|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
058606
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
131600
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Intelligence has long played an integral role in the context of western and broader international responses to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and efforts to contain the associated technology, materials and expertise. There are, of course, many challenges associated with accurately assessing proliferation intentions, processes, programmes and the underlying scientific and technical wherewithal. There is also an uneven record in this respect.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
051485
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
105721
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2011.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The technical and political evidence that Iran is seeking to establish a 'nuclear hedging' capability has gradually increased over the past nine years. The regime in Tehran has continued to insist that its nuclear ambitions are purely civilian in nature and it has resisted the international community's dual-track policy, encompassing both negotiations and sanctions, to persuade Iran to be fully transparent about its nuclear activities and plans, and to suspend work related to uranium enrichment and plutonium separation. While the prospects for a negotiated solution currently appear slim, the regime does not yet appear to have decided whether, or when, to produce nuclear weapons and to break out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is essential, therefore, to maintain and if necessary to build up the pressure on Iran and to strengthen efforts to disrupt its procurement of technology and materials for its nuclear programme. It is also imperative for the international community to maintain negotiations and also consider alternative diplomatic approaches to enhance the prospects of keeping Iran focused purely on civil nuclear ambitions, while at the same time resolving questions related to the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
075107
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
London, IISS, 2006.
|
| Description |
104p.
|
| Series |
Adelphi Paper 380
|
| Standard Number |
0415412382
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:1,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 051926 | 355.8251190961/BOW 051926 | Main | On Shelf | Reference books | |
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
111917
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The second Nuclear Security Summit on 26-27 March 2012 in Seoul provides an important opportunity to gauge international consensus on the threat posed by nuclear terrorism, and to evaluate progress in the development of multilateral cooperative efforts to prevent it. However, the 'nuclear security' agenda has long been complicated by the complexity of the issues it covers and diverging perceptions of the risks and threats in this area. Further complications involve the politics that have constrained the development of formal cooperative approaches and the patchwork nature of the existing multilateral policy architecture. While the Summit is unlikely to go very far in mitigating these complications, it will nonetheless provide impetus to multilateral efforts to strengthen the international regulative framework in this area and, in the process, to develop the norm of nuclear security. Beyond Seoul several priorities stand out. Nuclear safety and nuclear security need to be approached in a more balanced way by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and it must also be allowed to adopt a more joined-up, and less stove-piped, approach to nuclear governance across the safeguards, safety and security fields. Developing countries that are concerned by growing demands for strengthened nuclear security arrangements need greater reassurance from those proposing them that these will not undermine their rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to pursue civil applications of nuclear energy. Greater progress also needs to be made in universalizing the key nuclear security conventions and their amendments, and attention should be given to how momentum and high-level political buy-in to the nuclear security agenda can be maintained in the future both as part of, and beyond, the Nuclear Security Summit process.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
001792
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Hampshire, macmillan Press, 2000.
|
| Description |
xiii, 276p.
|
| Series |
Southampton studies in international policy
|
| Contents |
Forwarded by Lawrence Freedman
|
| Standard Number |
0312226187
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 042816 | 358.17/BOW 042816 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
129730
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article starts by discussing sensitive nuclear information and how malicious non-state actors could exploit this to facilitate acts of nuclear terror. Our analysis shows that there is a significant information security challenge in this area due to the diversity of sensitive information, the different communities within which it resides and the range of mechanisms by which it could be transferred. We then turn our attention to assessing different steps that could be taken to protect sensitive nuclear information. Here there are limits to the effectiveness of international instruments and national laws and consequently bottom-up initiatives designed to promote responsible self-governance should be developed and supported.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
084945
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|