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| 1 |
ID:
085488
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| 2 |
ID:
087786
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| Publication |
Washington D C, International Monetary Fund, 1998.
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| Description |
v, 61p.
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| Standard Number |
1557757771
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 045759 | 339.43/EIC 045759 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
070886
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| 4 |
ID:
064984
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| 5 |
ID:
106713
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
GOLD IS back, what with libertarians the country over looking to force the government out of the business of monetary-policy making. How? Well, by bringing back the gold standard of course.
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| 6 |
ID:
107893
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| 7 |
ID:
182935
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| Summary/Abstract |
The financial system is currently in a period of exceptionally rapid technological and organizational change, with the adoption of cloud computing to store and process financial data, artificial intelligence to analyze it, and blockchain to secure it. It is fashionable to assert that digital currencies will be part of that future. But cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin are too volatile to possess the essential attributes of money. Stablecoins have fragile currency pegs that diminish their utility in transactions. And central bank digital currencies are a solution in search of a problem.
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| 8 |
ID:
089945
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The economic crisis is hurting the world's top currency. But the pound, the yen, the euro, the renminbi, and the IMF's accounting currency are no match for the dollar. At least for now.
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| 9 |
ID:
102788
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The fact that resolving the crisis will be costly has one silver lining. It concentrates attention on the need to reform the institutions of the euro area to prevent equally costly crises from occurring again
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| 10 |
ID:
093209
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Discussions over the past year have yielded agreement on the outlines of what needs to be done to strengthen the global financial architecture. But the task of filling in the details remains.
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| 11 |
ID:
125156
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
It almost seems as if the European economic model is continuously experiencing an existential crisis.
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| 12 |
ID:
049925
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| Publication |
New York, Foreign Affairs, 2002.
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| Description |
xiii, 161p.
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| Series |
Foreign Affairs Editors' Choice
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| Standard Number |
0876093187
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 046434 | 337/GLO 046434 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 13 |
ID:
099440
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| 14 |
ID:
087943
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
THE GREAT Credit Crisis has cast into doubt much of what we thought we knew about economics. We thought that monetary policy had tamed the business cycle. We thought that because changes in central-bank policies had delivered low and stable inflation, the volatility of the pre-1985 years had been consigned to the dustbin of history; they had given way to the quaintly dubbed "Great Moderation." We thought that financial institutions and markets had come to be self-regulating-that investors could be left largely if not wholly to their own devices. Above all we thought that we had learned how to prevent the kind of financial calamity that struck the world in 1929.
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| 15 |
ID:
101303
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| 16 |
ID:
050889
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| 17 |
ID:
058492
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| 18 |
ID:
149075
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| Summary/Abstract |
“[H]istory … suggests taking more seriously concerns about inequality and, specifically, the resentment and alienation of once-privileged groups who feel left behind.”
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| 19 |
ID:
165028
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| Summary/Abstract |
From the standpoint of international economic relations, the key implications of the Versailles Treaty were as follows. Signatories committed their countries to reconstructing a free and open multilateral trading system such as had existed before the First World War. Other economic institutions and arrangements, as distinct from the trading system, were noteworthy only to the extent that they worked towards this paramount goal. Moreover, in so far as those other arrangements, starting with the gold standard and international financial relations, had been integral to the success of the prewar trading system, there was a presumption that they too should be reconstructed along prewar lines. This approach was subject to multiple conflicts and contradictions. It did not take account of how the economic world had changed, creating a mismatch between prewar institutions and postwar circumstances. It enshrined—indeed, it gave legal content to—the conventional wisdom that to the victor go the economic spoils by imposing that self-same reparations burden on Germany and the other defeated Central Powers. It highlighted the conflicted nature of American attitudes towards management of the international economic system. And it did not give the Soviet Union, ultimately to emerge as the second of the twentieth century's two Great Powers, a seat at the table. While seeking to avoid exaggerating the parallels, I argue that the structure of international economic relations in the wake of the Cold War resembles in important respects the structure of those relations after the First World War.
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| 20 |
ID:
186921
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