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ID:
173924
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| Summary/Abstract |
British intelligence in Ireland between 1919 and 1921 has been characterized as a toxic mix of incompetence and mendacity. This article will challenge this judgement by examining the activities, impact and consequences of a British civil servant, Alfred Cope, who between 1920 and 1921 was an Assistant Under Secretary in Dublin Castle. Using the three criteria of counter-intelligence operations: the ability to locate, identify and neutralize a target, it will be shown that within months of his posting to Dublin British intelligence, albeit inadvertently, had located and identified him as passing classified information to Sinn Fein. Political patronage meant the ability of the intelligence community to neutralize his impact was nugatory. Latterly Cope recognized the consequences of his actions reverberated beyond the period of his time in Ireland.
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| 2 |
ID:
101803
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| 3 |
ID:
162127
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| 4 |
ID:
040520
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| Publication |
London, Willam Collins Sons and Co. Ltd., 1987.
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| Description |
398p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
0002175983
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 028699 | 920.932712/DZH 028699 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
127721
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article is based on recently declassified Sigint reports on Eastern Europe produced by GCHQ and covering the years 1945 to 1950. This material allows historians to fill in an important gap in the current historiography, namely the virtual absence of Sigint in the discussion of post-war British policy. The significance of this material is not so much the actual content - much of it does not come as a great surprise to historians - but rather the extent to which it enabled the British government to almost immediately draw a precise and detailed picture of events behind the iron curtain and how this affected not only British foreign policy, but particularly domestic policy, in the field of counter-subversion.
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| 6 |
ID:
004724
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| Edition |
2nd Ed.
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| Publication |
Brassey, 1993.
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| Description |
xvii,295p.
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| Standard Number |
0-02-881025-2
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 035584 | 327.12/SHU 035584 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 7 |
ID:
059917
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| 8 |
ID:
100413
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Western counter-intelligence suffered a massive reputational loss on 9/11. Although many of the risks remain the same, the next decade is likely to see the increasing incidence of 'grey area phenomena': the convergence of subversive threats in ungoverned spaces. Better counter-espionage will be required to tackle cyber-attacks and information asymmetry, whilst some threats - such as the crime-terror nexus and proxy warfare - will require enhanced investment across the whole range of counter-intelligence capabilities.
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