| Publication |
2004.
|
| Description |
p41-54
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The failure of the Oslo process and the surge of violence since September 2000 have highlighted the unbridgeable gap that separates Israelis and Palestinians. After 11 September 2001, Western policies in the region have been faced with two choices. A ‘Palestine-first’ option would emphasise the centrality of the Palestinian–Israeli dispute to the region and seek to solve it, in the expectation that a solution will make it easier to cure the other ills of the greater Middle East. Yet the correlation between Palestine and these other problems is tenuous at best. The Bush administration correctly has chosen a second strategy: putting Palestine last. A solution to other regional problems might well prepare the ground for an eventual resolution of the Palestinian–Israeli dispute. Until conditions change, the best strategy is to significantly lower expectations, substituting conflict management for conflict resolution.
|