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| 1 |
ID:
126726
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The analysis indicates three sets of factors through which parties' willingness to achieve a consensual solution can be assessed: the contextual factors that contribute to adversaries' decision to proceed to official negotiations, the functions of the pre-negotiations and the changes that occur in the parties' perceptions during the pre-negotiations. A simultaneous exploration of these factors provides a more complete assessment of the parties' intentions and their willingness to proceed to negotiations directed at a win-win solution. This, in turn, enables a better understanding of the factors that undermine de-escalation initiatives, not only between Israel and the Palestinians but in other intractable conflicts as well.
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| 2 |
ID:
151228
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| Summary/Abstract |
This research examines Zartman’s formulation of mutually hurting stalemate and mutually enticing opportunity as variables pushing and pulling parties toward agreement during the negotiation that took place between southern and northern Sudan between 2002 and 2005. This case shows that ripeness theory and formulating the push and pull factors indeed help clarify what brought the parties to negotiate and reach an agreement. However, we contend that the push and pull formulation in its current form might not fully account for the complexity of processes in ethno-political intractable conflicts, such as in Sudan, when the process is characterized by the parties’ mutual distrust and the deep involvement of third parties, driven by their own domestic and foreign policy interests.
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| 3 |
ID:
124347
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It is generally accepted that the peace process, launched in 1993, went off the tracks and failed to meet the expectations of the interested parties: the state of Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and the international community. The international discourse plays down the historical depth of the dispute and everything which pertains directly to the Jewish religious, national, and cultural heritage that dates back more than three millennia in the Land of Israel. Also absent from the international discourse is an awareness of the rich academic and theoretical foundation of knowledge with regard to peacemaking. Concepts such as the positive peace, reconciliation, "ripeness," "stable peace" or "hurting mutual stalemate" have not been integrated into the discourse.
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| 4 |
ID:
124348
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
It is generally accepted that the peace process, launched in 1993, went off the tracks and failed to meet the expectations of the interested parties: the state of Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and the international community. The international discourse plays down the historical depth of the dispute and everything which pertains directly to the Jewish religious, national, and cultural heritage that dates back more than three millennia in the Land of Israel. Also absent from the international discourse is an awareness of the rich academic and theoretical foundation of knowledge with regard to peacemaking. Concepts such as the positive peace, reconciliation, "ripeness," "stable peace" or "hurting mutual stalemate" have not been integrated into the discourse.
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| 5 |
ID:
167452
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| Summary/Abstract |
President Clinton was deeply engaged and invested in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and this commitment seems to transcend administrations as Presidents Bush, Obama, and more recently Trump have made considerable efforts to mediate the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This article addresses the question of why would a US president risk his own legacy and the reputation of the office as an international mediator to try to solve this complicated case in the face of expected and proven failures? This study traces efforts made by recent US Presidents to mediate the long-standing protracted conflict between Palestinians and Israel understand the reasons for the ongoing US commitment to this process, and why different presidents and their administrations persist in their mediation attempts where their predecessors failed.
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| 6 |
ID:
084355
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Low expectations and international impatience forced the African Union to shift from a classical integrative approach to negotiations to "deadline diplomacy" during the final months of the Abuja talks between the Sudanese government and the Darfur rebel movements. As a result, the AU mediators - who had served as communicators and formulators - assumed the responsibility of manipulators. This transition scuttled plans for gradually arriving at the implementing details for a formula. Instead, acquiescence to power served as the chief reason for the signature of one of the movements, while the mediators showed disinterest and inflexibility in reigning in the other two movements that required a package of additional threats and inducements. Important lessons regarding the credibility of deadlines, the appropriateness of the formula, the necessity of ownership, inclusivity/exclusivity of the talks, and sufficient support for the movements in the prenegotiation and diagnosis phases can be drawn from the Abuja process.
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| 7 |
ID:
173737
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This article revisits ripeness theory and examines whether conflicts with armed Islamist groups can also be ripe for negotiation. The article argues that armed Islamist organizations can be willing to negotiate and demobilize, but talks are particularly vulnerable to spoilers and public backlash. To examine these dynamics, the article investigates the case of al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya in Egypt. Relying on a variety of primary and secondary sources, including organizational documents and testimonies by the leaders, the analysis shows that the absence of ripeness can indeed explain some of the failures of negotiations. However, when the conflict was finally ripe, talks broke down because of elite divisions and public backlash. The case reveals that there is a dark side to ripeness: the conditions that lead to a mutually hurting stalemate can also lead to public outrage, elite divisions, and opposition to negotiations.
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| 8 |
ID:
094698
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2010.
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This study focuses on the relationship between national identity and intractable conflict. Abdelal's definition of collective identity that refers to the level of agreement regarding the purposes, practices, relational comparisons with other entities, and narratives that define collective identity was adapted to national identity during intractable conflict and was later applied to Israel's national identity. A review of the Israeli 1969-2006 election platforms shows that in the 1980s and 1990s significant changes occurred in Israel's national identity. The most significant changes included: changes regarding the territorial purpose of Israeli identity; changes in practices on who may become an Israeli citizen; changes of perception of the relationship between Israel and the Arabs; and a growing Israeli acceptance of Palestinian identity. Since 2000, following the failure of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, some components of Israeli national identity have reverted to their original form. The study indicates that the Arab-Israeli conflict triggered changes in Israel's national identity, but the conflict also seemed affected by changes in that identity. The article connects the changes in Israeli national identity to specific mechanisms and conditions of conflict resolution and reconciliation.
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| 9 |
ID:
187039
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What can UN mediators do to bring warring parties to a negotiated settlement? This article – using ripeness theory – focuses on the parties’ incentives to make a policy shift from war to settlement, and mediators’ influence over such incentives. Mediators can influence through utilizing leverage to create incentives by affecting the parties’ perceived relative power, and through applying intangible resources to facilitate incentive creation without affecting perceived relative power. The constraint on UN mediators is their lack of leverage, while their potential lies in their unique repertoire of intangible resources for facilitative influence. A recurrent limitation of UN mediation manifests where state mediators’ manipulative influence is needed to create the parties’ incentives, and UN mediators’ facilitative influence alone is not enough. On the other hand, UN mediatory potential can be utilized where the parties’ incentives are developed through their own actions and often in the face of pressure and leverage from external patrons.
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| 10 |
ID:
141716
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A mutually hurting stalemate is a necessary but insufficient condition for the opening of negotiations, direct or mediated. It is subject to perception, buffered by many insulating ploys even if it seems to exist objectively. Thus, the major challenge for a mediator in most cases is to ripen the parties’ perceptions. In addition to the attitudinal challenge, there are structural challenges posed by other types of stalemates and near-stalemates, which call for not only persuasion but also manipulation by the mediator. The ultimate challenge to a mediator is to move successful negotiations producing conflict management onto the consummating phase of negotiations for conflict resolution. But the first removes the incentive for the second, since it ceases the violence that is the most effective source of pain.
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| 11 |
ID:
173733
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Under what conditions can Islamist armed conflicts be resolved through peace negotiations? Armed conflicts involving Islamist groups have emerged as one of the most pressing challenges on the global agenda for peace and security. But the track record of conflict resolution in these settings is not encouraging. While armed conflicts have generally decreased in the post-Cold War period, as many prolonged civil wars were resolved through negotiated settlements, this has not been true to the same extent for this sub-category of conflicts. Yet, we know surprisingly little about why this is the case. The purpose of this thematic issue is to address this gap. Each contributor tackles a different angle of the overarching research problem.
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| 12 |
ID:
123170
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Abstract High costs have long been seen as motivating conflict participants to seek peace. This article discusses two types of deviations from the "hurting-stalemate" logic: negotiations in the absence of high costs and non-negotiation in the face of high costs. Two prominent explanations for these deviations are discussed and evaluated, initially through a statistical analysis of peace overtures in intrastate conflicts and then through a case study of the Indian civil war in Kashmir. The results suggest that theoretical explanations focusing on the preferences and political strength of leaders have traction at all levels of violence. Variables associated with shifts in perception, such as leadership change or political shocks, seem to have different effects as the level of violence in a conflict changes.
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| 13 |
ID:
095122
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Six authors of the younger generation - three from Armenia and three from Azerbaijan - examine the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh in a joint effort to overcome their heritage of stereotypes and hostility. While their proposals vary, there is some creative overlap, and all of them recognize the obstacles as four standard characteristics of intractable conflicts: no salient solution, no ripeness, profitability, and no Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA). From these obstacles stem some ideas for creative progress, if not immediate solutions.
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| 14 |
ID:
173738
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There have been several attempts to find negotiated solutions to the armed conflicts in Southern Thailand. Yet, these attempts of accommodation and mediated peace negotiations were aborted without any concrete results, with the exception of a formal peace process being officially launched in 2013. What explains the readiness of the parties to the conflict to enter negotiations at this stage, but not at earlier attempts? We argue that the political context can help to explain why some negotiation attempts result in negotiations, whereas others do not. We analyze the factors behind the readiness of the two sides – the Thai state and the Patani separatist insurgency – to sit down for official peace negotiations, focusing on the presence of valid spokespersons, which is an understudied element of ‘ripeness’. This case demonstrates that the problem of finding valid spokespersons may be an obstacle for peace processes especially in religiously defined conflicts.
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| 15 |
ID:
165682
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The UK ‘Brexit referendum’ set in motion a unique and highly complex set of negotiations to withdraw from a fundamentally embedded economic and political union. The final referendum was preceded by a nine-month pre-negotiation phase; this article examines the dynamics of that stage. The context of a unilaterally initiated negotiation, together with the economic and political costs associated with it, distinguish it from the existing literature. Three analytical approaches are combined and built upon in this article: the tasks of the pre-negotiation phase, the readiness of the temporal moment, and the demands of multi-level, multi-party negotiations. The concept of psychological readiness has broad theoretical import, though explicit recognition is given that negotiators are not unitary decision makers and that the incorporation of a political analysis is required. The combination of these frameworks provides insight into the dynamics of this phase and the difficulties experienced by both the UK and EU27.
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| 16 |
ID:
187044
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The US-China trade war lasted for two years, resulting in a volatile environment for multinational businesses and exacerbating already heated Sino-American political tensions. Despite all the uncertainty it produced, the Phase One trade agreement was an economic ceasefire and not a negotiated agreement that resolved core issues in the Sino-American trade relationship. The US-China trade war negotiations failed to yield a successful negotiated agreement addressing core bilateral trade issues largely due to a mutually enticing opportunity to produce a ceasefire rather than address core issues, and process failures. The United States failed to collect information and apply expert advice in the diagnostic stage; both parties failed to establish a negotiation formula; and the US lacked an authoritative spokesperson. This led to a nearly-wasted two years of negotiations, which concluded with the Phase One trade deal declared in January 2020 due to both sides’ perception of a mutually enticing opportunity.
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| 17 |
ID:
101471
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2010.
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In certain separatist conflicts there is a greater likelihood of external mediation if the political 'redefinition' of the state insisted upon by the insurgents undergoes a revision, from secession to self-determination, understood as a variant of autonomy. In the same vein, although it may not happen concurrently, insurgent movements become more amenable to external mediation if and when opposing governments revise the preferred conflict outcome from a military defeat of the insurgents to a 'containment' of the movement. These two developments - a revised demand from the insurgents for how the state should be defined and an altered military strategy adopted by the government - can serve as 'objective referents' helping external parties to identify a ripe moment in the conflict and initiate mediation.
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| 18 |
ID:
139392
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Despite saying that they will never “talk to terrorists,” many countries have done so. Often these dialogues have included a component of so-called “Track Two Diplomacy.” This article examines whether such a dialogue could be held with al Qaeda and other such groups. Research demonstrates that dialogues have been useful in ending terror campaigns in certain circumstances, but that they were never the decisive element. Where they have been useful, dialogues have helped to distinguish those members of terror organizations who are willing to talk from the hardliners, in helping to develop ‘acceptable’ players on the other side, and in allowing the two sides to better understand each other. The article finds that a dialogue with the hard core of al Qaeda is likely impossible, but that some elements may be willing to talk. Such dialogues will be localized and will be about specific concerns and, like in other cases, will be about seeing if there are elements of the movement that can be detached from the hard-core base. Track Two may have a role to play in these dialogues, but expectations should be kept modest.
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| 19 |
ID:
102492
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2011.
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This article surveys the emergence of conflict management from the academic and policy shadows into a far more prominent field of inquiry and practice. As the barriers to entry into third party roles collapsed at the end of the Cold War, the field of conflict management expanded, diversified, and fragmented into a range of practice areas (scholarly, policy-oriented, and operational). Four phases of this evolution are identified. An increasingly crowded field lacks gatekeepers or natural coherence, underscoring the need for leadership and sustained, coordinated efforts. The study of mediation has blossomed around the work of Zartman and others, while the policy community has swung back and forth in its enthusiasm for third party roles in an age where hard power and smart power vie for pride of place. Conflict management responses are increasingly spontaneous, ad hoc and case-specific. Debate is emerging over the pros and cons of engaging with armed non-state actors that are placed on proscribed lists in the struggle against terrorism. Post-conflict challenges continue to pose a severe test to practitioners of peacebuilding.
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| 20 |
ID:
050912
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