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| 1 |
ID:
186373
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| Summary/Abstract |
After decades of wars in the Middle East, growing great power competition, and changing priorities at home, there is much uncertainty about America’s place in the world today. Russia’s brazen invasion of Ukraine has further shaken up debates over America’s global priorities and purpose, including in the Middle East. On one hand, a consensus has emerged across the American political spectrum that after costly investments with little discernable payoff, the United States should do less in the Middle East and more to confront a rising China. President Obama aspired to “pivot to Asia” but new terrorism threats like the Islamic State sidetracked him along the way. Now, by some accounts, Biden is finally completing the pivot, even if the Ukraine war is shifting US attention back to Europe and Russia. On the other hand, tens of thousands of US forces remain in the Middle East, increasingly vulnerable to attacks by Iran and Iranian-aligned nonstate actors. All the while, American military strikes against Iranian-aligned groups and major US arms sales to regional partners continue apace.
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| 2 |
ID:
051119
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| 3 |
ID:
090343
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| 4 |
ID:
112114
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| 5 |
ID:
173653
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| 6 |
ID:
141123
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| Summary/Abstract |
Fears of Iranian ambitions predate the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Such anxiety certainly increased after Iran’s early efforts to export its revolution abroad, but fear of Iranian influence has been a constant feature of the modern Middle East. For the United States and its partners, Iran’s role in the region became once again a predominant concern following the 2003 Iraq War, widely perceived to have removed the last Sunni buffer against Shia Iran. As American forces battled Iranian-backed militias in Iraq, Arab neighbours fretted about the growing ‘Shia crescent’ enveloping the region. Subsequent shocks, most significantly the Arab uprisings of 2011, have only reinforced the prevailing view that Iran is fulfilling its ambition to be the region’s hegemon. With many concerned that the Vienna nuclear deal will further strengthen Iran’s regional power, it is time to reassess the conventional wisdom.
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| 7 |
ID:
115299
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article reviews the origins and evolution of the Middle East weapons of mass destruction-free zone (WMDFZ) concept and the proposal for a 2012 conference on the subject, and explores new challenges and opportunities for regional arms control in the current regional environment. It suggests that new models may be necessary to revitalize regional arms control efforts. The establishment of a broad regional security forum could include, but should not be limited to, curtailing weapons of mass destruction through the zone approach. Even if the 2012 conference fails to materialize, or is limited to a one-time event, the proposal for such a conference has provided an important opportunity to rethink future options for a regional arms control and security process.
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| 8 |
ID:
183790
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| Summary/Abstract |
Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s cordial relations with the Biden administration and relatively muted posture during nuclear negotiations in Vienna raise questions about whether his government is pursuing a different strategy towards Iran than did his predecessor, Benjamin Netanyahu. This article argues that it is not. Despite reinvigorated Israeli debates critical of Netanyahu’s policies and improved atmospherics with the American government, official Israeli policy remains essentially unchanged. The Israeli government is still wary of nuclear diplomacy, offers few alternatives to continued diplomatic and economic pressure, and views military options as viable even if they can only set back Iran’s nuclear programme temporarily. While Bennett wants to avoid open confrontation with Washington, Israel will not relax tensions with Iran, particularly in non-nuclear arenas like Syria. In the past, Israeli sabotage against Iran’s nuclear assets subsided in the run-up to and after the nuclear agreement; this time around, Israel may not feel so constrained.
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| 9 |
ID:
077373
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| 10 |
ID:
057951
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