| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
160373
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Although foreign policy bipartisanship in Westminster systems is often heralded as a normative good, there is an emerging scholarship which suggests that a bipartisan approach to foreign and defence policy comes with considerable costs. This article seeks to join that debate. It does so by examining two contemporary foreign/defence policy issues in Canadian politics: the mission in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014 and the efforts to replace the CF-18 Hornet flown by the Royal Canadian Air Force. These two cases do not offer clear conclusions about the normative argument about foreign policy bipartisanship. The embrace of a bipartisan approach to the Afghanistan mission confirms the criticism that bipartisanship can suppress public debate and did indeed distort a consideration of policy options. But the case of the CF-18 replacement suggests that there are significant costs if government and opposition replace a search for bipartisan consensus on key policy issues with an overt politicisation that seeks partisan advantage by ‘playing politics’ with foreign and defence policy issues, concluding that the quality of partisanship is a necessary condition to avoid the dysfunctions and costs of bipartisanship.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
060847
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
058944
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
069361
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
121239
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
There is a good reason why the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program is so often
described as the "arms deal of the century." In a report published on the last
day of 2010, the Pentagon estimated lifetime operating and sustainment
costs for the US F-35 fleet-then projected at 2,443 units, not counting
the prototypes-at US$1.45 trillion.1
Cost analyses of this type are always
much-debated: How many units will be sold in total? How does one define "lifetime"? How reliable will the system be once it enters service? What
will be the nature of its deployment? And so on. Beyond dispute is that the
F-35 constitutes one of the largest, if not the largest, weapons programs in
modern history.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
097049
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
121248
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Looking at the process that the Conservative government of Stephen Harper
tried to use to replace the Royal Canadian Air Force's aging CF-18 Hornet fleet
with 65 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters, it is hard
to disagree with Andrew Coyne's assessment that the acquisition program
was "a fiasco from top to bottom, combining lapses of professional ethics,
ministerial responsibility and democratic accountability into one spectacular
illustration of how completely our system of government has gone to hell."1
For the evolution of Canada's participation in the F-35 program-from
the first memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed by the Liberal
government of Jean Chrétien on 2 January 1998 to the so-called "reset" of
the program in December 2012-readily fits the nouns the Canadian media
so commonly used to characterize the F-35 acquisition: fiasco, debacle, mess,
scandal, and shambles in English, or fiasco, scandale, incompétence, gâchis
(mess), gouffre financier ("money pit") in French.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
050270
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
161610
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This paper surveys Canada’s ambivalence towards the Asia Pacific, and seeks to put that ambivalence into the broader context of the dominant strategic perspective in Canada that has privileged, and continues to privilege, a North Atlantic focus for Canadian foreign and defence policy. It argues that Canada’s laggardly approach to Asia Pacific diplomacy can be best explained by the widespread perception among Canadians—and their government—that the North Atlantic alliance should remain the key driver of Canadian foreign and defence policy. Indeed, this geostrategic outlook has actually intensified with the election of Donald J. Trump and his unorthodox approach to the transatlantic alliance and the liberal international order. I argue that this North Atlantic outlook, so dominant for so much of Canada’s history, will continue to anchor Canadian foreign and defence policy, making Canada’s engagement in the Asia Pacific more problematic.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 10 |
ID:
085540
|
|
|
| 11 |
ID:
080392
|
|
|