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| 1 |
ID:
151429
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| Summary/Abstract |
The question of the appropriate relationship between academics and policy-makers is not new and is unlikely ever to be answered to everyone’s satisfaction. There is no rule which says that academic research must be motivated by anything other than innocent curiosity or the state of the discipline, or that policy-makers are under any obligation to take any notice of academic advice given the other demands on their time. Nor is it the case that the academic influence is invariably benign.
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| 2 |
ID:
071100
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| 3 |
ID:
034970
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| Publication |
London, Macmillan London Ltd., 1985.
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| Description |
192p.
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| Standard Number |
0333384164
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 026379 | 327.0917130223/FRE 026379 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
153360
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article draws largely on my experience as the Official Historian of the Falklands Campaign, and then as a member of the UK inquiry into the Iraq War. My aim is to explore the particular challenges faced when charged with holding ministers, officials and officers directly to account. Although I was solely responsible for the Falklands history, I was part of a team working on the Iraq Inquiry, led by Sir John Chilcot. Not only am I speaking for myself, but it is not my intention to offer revelations about the workings of the inquiry.1 In practice, the work was relatively straightforward. Despite pre-publication comments about the length of the report and the time it had taken to prepare, the reasons for this were apparent on publication. The panel stuck together despite irritating and at times intrusive media speculation; the report’s findings did not leak in advance; and any disagreements, which rarely touched on the broad thrust of the report, were always settled without fuss. Compared with other inquiries, we were not even that expensive. Academics and former mandarins come at a discount to lawyers.
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| 5 |
ID:
145194
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There is no clear prospectus for a United Kingdom outside the European Union, or for an EU without the UK. ‘Brexit’ is presented as a great escape from a remote bureaucracy impervious to democratic accountability. Once liberated from Brussels, according to the Leave campaign, the nation will be able to achieve, through its energy and resourcefulness, great things that are currently beyond its grasp. What those great things might be is not specified. The Leave campaign is not a political party with a leadership and a manifesto, waiting to form an alternative government should its campaign succeed. It is a loose coalition of individuals from across the political spectrum, including free traders and protectionists, interventionists and isolationists. It is unsurprising that it has no agreed position on optimum future trading arrangements, or on how the country should engage with the rest of the world.
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| 6 |
ID:
185832
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| Summary/Abstract |
We are grateful to Kjølv Egeland, Thomas Fraise, and Hebatalla Taha for their commentary on the four editions of The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. In addition to their critique of the book, their review was intended to offer ‘a looking glass into the broader field of nuclear security studies’. Our reply to their review therefore touches both upon their critique, as well as the more general theme of writing about the history of nuclear strategy. Although we disagree with many of their criticisms, and in some instances believe our work was misrepresented, the reviewers have nevertheless made points that deserve serious consideration by ourselves as well as other scholars working in the field. In this reply, we not only defend our work, but also use this as an opportunity to discuss how to approach the past of nuclear strategy, which in turn can allow us to better appreciate the present and future. In the first half of our reply we discuss the reviewers’ more general criticisms of our approach. In the second half we deal with some specific criticisms.
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| 7 |
ID:
065661
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| Publication |
1998.
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| Description |
p.39-56
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| 8 |
ID:
191949
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Oxon, Routledge, 2023.
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| Description |
163p.pbk
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| Series |
Adelphi series; 493-495
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| Standard Number |
9781032707860
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 060439 | 320.014/FRE 060439 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 9 |
ID:
083495
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New York, PublicAffairs, 2008.
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| Description |
xxviii, 601p.
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| Standard Number |
9781586485184
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 053910 | 327.73056/FRE 053910 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 10 |
ID:
051140
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| Publication |
London, Cassell and Co., 2001.
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| Description |
224p.
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Cassell history of warfare.
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| Standard Number |
030435290X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 045492 | 327.16/FRE 045492 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 11 |
ID:
187920
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| Publication |
UK, Allen Lane, 2022.
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| Description |
xvii, 589p.: ill., mapshbk
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| Standard Number |
9780241456996
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 060264 | 355.33041/FRE 060264 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 12 |
ID:
105837
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| 13 |
ID:
181686
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| Summary/Abstract |
Liberalism as the ideology of the Western alliance is in crisis. Having seen off Nazism and communism, it gained influence after the end of the Cold War, which produced optimism about security, human rights and global prosperity. Now liberalism, shaken by the financial crisis and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, is in retreat. Illiberal states, notably China and Russia, are reshaping the international system. Liberalism may not be able to continue to bind allies together, or enable them to cooperate effectively in a severe crisis. There are three counters to a gloomy prognosis, however. Firstly, heightened great-power competition has reinforced rather than undermined the alliance. Secondly, Russia and China have no substantial alliances, and are showing that authoritarian governments face serious problems of their own, including entrenched leaderships. Thirdly, liberalism remains better equipped to adapt to new circumstances.
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| 14 |
ID:
059525
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| Publication |
Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004.
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| Description |
vii, 145p.
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| Standard Number |
0745631134
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 049294 | 355.0217/FRE 049294 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 15 |
ID:
130270
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Once the Cold War ended, and with it the prospect of a cataclysmic Third World War, many argued that the nuclear arsenals accumulated during its 45 years were anachronistic and redundant. By the mid-1990s, calls for their complete elimination had gained notable adherents.1 Yet, while elements of these arsenals were removed without much difficulty, their size and destructive power remained substantial and the disarmament movement soon flagged. It took about a decade for it to revive, when in 2007 a surprising group of senior American statesmen refreshed the process.2 Organizations such as Global Zero, which has attracted high-profile support,3 and various international commissions4 echoed their call for a world free of nuclear weapons. This issue impressed itself sufficiently on Barack Obama that he made it the subject of one of his first speeches as President, when he spoke in Prague in April 2009 and committed the United States to the goal of complete nuclear disarmament.
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| 16 |
ID:
027605
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| Publication |
London, Tri-Service Press, 1990.
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| Description |
xi, 516p.
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| Standard Number |
1854880284
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 032429 | 327.174/FRE 032429 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 17 |
ID:
054527
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| Edition |
2nd edition
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| Publication |
Hampshire, macmillan Press, 1981.
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| Description |
xxi, 522p.
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| Standard Number |
0333414152
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 039710 | 355.825119/FRE 039710 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 18 |
ID:
004596
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| Publication |
Houndmills, Macmillan, 1981.
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| Description |
xviii, 473p.Paperback
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| Standard Number |
0333345649
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 021767 | 355.825119/FRE 021767 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 19 |
ID:
153641
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| Summary/Abstract |
Tony Blair’s April 1999 Chicago speech is widely seen as foreshadowing his later decision to support the invasion of Iraq. Two sets of context for the speech are described: other criteria for the use of force, going back to the Just War tradition and more recent contributions from Caspar Weinberger and Colin Powell, and the December 1998 strikes against Iraq and the Kosovo War, which began in March 1999. The origins of the five factors mentioned when considering force are explored and their implications assessed.
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| 20 |
ID:
090521
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
During the cold war deterrence worked better in practice than in theory. IT became an article of faith that great power war was virtually unthinkable because of the consequences, yet this conclusion was reached without ever working through the scenarios. Today, in a world of shrinking great power arsenals and proliferation small arsenals, we may now be moving away from the models which serves us will during the cold war. Lawrence Freedman interrogates the assumptions which underpinned strategic deterrence and casts an eye on a more ambiguous nuclear future
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