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ID:
090982
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The question of how to deal with so-called rogue states, especially those trying to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD), is currently of central importance to the world. Advocates of military action, who predominated immediately after 9/11, have lost credibility in recent years. Yet they have claimed one clear success: Libya's decision to renounce WMD in late 2003. The Bush administration believed that this decision was based largely on fears of US military action. This essay, in contrast, argues that other factors were crucial, notably the impact of years of economic sanctions and the lure of economic incentives. Thus the Libyan case, far from supporting a military approach to "rogue states," in fact argues for a patient policy of diplomacy and economic carrots and sticks.
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| 2 |
ID:
081994
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, critics referred to its allies not as the "Coalition of the Willing," but as the "Coalition of the Bribed, Bullied, and Blind." How accurate is this view? This paper will examine the role of American economic linkage as a policy tool in shaping the coalition. As we shall see, sometimes positive economic instruments were used, ranging from foreign and military aid to access to U.S. markets. For other countries negative linkage was used, that is, the threat of economic sanctions. In the end, such tactics were often effective. This helps demonstrate the relevance of economic linkage in forming alliances
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