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ID:
135874
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article looks at structural analogies between the strategic situation in Europe in the summer of 1914 and in East Asia today, with particular emphasis on the probability of the outbreak of a major war. The author examines analogies regarding the nature of the international system, i.e. is the international system characterized by outright anarchy or by a more or less developed and institutionalized understanding among the main actors about the way to preserve peace and to organize economic exchange? The article addresses domestic factors (nationalism, democratic, authoritarian or semi-democratic regimes) and investigates military dynamics against the backdrop of geography and the availability of military equipment and technologies. Possible routes of military escalation are also discussed. Special attention is paid to states that have isolated themselves and that dispose of military means that might promise swift victory. The article comes to the conclusion that there are very few similarities between Europe in 1914 and East Asia today, but that both the high degree of militarization of the Korean peninsula and the evolving military competition between the US and China in the region do imply the possibility of a major armed conflict in a not too distant future
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| 2 |
ID:
077683
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Applying the method of enlightenment correctly to the area of nuclear non-proliferation would require a major effort to critically evaluate ideologies. Liberal arms control-despite its many successes and merits-has devised over the years a whole set of ideological tenets and attitudes. Some of them have been transformed into beliefs that could be termed myths. The most prominent ideological myth of the liberal arms control school is the notion that the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of 1968 (NPT) was in essence a disarmament agreement, not a non-proliferation treaty. To depict the negotiations as a premeditated effort of enlightenment, where the governments of this world came together to solemnly decide that some of them would be allowed to have some nuclear weapons for an interim period while the others would renounce their possession immediately, is pure. It would be equally wrong to qualify the 'grand bargain' as one between the nuclear haves and the nuclear have-nots. Another myth of the liberal arms control school is the notion that-in order to gain support for the NPT-the superpowers had altered their nuclear weapons strategy in the 1960s. Again, this contention is not borne out by the development of nuclear strategies and doctrines. The third myth is the contention that there was an abrupt shift in US non-proliferation policy as George W. Bush came into power. The major changes in US non-proliferation policy had already started during the Clinton administration and some of them can be traced back to the tenure of President George W. H. Bush senior. They all reflected the changed international environment and represented necessary adjustments of the non-proliferation strategy. The Clinton administration left some of the traditional paths of arms control and rightly undertook some changes that were necessary because traditional instruments of arms control were no longer adequate. The Bush administration continued that policy, but in a more radical way.
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| 3 |
ID:
169105
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article gives an overview of the literature on war termination both in the fields of behaviouralism social sciences and policy-oriented strategic studies. It identifies shortcomings and problems related to both lines of research. The main problem is the undifferentiated and indiscriminate use of the term ‘war’. The article proposes a categorisation of wars that could form the basis for more thorough research on the topic of war termination.
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| 4 |
ID:
051472
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| 5 |
ID:
034014
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| Publication |
Boulder, Westview Press, 1988.
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| Description |
ii, 87p.
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| Series |
Occasional paper series; 8
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| Standard Number |
0813306574
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 030756 | 327.174/KRA 030756 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 6 |
ID:
005783
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| Publication |
Bonn, Research Institute of German Society for foreign Affairs, 1995.
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| Description |
74p.
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| Standard Number |
3771305039
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 037227 | 327.47/RAH 037227 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 7 |
ID:
096990
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| 8 |
ID:
179024
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| Summary/Abstract |
This commentary asks why Russia has started again to invest in land-based intermediate-range missiles, which can be used both in conventional and nuclear roles. As resorting to the action-reaction scheme cannot explain Russian efforts, the nature of the specific Russian approach towards military issues requires consideration. Russia obviously seeks to achieve major strategic advantages in case of a regional war occurring in Europe by having available a capability for escalation dominance. Only Russia can initiate such a war, not the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO]. The Western Alliance should respond by improving the conventional defence capabilities with which it is going to protect particularly the Baltic States and Poland. Moreover, NATO will have to review its nuclear posture in Europe.
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| 9 |
ID:
057316
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