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| 1 |
ID:
144703
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since his inauguration on 29 May 2015, President Muhammadu Buhari has taken several practical, policy and diplomatic actions aimed at defeating the six-year long insurgency by Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria. These actions have started to have a modest positive impact on reclaiming the territories previously held by the terrorists. Boko Haram has reacted by ramping up its attacks on soft targets and communities in the north-east. This article focuses on Boko Haram's bombing activities in Nigeria's capital city, Abuja. It shows that between 2011 and 2015, Boko Haram has staged nine bombings in Abuja, resulting in the deaths of at least 191 people, including suicide bombers. It argues that the October 2015 suicide bombings in Kuje and Nyanya, Abuja, represent Boko Haram's bold attempt to respond to President Buhari's counter-insurgency efforts. The article proposes the ‘five Ds’ approach as part of robust measures for combating the insurgency.
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| 2 |
ID:
169230
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article discerns the shifts in China's engagement with its Western neighbour, Afghanistan. Beijing's approach has gradually shifted from dis-interest to a careful re-calibration of strategy indicating Afghanistan's growing eminence in its strategic calculus. This transposition – dating back to the 1980's – it is argued has been accentuated as the ‘West’ weans itself away from the Afghan theatre. This article demonstrates that Beijing's chequered history of engagement with Kabul has been historically underpinned by its engagement with a plethora of actors identified with ‘political Islam’ who in turn are patronized by its allies in Rawalpindi. Its deepening footprint in contemporary Afghanistan while continuing to be coloured by the prism of Rawalpindi, is informed by a growing sense of unease regarding the perceived adverse imprint that developments across China's Western borders are likely to leave on its domestic security and growing economic interests in the region.
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| 3 |
ID:
149823
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| Summary/Abstract |
Allied forces have begun the offensive to retake the northern Iraqai city of Mosul from the Islamic State. Reporting from Iraq, Jack Watling analyses how the successful recapture of the city will effect broader political and sectarian dynamics in the country.
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| 4 |
ID:
146399
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| 5 |
ID:
164604
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| Summary/Abstract |
Employing counterfactuals to assess individual and systemic explanations for the split between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), this article concludes that individual leaders factor greatly into terrorist alliance outcomes. Osama bin Laden was instrumental in keeping Al Qaeda and ISIS allied as he prioritized unity and handled internal disputes more deftly than his successor, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Although a troubled alliance, strategic differences between Al Qaeda and ISIS were not sufficient to cause the split. Rather, the capabilities of Al Qaeda's leader determined the group's ability to prevent alliance ruptures.
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| 6 |
ID:
141371
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| 7 |
ID:
172168
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| Summary/Abstract |
On June 29, 2014, the Islamic State emerged and declared the establishment of its caliphate. The declaration was a direct challenge to other Sunni Jihadi groups including Al Qaeda and an attempt to become the leading Jihadi group around. The rivalry that evolved within Sunni Jihadism, and particularly between Al Qaeda and its renegade affiliate the Islamic State, entailed a hitherto unseen competitive environment within the Jihadi field. Interestingly, the increased competition did not lead to a dynamic of competitive escalation and mutual radicalization of behaviour. Theory tells us to expect competitive escalation, or outbidding, in such contexts, but despite the initial success of the Islamic State’s brutality and offensive conquest in Syria and Iraq, Al Qaeda did not “play along” and instead pursued a different path. The reason for this absence of competitive escalation, this paper argues, is to be found in a pre-conflict methodological re-orientation within Al Qaeda and in the pacifying role played by influential Al Qaeda-affiliated ideologues.
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| 8 |
ID:
143835
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| Publication |
Oxon, Routledge, 2015.
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| Description |
xii, 354p.hbk
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| Series |
Contemporary Terrorism Studies
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| Standard Number |
9781138789975
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058478 | 363.325/RAJ 058478 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 9 |
ID:
158001
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| Publication |
London, C Hurst and Co. (Publishers) Ltd, 2017.
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| Description |
xiv, 291p.pbk
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| Standard Number |
9781849048101
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059348 | 303.625/HOL 059348 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 10 |
ID:
159888
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| Summary/Abstract |
We describe a novel hybrid method of content analysis that combines the speed of computerized text analysis with the contextual sensitivity of human raters, and apply it to speeches that were given by major leaders of Al-Qaeda (AQ)—both in its “core” Afghanistan/Pakistan region and its affiliate group in Iraq. The proposed “Ideology Extraction using Linguistic Extremization” (IELEX) categorization method has acceptable levels of inter-rater and test-retest reliabilities. The method uncovered subtle (and potentially non-conscious) differences in the emphases that Usama Bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri put on the various components of their ideological justification for terrorism. We show how these differences were independently recognized as the crux of the rift in AQ, based on documents that were confiscated in Abbottabad following Usama Bin Laden’s assassination. Additionally, several of the ideological discrepancies that we detected between AQ “core” and its Iraqi affiliate correspond to schisms that presumably led to the splintering of AQ Iraq and the rise of ISIS. We discuss IELEX’s capability to quantify a variety of grievance-based terrorist ideologies, along with its use towards more focused and efficient counter-terrorism and counter-messaging policies.
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| 11 |
ID:
146815
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The effort to degrade and defeat the Islamic State is like many other multilateral military efforts – characterized by widely varying contributions to the effort. This article seeks to understand the patterns of contributions. Three sets of explanations are applied: the lessons of Afghanistan and Libya, variations in how potential contributors feel the threat posed by the Islamic State, and domestic political dynamics. While there may be some political processes that overlap with the big lessons and with the threat of the Islamic State, the patterns of contributions thus far suggest that the key drivers of reactions to the Islamic State are the desire not to repeat Afghanistan combined with some impetus provided by Islamic State attacks in the various homelands. The conclusion suggests some policy implications as well as some ideas for future research.
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| 12 |
ID:
143272
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| Summary/Abstract |
A quarter century after the end of the Cold War the United States faces an international geopolitical landscape that many would have not imagined a generation ago. Today the U.S. faces a disordered world where revisionist powers such as China and Russia wish to change the dynamics of the international system and a revolutionary Islamic State has aspirations to overthrow the entirety of the system itself. While the U.S. still maintains the strongest conventional military capabilities in the system it also has many global commitments and its resources are constrained. In order to cope with the current disordered world it must learn to operate within the current era's ambiguities, particularly in the space between war and peace, and much more adroitly blend its capabilities across the elements of national power to directly and indirectly confront threats and challengers.
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| 13 |
ID:
133849
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Turmoil in Iraq reached a new level when ISIL seized Mosul after the Iraq security force collapsed on June 10. Although ISIL, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant , look after over Fallujah in early 2014, this latest development has deeper repercussions. On June 29, ISIL declared a large territory between Iraq and Syria a new state.
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| 14 |
ID:
154355
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study analyzes how Inspire and Dabiq seek to appeal to and radicalize English-speaking Muslims. It examines how each magazine strategically designs ingroup, Other, crisis, and solution constructs and interplays these via value-, dichotomy-, and crisis-reinforcing narratives. This analysis also explores how narrative, imagery, and counternarrative messaging are used to shape readers' perceptions and polarize their support. While both magazines are dominated by narratives designed to empower readers toward action, Inspire relies heavily on identity-choice appeals while Dabiq tends to balance identity- and rational-choice messaging. This study concludes by identifying key lessons for counterterrorism strategic communications campaign and message design.
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| 15 |
ID:
190963
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyses Islamic State’s English language propaganda targeting Western women and how that messaging changed as the group shifted from territorial control back into an insurgency. It argues that Islamic State leverages five female representations in its appeals to women in order to construct and project an alternative gender order designed to further the group’s strategic objectives. As those objectives changed, so did the nature of its appeals and the female representations its propaganda emphasised. Based on primary source analysis, it draws on fifteen issues of Dabiq which spans a period of success for the group when it controlled territories and population centres (July 2014 to July 2016) and thirteen issues of Rumiyah which was a period characterised by strategic decline back into an insurgency (September 2016 to September 2017).
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| 16 |
ID:
172050
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the rise of the Islamic State (IS) through its anashid (a cappella), analyzing their lyrics and their musical attributes such as sonic elements, pitch, and harmony, among others. It focuses on key themes that define the group's lyrics and traces the evolution of anashid production and use—an evolution that began with the IS borrowing existing jihad-themed anashid to articulate its message and accompany its video messaging, and led to a far more developed and sophisticated sonic identity in the form of internally produced, group-specific anashid. The IS's claims to legitimacy as the caliphate are sounded out in the group's anashid. The recurring appearance of propaganda in the form of anashid and videos builds a strong case for the genre's significance among the highly complex factors catalyzing an individual's involvement in carrying out violence, especially among recent attacks within Western countries in the name of IS.
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| 17 |
ID:
142972
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| 18 |
ID:
129869
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| 19 |
ID:
143059
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2016.
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| Description |
xiv, 380p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9788182748859
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Copies: C:2/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058437 | 355.005095/MUN 058437 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
| 058438 | 355.005095/MUN 058438 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 20 |
ID:
141132
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| Summary/Abstract |
In a BBC Radio Four interview on 9 October 2014, UK Defence Secretary Michael Fallon declared that the war against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in the Middle East ‘can only be won on the ground, but it can also only be won by a home army, not by America or Britain’. According to Fallon, this was the main lesson to be learned from recent Western interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, where occupation by Western forces had ostensibly triggered full-blown insurgencies. By this logic, rather than deploying ground forces, the West should restrict its role to training and supplying local forces and to supporting the latter with airstrikes. In the fight against ISIS, the relevant local players that warrant Western support are the Iraqi army, Kurdish peshmerga forces and moderate Syrian rebel organisations.
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