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| 1 |
ID:
076384
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| 2 |
ID:
089752
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's retention of power means that Iran's nuclear ambitions are likely to continue. This article explores how and when Iran could achieve a nuclear weapons capability and what these scenarios might entail.
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| 3 |
ID:
062291
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| 4 |
ID:
085786
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In January of 2007, China knocked one of its weather satellites out of orbit, and threw the international community into panic. Some figured the satellite-killer test was the harbinger of a future war in space that could cripple a technology-dependent United States military. This viewpoint examines the possibilities of a Chinese assault on American satellites.
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| 5 |
ID:
080445
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
GUI_Missile_Flyout is a stand-alone program running under Windows for simulating ballistic missiles with 1, 2, or 3 stages in a framework with a round, rotating Earth. Users can easily input all the necessary parameters in an intuitive graphical user interface (GUI). A modest number of quantities can be interactively plotted on the Interface but the complete trajectory can be saved as either an Excel or Matlab file for further analysis. The trajectory can also be directly displayed in Google Earth for visualization. The GUI can be used to optimize pitch-over parameters to maximize range or aim at a specific target (entered, as is the launch site) through latitude-longitude pairs. In addition to an introduction to using the program, this article describes the integration of the three-degrees-of-freedom equations of motion and approximations made to the aerodynamic (such as a parameterized drag coefficient, Cd). The program is freely available from the website
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| 6 |
ID:
051512
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| 7 |
ID:
170742
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| Summary/Abstract |
There are renewed worries that the U.S. nuclear command, control, and communications system (NC3) might be attacked with cyberweapons, potentially triggering a war.1 These concerns have been present since at least 1972 when the Air Force Computer Security Technology Planning Study Panel found that the “current systems provide no protection [against] a malicious user
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