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| 1 |
ID:
082999
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| Publication |
London, Routledge, 2008.
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| Description |
130p.
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| Series |
Adelphi Paper; 396
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| Standard Number |
9780415465830
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 053755 | 355.0217/PER 053755 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
129103
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A final nuclear deal with Iran should meet the underlying objective of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions since 2006: "the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme."A final agreement could be codified and endorsed through a new resolution, which need not include all of the specific instrumental elements of past resolutions-for example, suspension of all uranium enrichment-if the council determines that the overall objective has been met. As the resolutions acknowledge, to be durable, such an agreement also must satisfy Iran's interest in having a purely peaceful nuclear program free from sanctions. The devilish challenge will be in the details. History will inform each party's requirements. The six-country group that has been negotiating with Iran, the so-called P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), will remember that Iran secretly had, at least until 2003, what appeared to be a dedicated, multifaceted program to acquire capabilities to produce nuclear weapons. Iran still has not cooperated fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to clarify these activities and continues to expand sensitive fuel-cycle capabilities beyond any plausible civilian requirement. Iranian leaders, for their part, remember numerous episodes that reflect a U.S. determination to hasten an end to their regime.
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| 3 |
ID:
062454
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Jul-Aug 2005.
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| Summary/Abstract |
President Bush is only half right to trumpet the spread of freedom as the main objective of U.S. foreign policy; the pursuit of justice is just as important. Broadening the focus would not only befit the United States' political tradition, but also help neutralize opposition from radical Islamists and critics of globalization.
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| 4 |
ID:
094518
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| 5 |
ID:
179384
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States’ nuclear weapons modernization budget is sloping up like a ski jump. It includes down payments to develop two new missiles, a new nuclear warhead, and new generations of bombers and ballistic missile submarines. Russia, with its stockpile of roughly 4,500 nuclear weapons, is developing and/or deploying a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of carrying more than 10 nuclear warheads, a hypersonic glide vehicle, an autonomous underwater torpedo that President Putin claimed could deliver a nuclear weapon to the US coast, and a nuclear-powered cruise missile with unlimited range.
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| 6 |
ID:
001752
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| Publication |
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000.
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| Description |
xx, 597p.
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| Standard Number |
019565207X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 042697 | 355.8251190954/PER 042697 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 7 |
ID:
051112
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| 8 |
ID:
011700
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| Publication |
Oct-Dec 1996.
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| Description |
413-425
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| 9 |
ID:
143008
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| Summary/Abstract |
Indian decision makers face a strategic conundrum: how to deter and/or respond to future terrorism emanating from Pakistan. The dilemmas are manifold: punitive action may assuage the desire of an angry public for revenge, but too heavy a response may motivate actors in Pakistan to escalate attacks in India; while a weak riposte is unlikely to convince Pakistan’s civilian and military leaders to alter their long-standing embrace of conflict against India by proxy. Both the Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the Manmohan Singh governments faced this conundrum in January 2002 and November 2008, respectively, following the attacks by Pakistan-based militants in Delhi and Mumbai. Both chose to exercise restraint rather than strike back.
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| 10 |
ID:
147473
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2016.
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| Description |
xii, 297p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9780199467495
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058807 | 363.32/PER 058807 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 11 |
ID:
051874
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| 12 |
ID:
057866
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| 13 |
ID:
180420
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| Summary/Abstract |
When adversaries consider each other’s capabilities and intentions, they focus on whichever is most threatening. With nuclear weapons, force posture and operational practices are usually considered more important than what leaders declare are circumstances in which they would consider unleashing nuclear weapons. Still, nuclear policies and forces require rationales to guide them. Declaratory policy articulates such rationales, even if decision-making on the development of nuclear weapons and other capabilities sometimes has a bureaucratic-political-economic logic of its own.
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| 14 |
ID:
065360
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| Publication |
New Delhi, India Research Press, 2005.
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| Description |
220p.
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| Standard Number |
8187943408
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 050050 | 327.1747/PER 050050 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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