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| 1 |
ID:
051476
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| 2 |
ID:
110147
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| 3 |
ID:
147513
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| 4 |
ID:
116601
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 1990, U.S. political scientist John Mearsheimer predicted that we would soon "miss the Cold War."1 In the months and years that followed, the eruption of bloody conflicts in the Balkans and in Africa gave birth to fears of a new era of global chaos and anarchy. Authors such as Robert Kaplan and Benjamin Barber spread a pessimistic vision of the world in which new barbarians, liberated from the disciplines of the East-West conflict, would give a free rein to their ancestral hatreds and religious passions.2 Journalists James Dale Davidson and William Rees-Mogg chimed in that violence would reassert itself as the common condition of life.3 Former U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan warned that the planet was about to become a "pandemonium."4
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| 5 |
ID:
141127
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| Summary/Abstract |
Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and aggression against Ukraine, members of NATO are again pondering the strength of Western deterrence. Over the course of the Ukraine crisis, President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly emphasised the potency of Russian nuclear weapons, announced new nuclear-weapons programmes and brushed off accusations that Russia is cheating on a number of arms-control agreements. Most ominously, Putin has declared that he would have been prepared to place Russian nuclear forces on alert – which implies threatening their use – had the annexation of Crimea met with serious resistance.
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| 6 |
ID:
142988
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the past two years, the expression “red line” has become a regular feature of the global policy debate. So much so that it risks becoming a punch line. Red lines have appeared in discussions about the Ukraine crisis, Iran's nuclear program, and Syrian use of chemical weapons. President Obama famously stated in 2012 that “a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized.”
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| 7 |
ID:
066730
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| 8 |
ID:
094513
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| 9 |
ID:
141118
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| Summary/Abstract |
American and European diplomats worked hard to close most of the avenues and loopholes that Iran could exploit to advance its nuclear programme. The enriched-uranium stockpile and the number of centrifuges will be significantly reduced. The plutonium route is blocked. The list of prohibited activities is impressive, as is the scope of monitoring – from uranium mines to procurement channels. The E3/EU+3 (France, Germany and the UK, plus China, Russia and the United States) have been creative in ensuring that the threat of reimposing sanctions is not hollow. And whatever happens next, the patient efforts of the E3/EU+3 since 2006, along with the harshest non-proliferation sanctions ever imposed, will have demonstrated that illegal nuclear proliferation is costly. Simply put, this is the most detailed non-proliferation agreement ever devised. But it nevertheless includes several problematic aspects, which deserve careful scrutiny.
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| 10 |
ID:
077793
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
France still sees its nuclear arsenal as essential both as insurance against future major risks and as support for an independent foreign policy. There is a wide consensus in the country to maintain a nuclear deterrent, both among political parties and the general public. A modernization program is under way that will ensure the continued efficacy of the French nuclear force well into the 2030s, and France has adopted a fairly restrictive interpretation of its disarmament commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This suggests that the likeliest future direction of France's nuclear policy is conservatism. However, other scenarios remain possible, especially in the domain of transatlantic and/or European cooperation
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| 11 |
ID:
124849
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Who would have predicted just two years ago that cash-strapped, inwardly-focused, soul-searching France would embark on a flurry of military operations and bold strategic moves? How France can really afford to remain a global power while imposing some of the heaviest budget cuts ever.
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| 12 |
ID:
052343
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| Publication |
Jul-Aug 2004.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Its nuclear weapons policy is still one of tous azimuts (general deterrence), but France is downsizing its arsenal and seeking greater flexibility.
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| 13 |
ID:
076718
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Proliferation in Europe stopped in the 1960s due to the nuclear guarantee given by the United States and the European integration process. These factors still apply today but emerging nuclear programs in the European Union (EU) neighborhood and the distension of the transatlantic link make the possibility of a new nuclear country in Europe not completely unthinkable. Turkey would be a prime candidate. In addition, some isolated states could go nuclear if faced with a perceived security threat. Ukraine would be the most likely case. Finally, in extreme circumstances, an EU member could consider a nuclear program. In light of such possibilities, the U.S. security guarantee to Europe, including a nuclear dimension, remains an important nonproliferation instrument
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| 14 |
ID:
153983
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| Summary/Abstract |
Why have nuclear weapons not been used since 1945? The more time passes, the more the question becomes relevant and even puzzling for pessimists. Most strategists of the 1960s would be stunned to hear that as of 2017, there still has yet to be another nuclear use in anger.
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| 15 |
ID:
158014
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| Summary/Abstract |
The dominant narrative about Russia’s nuclear weapons in Western strategic literature since the beginning of the century has been something like this: Russia’s doctrine of ‘escalate to de-escalate’, and its large-scale military exercises, show that Moscow is getting ready to use low-yield, theatre nuclear weapons to stop NATO from defeating Russia’s forces, or to coerce the Atlantic Alliance and end a conflict on terms favourable to Russia.
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| 16 |
ID:
156302
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| Summary/Abstract |
In summer 2013, the Syrian regime launched a large-scale chemical-weapons attack against its own people in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta, an event that left many people dead, disturbed France–US relations and reverberated around the world with potentially profound consequences for deterrence.
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| 17 |
ID:
169178
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