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| 1 |
ID:
118204
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| 2 |
ID:
120463
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the context of the contemporary crisis of neoliberal political economy, the politics of austerity has reasserted the liberal utility of the state as the political authority of market freedom. This article argues that economy has no independent existence, and that instead, economy is a political practice. It examines the political economy of Adam Smith and the German ordoliberal tradition to decipher the character of the political in political economy and its transformation from Smith's liberal theory into neoliberal theology. Ordoliberalism emerged in the late 1920s at a time of a manifest crisis of political economy, and its argument was fundamental for the development of the neoliberal conception that free economy is matter of strong state authority. The conclusion argues with Marx that the state is the concentrated force of free economy.
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| 3 |
ID:
051622
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| 4 |
ID:
151518
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| Summary/Abstract |
The spectacular scale and speed of China’s domestic renewable energy capacity development and technology catch-up has in recent years been followed by the ‘go out’ of Chinese clean energy technology firms seeking new markets and opportunities in sub-Saharan Africa. This paper explores the growing involvement of China in the development and transfer of renewable energy technologies in Africa and examines the key drivers and obstacles shaping Chinese renewable energy investments and exports. Far from there being some kind of grand or harmonious strategy directed by a single monolithic state, we argue that fragmented and decentralised state apparatuses and quasi-market actors in China are increasingly pursuing their own independent interests and agendas around renewable energy in Africa in ways often marked by conflict, inconsistency and incoherence. Moving beyond the state-centric analysis common in much of the research on contemporary China–Africa relations, we examine the motivations of a range of non-state and quasi-state actors, as well their different perceptions and constructions of risk, policy environments and political stability in recipient countries. The paper explores the case study example of South Africa, where Chinese firms have become increasingly significant in the diffusion of renewable energy technology.
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| 5 |
ID:
038856
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African history
/ Curtin, Philip; Feierman, Steven; Thompson, Leonard; Vansina, Jan
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1978
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| Publication |
London, Longman, 1978.
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| Description |
xv, 612p.: mapspbk
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| Standard Number |
0582646634
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 018200 | 960/CUR 018200 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 6 |
ID:
185282
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| 7 |
ID:
160849
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| Summary/Abstract |
Oligarchy (oligarhi) has become a well-worn Mongolian term for describing the social order. Real power and wealth is now said to be monopolized by a small number of super-elite families. The roots of this oligarchic capitalism lie in the process by which ownership was acquired and concentrated so as to take control of companies, rather than simply making profitable investments. The emergent form resembles Thomas Piketty's notion of ‘patrimonial capitalism’, a political economy dominated by inherited private capital, rather than the wealth created by entrepreneurship or innovation. Mongolian capitalism can also be seen as patrimonial in another sense. Its roots lie in the opportunistic struggle over a form of national patrimony: the enterprises and resources inherited from the previous political economy. The new proprietorial class already appears faintly dynastic, and presently there seem to be no barriers to the transmission of wealth to the next generation of super-rich.
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| 8 |
ID:
144553
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This article writes the agrarian history of an obscure locality, Cuttack, in early-nineteenth-century British India. In doing so, instead of exalting the explanatory power of the local, or the particular, it interrogates the category of the ‘local’ itself by demonstrating how it was assembled as the object of agrarian governance in British India through a densely interwoven network of discursive practices. I present this network as various inter-regional practices and debates over agrarian governance in British India and some methodological debates of political economy in contemporary Britain. This article argues that the governmental engagement with locally specific, indigenous forms of interrelationship between landed property and political power in British India can be more productively understood as internal to the transformed vocabulary of contemporary political economy, rather than lying outside it, amid the pragmatism and contingency of governance. Accordingly, it shows how the particularity of agrarian relations in a locality was produced out of a host of reconfigurations, over different moments and sites, of a universal classificatory grid. In the process, I question those histories of British India which, being rooted in a series of hierarchized binary oppositions, like inside–outside, abstract–concrete, or universal–particular, reproduce the rationality of colonial governance.
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| 9 |
ID:
014963
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| Publication |
Dec 1992.
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| Description |
19-40
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| 10 |
ID:
133568
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
D M Harver analyses the changing patterns of political ideology and economic thinking in India post-1985 and looks at the changing economic philosophy embraced by successive central and state governments. He also traces the main causes of the re-emergence of religiosity as a political factor.
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| 11 |
ID:
099316
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2010.
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The relative weakness of the American labor movement has broader political consequences, particularly for the ambitions of the Obama presidency. Absent a strong countervailing political constituency like organized labor, well-organized and more powerful stakeholders like business and industry groups are able to exert undue influence in American democracy, thereby frustrating attempts at political reform. I argue that it is impossible to understand the current political situation confronting the Obama administration without an account of the underlying sources of labor weakness in the U.S. In such an account two factors loom especially large. One is the role of the state in structuring labor market institutions and the rules of the game for labor-business interactions. The second is the distinctively racialized character of the U.S. political economy, which has contributed to labor market segmentation, a unique political geography, and the racial division of the U.S. working class. In our current post-industrial, post-civil rights racial and economic order, whether and how the labor movement can overcome its historical racial fragmentation will determine its possibilities for renewal and ultimately its political strength in relation to the Obama presidency. If the labor movement remains an uneven and weak regional organization hobbled by racial fragmentation, the Obama Administration's efforts to advance its core policy agenda will lack the necessary political force to be effective.
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| 12 |
ID:
001856
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| Publication |
California, Annual Reviews, 1998.
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| Description |
xx,477p.
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| Standard Number |
0-8243-3301-2
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Copies: C:2/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 042848 | 320.05/POL;1-2 042848 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
| 042849 | 320.05/POL;1-2 042849 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 13 |
ID:
116883
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article discusses the attempt undertaken by several development aid agencies since the turn of the century to integrate political economy assessments into their decision making on development assistance. The article discusses three such attempts: the Drivers of Change adopted by the UK's Department for International Development, the Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis (sgaca) developed by the Dutch Directorate General for International Cooperation and the new thinking on political economy analysis, policy reform and political risk advanced by the World Bank. On the basis of a political-economic interpretation of development agencies, two main factors are found to hinder the successful application of political economy assessment. In the first place, the agencies' professional outlook leads them to see development in primarily technical terms. In the second place, the nature of incentives for development professionals leads them to resist the implementation of political economy analyses.
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| 14 |
ID:
106787
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article traces the trajectories of Islamic politics in Indonesia and Malaysia in relation to the changing political economy of these two countries. The approach adopted is to understand Islamic politics less on the basis of Islamic doctrine, or conflicts over its interpretation, than in connection with the changing social bases of politics, the context established by capitalist economic transformations, the evolution of the post-colonial state from the Cold War and its aftermath, and of crises of political economy in the 1980s and 1990s. The exercise reveals important convergences and divergences in trajectories that help to explain the complex historical processes which have shaped Islamic politics in these two cases and possibly beyond. It also reveals the entanglement of Islamic politics in very profane conflicts over power and tangible economic resources over time. In both countries a new form of Islamic populism has emerged as a major articulator of grievances against the secular state and perceived social injustices. However, the same historical processes have enabled the social agents of Islamic politics in Malaysia to contest state power more effectively than their counterparts in Indonesia.
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| 15 |
ID:
183776
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Foundational theories of trade politics emphasize a conflict between consumer welfare and protectionist lobbies. But these theories ignore other powerful lobbies that also shape trade policy. We propose a theory of trade distortion arising from conflict between consumer welfare and importer lobbies. We estimate the key parameter of the model—the government's weight on welfare—using original data from Venezuela, where Hugo Chávez used an exchange-rate subsidy to underwrite hundreds of billions of dollars of imports. Whereas estimates from traditional models would make Chávez look like a welfare maximizer, our results indicate that he implemented distortionary commercial policy to the benefit of special interests. Our analysis underscores the importance of tailoring workhorse models to account for differences in interest group configuration. The politics of trade policy is not reducible to the politics of protectionism.
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| 16 |
ID:
006044
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| Publication |
New Delhi, A P H Pubshing Corporation, 1996.
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| Description |
xxix, 431p.
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| Standard Number |
81702246910
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 037687 | 355.622/CHA 037687 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 17 |
ID:
157891
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Temporary migrant workers in Southeast Asia are subject to various abuses in recruitment, work and repatriation. A decade ago ASEAN governments committed to developing an Instrument governing migrant worker rights, but a series of deadlocks have stymied this agreement. Prevailing accounts explain this impasse as the consequence of incompatible national interests, norms of non-interference and consensus, a lack of institutional capacity and the limits of rights advocacy in ASEAN. Conversely, utilising a political economy framework, this article demonstrates this impasse in regional governance reflects societal-level conflicts among migrant workers, civil society organisations, business groups and state-based actors, generated by the latter’s adoption of migrant labour as both a livelihood and development strategy.
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| 18 |
ID:
150004
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To help overcome the challenge of growing CO2 emissions, China is experimenting with market-based instruments, including pilot CO2 emissions trading systems (ETSs) in seven regions that serve as precursors of a national CO2 ETS. Implementing an ETS in a rapidly growing economy in which government authorities exercise significant control over markets poses many challenges. This study assesses how well three of the most developed pilot ETSs, in Guangdong, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, have adapted carbon emissions trading to China's economic and political context. We base our study on new information gathered through interviews with local pilot ETS regulators and experts, analysis of recent trading data, and extensive legal and literature reviews. We point out instances in which pilot regulators have deftly tailored carbon emissions trading to China's unique context and instances in which designs are insufficient to ensure smooth operation. We also indicate areas in which broader institutional reforms of China's political economy may be required for carbon emissions trading to operate successfully. We make nine recommendations to improve the design and operation of the pilot programs and to inform the construction of a national CO2 ETS.
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| 19 |
ID:
127619
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
China's financial system, dominated by the banking sector, has played a central role in the development of an imbalanced trajectory of economic development and growth. As one of the primary mechanisms for implementing decisive macro-economic policy, the banking sector has hitherto served the Chinese growth strategy well in actively allocating capital towards the investment and export sectors, whilst proving capable of managing the macro-economic ramifications of this highly inter-ventionist strategy. However, the role of the financial system in this growth strategy is also rooted in the requirement that authority over financial capital remains closely tied to state institutions and policies, due to elite concern over politico-economic instability. Based on policy analysis and qualitative interviews conducted in mid-2012, the article suggests that whilst the structure of the financial system was conducive to fostering the growth of the real economy, it will hold back not the need for rebalancing, but rather the process of rebalancing itself.
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| 20 |
ID:
188444
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Natural resources—blessing or curse? Indonesia provides an excellent case study for an examination of this question. It is a major commodity exporter; the fourth most populous country in the world; and the world’s largest archipelagic state with huge mineral, forest and maritime resources. Indonesia also has three distinctive features that are particularly relevant for such a study. First, with the exception of the Asian Financial and COVID-19 crises, it has had at least moderately strong economic performance for the past half-century. This distinguishes it from the majority of resource-rich developing countries, and therefore there are lessons to be learnt from its management of these boom and bust episodes, particularly the latter. Second, Indonesia has experienced two rather different resource booms—the first based mainly on oil and gas in the 1970s and the second based primarily on coal, palm oil and gas over the years 2005–11. The economic, social and environmental effects of these two booms have differed significantly. Third, the country experienced major regime change in 1998–99, from the centralized, authoritarian Soeharto regime in 1966–98, which presided over the first boom, to the subsequent democratic, decentralized regime during the second boom. The very different political and institutional arrangements had important implications for the management of the boom and its distributional effects. We examine these issues in a comparative context, employing as reference points two very large natural resource exporters, Brazil and Nigeria, and Malaysia, a smaller, more dynamic Southeast Asian comparator.
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