| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
137978
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| 2 |
ID:
166257
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| 3 |
ID:
076017
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Special Operations Forces (SOF) have transitioned from a marginalized force structure to a prominent part of U.S. military strategy. The gradual increase in status for SOF has been a long road. Historically, conventional military leaders have been skeptical of SOF and reluctant to use such forces. Political leaders, in contrast, have traditionally had an almost intuitive understanding of the capabilities and potential benefit of SOF. For the first time, military and political leaders are both convinced of the value of SOF. This shift has occurred for several factors: a dramatic change in the security environment marked by irregular threats, the declaration of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and the conduct of SOF in Afghanistan and Iraq.
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| 4 |
ID:
149392
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| 5 |
ID:
056761
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| 6 |
ID:
122603
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since 1998 General Mieczystaw Cieniuch Has Held A Series Of Joint And Strategic Assignments. He Began In The General Staff Of The Polish Armed Forces As Head Of The Command Directorate And, In 2000, As The 5-J Strategic Planning General Directorate. In 2006 He Serve As Acting Chief Of The General Staff Of The Polish Armed Forces And Subsequently As The Polish Military Representative To The Military Committees Of NATO And The EU In Brussels. In 2009 He Returned To Poland To Become Advisor To The Minister Of National Defence. On 7th May 2010 He Assumed The Position Of The Chief Of The General Staff Of The Polish Armed Forces, The Highest Military Post In Poland. On August 15th Of That Year, He Was Promoted To The Rank Of General.
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| 7 |
ID:
132725
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Focusing on contemporary Special Forces (SOF/SF), this article analyses expanding SF developments in the context of conducting rapidly proliferating multi-functional operations during an overall era of globalised strategic risk. This is while SF simultaneously have to negotiate the not necessarily reconcilable challenge of wider national-to-global-impacting defence transformation and military cuts, which include extending to closely impacting on SF support units. When examining the optimisation of the command of special operations, including better developing Special Operations Commands (SOCOMs) or closest nearest equivalents, and when evaluating the attendant advancement of what can be best characterised as the improved strategic direction and use of SF, several helpful operational-to-strategic and structural-to-cultural lessons soon emerge. For both now and for differently ranging futures, further consideration of these noteworthy lessons is warranted.
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| 8 |
ID:
138661
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| 9 |
ID:
050094
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| 10 |
ID:
119607
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The special operations vehicle concept derives from types used by the British SAS and Australian SASR, completely un - armoured vehicles relyingon stealth and speed for protection. Such vehicles allow quick egress for crews, maximum awareness, and ease of weapons use (personal and flexibly - mounted). Recent month and years have been a plethora of new vehicles derived from existing military designs, hijacked from other worlds, such as forestry and extreme off-road motor sport, or design specially for Special Operations Forces (SOF) mossions.
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