| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
114156
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Why, in spite of past failures, do liberal democracies continue to intervene militarily and fight counterinsurgency wars? The answer is grounded in learning. Liberal democracies acknowledge past failures, tracing them to the interaction between the events on the battlefield and society at home. Specifically, they identify the educated middle class and its mix of expedient and altruistic motivations as preventing effective military campaigns and victory. Hence, the main effort of liberal democracies is that they aim to fight wars that are divorced from society. At their disposal are advanced military technology, the professional all-volunteer force, proxies and alliance partners, and private military companies. The desocialising effects of these are complemented by control of the media and thereby the flow of information from the battlefield to society. Liberal democracies have found a way to continue to play the violent game of world politics, but they do so less democratically as they fight asocial wars.
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| 2 |
ID:
051000
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| Publication |
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
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| Description |
xiii, 295p.
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| Standard Number |
0521008778
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 047935 | 355.02/MER 047935 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
152857
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| Summary/Abstract |
GIL MEROM analyzes the multiple levels of what he characterizes as an Israeli “alarmist” perception of the Iranian nuclear threat. He argues that Iran’s nuclear military program would be less of a threat than argued by the Netanyahu government and that it would not merit an Israeli strategic change, be it formally exposing Israel’s nuclear capabilities or striking Iran preventively.
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| 4 |
ID:
150961
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Israeli political leadership has invested massively in preparing a credible preventive strike option on Iran's nuclear program. The article assesses this option in the context of Israel's operational acumen and strategic preferences. It points out to a critical gap between the capacity to achieve the operational objectives and the strategic utility of a preventive strike. It then discusses the logical fallacies underlying Israeli leaders' explanations of how this gap would be overcome, assessing the potential downsides of a strike.
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