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Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
180898
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Summary/Abstract |
Narendra Modi came to power in 2014 promising robust economic management and more employment. The campaign promise of “maximum governance, minimum government,” created hope that Modi would transform India’s economy by removing obstacles to growth and job creation. We assess the Modi government’s economic policies from 2014–2019 focusing on salient initiatives like demonetization, bankruptcy law, GST reforms, and “Make in India.” We argue that Modi’s economic policies must be understood, first and foremost, as a political strategy to build political support and ensure the BJP’s hegemony through the next decade. In addition, we show that Modi’s success in building his personal image as a decisive leader perversely triggered institutional changes such as centralization of decision-making and political management of information that diminished India’s state capacity and led to policies that failed to address, and in many cases exacerbated, India’s economic problems.
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2 |
ID:
087220
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Publication |
Overseas Development Council, 1990.
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Description |
247p.
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
032413 | 337.1/FEI 032413 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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3 |
ID:
049965
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Publication |
New Brunswick, Transaction Books, 1990.
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Description |
viii, 247p.
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Series |
U.S.-Third World Policy Perspectives: No. 14
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Standard Number |
0887389914
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
044768 | 338.9/FEI 044768 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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4 |
ID:
058934
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Publication |
Oct 2004.
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Summary/Abstract |
Since 1990, India’s equity markets have been transformed from archaic institutions to, in some respects, exemplars of global best practice. This essay investigates the role of financial globalization in shaping these changes. It examines the economic incentives created by the growth of international capital flows, the political leverage of international financial institutions, and the impact of international norms. It argues that international capital flows created relentless incentives for reform, but also that these incentives do not dictate specific policy responses. International norms played an important role both in offering models for specific reforms and in shifting the rhetorical field of policy discourse in favor of the reformers.
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5 |
ID:
098219
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