ID:
170465
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Summary/Abstract |
Debates surrounding the appropriateness of “humanitarian intervention” remain a key feature of the post-Kosovo international security environment. NATO has attempted, in the past, to intervene on “humanitarian” grounds, both in Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011. By systematically comparing both operations—analyzing three related phases, namely the pre-intervention justifications offered, the manner in which NATO, and particularly the United States, sought to intervene, and the level of commitment shown in the post-intervention phase—it is clear that the best that Western organizations and efforts can hope for is “limited humanitarianism,” even with the added boosts—in the case of Libya—of a cleaner international mandate from the United Nations Security Council and normative support from the relatively newly minted but already damaged concept of responsibility to protect (R2P). There are lessons for future operations of this nature.
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6 |
ID:
127540
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7 |
ID:
005066
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Publication |
London, Routledge, 1994.
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Description |
xxi,354p.;tables
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Standard Number |
0415049938
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
036208 | 305.800959/BRO 036208 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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8 |
ID:
108768
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Publication |
2011.
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Summary/Abstract |
In 2010, the EU agreed its third five year programme for internal security, with the Stockholm Programme building on pre-existing arrangements from Tampere and The Hague. This article seeks, firstly, to highlight the nature of the problem that has confronted the EU in the area of internal security, by exploring a range of thematic concerns regarding both the institutional and conceptual construction of the EU's internal security regime, from the lack of an effective statistical analysis into the nature of the problem confronting the member states to the continued fragmentation of the European level as a practical venue for policy-making. Having considered the consequences of these continuing structural flaws, in terms of both the EU's wider credibility and legitimacy as an actor in this key security field, the second half of the article proceeds to critically appraise the solutions contained both within the 2010 Stockholm Programme and the Treaty of Lisbon. Having considered both, it will be argued that, at best, the 'Stockholm solution' simply papers over pre-existing cracks, leaving the EU with a continued credibility gap in this important and developing area of co-operation.
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9 |
ID:
170460
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Summary/Abstract |
Two decades after NATO’s Operation Allied Force (OAF) was successfully concluded in June 1999, to the extent at least of forcing Serbia to give up control of its rebellious Kosovo province, the articles in this special issue, timed to coincide with this anniversary, set out to explore the lasting controversies, implications and legacy of this demonstration of the use of coercive force for declared “humanitarian” purposes.
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10 |
ID:
061074
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