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Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
132635
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
In May, the U.S. government circulated a wanted poster showing five members of a shadowy Chinese cyber-espionage unit. No one expects any of them to turn up in a U.S. courtroom, but the object of the publicity was twofold. First, it was intended to show the Chinese that the U.S. government takes their operations seriously, that it can and will retaliate in some unspecified way. It is as pointless to ask the Chinese (and many others) to abandon cyber espionage as it would be to seek an international treaty barring any other kind of spying. The spies would stay in business, but some naive governments would abandon counterespionage, and cease any spying of their own.
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2 |
ID:
124089
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
The article offers information on Chinese cruise missiles, the production rate for which is increasing every year. Possible Chinese naval deployment of a long-range land-attack cruise missile may be compared with the initial U.S. Navy deployment of Tomahawks aboard surface ships, including battleships, in the 1980s Chinese may plan to use their cruise missiles in the way the Tomahawks are used to hit particular precision targets from unexpected axes.
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3 |
ID:
111121
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Publication |
2011.
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Summary/Abstract |
In late 2006, Andrew Marshall, the Director of the Office of Net Assessment in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, asked us to answer several questions: Why
had the Royal Navy (RN) developed the angled flight deck, steam catapult, and
optical landing aid before the U.S. Navy (USN) did? Why had the USN not developed these innovations, which "transformed carrier
design and made practical the wholesale use of
high-performance jet aircraft," in parallel with the
RN?
1
Once developed by the RN, how had these three
innovations "jumped the gap" to the USN?
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4 |
ID:
124037
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
In April, India successfully tested its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Agni-V, with a stated range of 10,000 km (about 5,500 nm). The Indians announced that after two or three more successes they would introduce Agni-V into their armed forces. The Indian success contrasted with the dramatic failure of a North Korean attempt that same month to orbit a satellite; the North Korean missile exploded shortly after takeoff.
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5 |
ID:
108199
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Publication |
Newport, Naval war college press, 2011.
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Description |
xiv, 221p.
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Series |
Naval war college Newport paper 37
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Standard Number |
9781884733857
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
056305 | 387.7/HON 056305 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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6 |
ID:
093366
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7 |
ID:
058524
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8 |
ID:
004208
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Publication |
Washington, Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987.
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Description |
xii, 85p.
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Series |
Special report
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Standard Number |
0080355447
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
028178 | 355.031/GUE 028178 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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9 |
ID:
025114
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Publication |
Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 1989.
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Description |
511p.
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Standard Number |
0870217933
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
032806 | 623.40294/FRI 032806 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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10 |
ID:
093277
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Publication |
Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2009.
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Description |
xv, 360p.
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Standard Number |
9781591142867
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
054674 | 359.42/FRI 054674 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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11 |
ID:
070240
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12 |
ID:
051286
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Publication |
Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 2001.
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Description |
352p.
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Standard Number |
1557502919
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
048040 | 359.030973/FRI 048040 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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13 |
ID:
040745
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Publication |
Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 1984.
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Description |
192pHbk
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Standard Number |
0870219545
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
025681 | 623.8257/FRI 025681 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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14 |
ID:
051232
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Publication |
Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2003.
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Description |
vii, 327p.hbk
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Standard Number |
1591142903
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
048234 | 958.1046/FRI 048234 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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15 |
ID:
122674
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
Why are littoral operations so difficult? What is particularly bad about very shallow water (VSW). Leading up to and including the surf zone (S2)? The reference is always to mine countermeasures (MCM) in an amphibious context, because otherwise ships can and should evade really shallow water. MCM close to and on the beach always seem to involve technology very different from what is needed in even slightly deeper water. Many navies otherwise skilled in MCM lack such techniques. because they are concerned mainly with keeping harbours open in the face of enemy mining rather than in supporting amphibious operations. Only a few Navies have invested in the ability to land despite resistance. including mines.
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16 |
ID:
073016
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17 |
ID:
057610
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Publication |
London, Jane's publishing co., 1988.
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Description |
ix, 246p.
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Standard Number |
0710605005
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
029836 | 359.030973/FRI 029836 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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18 |
ID:
133494
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
Imagine that your closest trading partner is also your most threatening potential enemy. Imagine, too, that this partner is building a large navy specifically targeted at yours, hence at the overseas trade vital to you. Does that sound like the current U.S. situation with respect to China? It was certainly the British situation relative to Germany a century ago, on the eve of World War I. History never repeats, but it is often instructive to look at the mistakes of the past. The worse the mistakes, the more instructive. No one looking at the outbreak and then the course of World War I can see it as anything but a huge mistake. Hopefully we can do better.
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