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HUTH, PAUL (4) answer(s).
 
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1
ID:   050908


Comparative public health: the political economy of comparative / Ghobarah, Hazem Adam; Huth, Paul; Russett, Bruce March 2004  Journal Article
Ghobarah, Hazem Adam Journal Article
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Publication March 2004.
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2
ID:   076161


Covenantswithout the sword: international law and the protection of civilians in times of war / Valentino, Benjamin; Huth, Paul; Croco, Sarah   Journal Article
Huth, Paul Journal Article
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Publication 2006.
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3
ID:   053443


Draining the sea: Mass killing and Guerrilla warfare / Valentino, Benjamin; Huth, Paul; Balch-Lindsay, Dylan Spring 2004  Journal Article
Huth, Paul Journal Article
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Publication Spring 2004.
Key Words Insurgency  ;  Guerrilla Warfare  ;  Military Threat 
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4
ID:   111738


Law and the use of force in world politics: the varied effects of law on the exercise of military power in territorial disputes / Huth, Paul; Croco, Sarah; Appel, Benjamin   Journal Article
Huth, Paul Journal Article
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Publication 2012.
Summary/Abstract In this paper, we investigate how international law shapes leaders' decisions regarding the use of force in the context of territorial disputes. We argue that if the legal principles relevant to the dispute are capable of suggesting a focal point, international law will have a powerful role to play in informing leader behavior. Specifically, if a focal point exists, the state that it favors will avoid using force and prefer negotiations when considering an initial challenge to the status quo. However, we expect focal points to have the opposite effect once states are involved in a militarized dispute. Under these circumstances, the state with a legal advantage will be more likely to escalate the level of military force. Using a series of statistical tests, we find strong support for our theoretical argument.
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