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| 1 |
ID:
180380
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| Summary/Abstract |
Whatever happens in Kabul, the Taliban will remain the most powerful military and political force among the Pashtuns of Afghanistan.
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| 2 |
ID:
098986
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| 3 |
ID:
148596
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| Summary/Abstract |
THE FIRST significant round of negotiations between the Afghan state and the Taliban essentially came to an end on May 21, with the killing by an American drone strike of Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour on the Pakistani border with Afghanistan. The Obama administration, it appeared, had abandoned hopes of successful talks with the Taliban in favor of a military-led strategy of decapitating the movement and provoking its fragmentation as a result. Leading figures in the Afghan government and security forces have urged Washington to adopt this strategy.
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| 4 |
ID:
154600
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| Summary/Abstract |
Seventy years after independence, Pakistan trundles on in its own messy way.
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| 5 |
ID:
178814
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| 6 |
ID:
172482
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| Summary/Abstract |
Strong and legitimate states remain central to any efforts to limit climate change and maintain Western democracy.
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| 7 |
ID:
147504
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| Summary/Abstract |
Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump exemplify – in Trump’s case, to the point of caricature – contemporary versions of what I have previously called the thesis and antithesis of American nationalism.1 Both of these traditions have undergone important changes over the years in response to social, cultural and demographic shifts. Nevertheless, both also embody very old strains of American political culture, stretching back, in some cases, to the foundation of the republic and beyond. The contest between the new forms of these old traditions is likely to define politics in the United States for many years to come.
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| 8 |
ID:
110460
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Rather than a future in which Chinese hegemony will replace that of the United States, we seem to be rapidly entering a world in which no country will exercise anything resembling true world leadership. This bears a sinister resemblance to the 1920s, when the United States replaced Britain as the world's leading economic power, but was wholly unwilling to shoulder additional burdens of global leadership.
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| 9 |
ID:
084284
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| 10 |
ID:
172950
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| 11 |
ID:
152020
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Pakistani security forces have won their fight against the insurgency of the Pakistani Taliban, though terrorism will remain a serious problem for the foreseeable future. Victory was won not chiefly on the basis of new tactics, but of the recovery of legitimacy for the campaign among the population and the armed forces. This occurred when the war came to be seen as one waged not in the interests of the USA, but for the defence of Pakistan. In Balochistan, the nationalist insurgency has been different from and weaker than that of the Taliban—but may prove longer lasting. Military tactics in Balochistan have closely resembled those of the British Raj, and have been based with some success on fomenting tribal divisions and co-opting tribal elites.
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| 12 |
ID:
068938
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| 13 |
ID:
064754
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| 14 |
ID:
162064
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| 15 |
ID:
050885
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| 16 |
ID:
060938
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| 17 |
ID:
107151
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since Pakistan achieved independence in 1947, the country's military has governed the country outright three times and exerted a strong political influence even when not in power.Pakistan's tradition of military dominance stems above all from the fact that the Pakistani military is the only institution that works more or less as it is meant to, as measured against the generally accepted standards of a modern state institution. This creates the belief among some sections of Pakistan's population that the efficiency displayed by the military within its own sphere can be extended via military government to the working of the state as a whole. This belief, however, is a mistake. Each time the military takes over the entire Pakistani system, it soon finds that the state is so weak that it has no choice but to work through the same old local elites, using the familiar methods of patronage, corruption and exploitation of kinship ties.
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| 18 |
ID:
102696
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
U.S. STRATEGY toward Pakistan is focused on trying to get Islamabad to give serious help to Washington's campaign against the Afghan Taliban. There are two rather large problems with this approach. The first is that it is never going to happen. As U.S. diplomats in Pakistan themselves recognize (and as was made ever so clear by the WikiLeaks dispatches), both Pakistani strategic calculations and the feelings of the country's population make it impossible for Islamabad to take such a step, except in return for U.S. help against India-which Washington also cannot deliver.
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| 19 |
ID:
173032
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| Summary/Abstract |
The challenge for U.S. and Western politicians in meeting the short-term crisis of the coronavirus and the long-term crisis of climate change is to create, by democratic means, the sort of national consensus that will make radical and consistent strategies possible.
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| 20 |
ID:
075424
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