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| 1 |
ID:
146595
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| Contents |
The fractured maritime mandate in India and the involvement of multiple agencies and ministries for matters maritime, make it complicated to achieve synergy. The UWR, Goa is a defence facility under the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Earth Science in mandated to provide R&D support for ocean related aspects, the we have the Ministry of Shipping and Ministry of Science and Technology as other players. It is known that there are close to 17 agencies and ministries of the Government of India involved in maritime issues. The huge resource and support required for UDA is possible only when all these agencies come together for a long term commitment to enhance our UDA in the IOR. A comprehensive Maritime Strategy formulation with clear focus on UDA is the only way forward to synergise the efforts of all the possible players involved. The Make in India initiative can be leveraged to contribute significantly to the Blue Economy with a clear maritime focus backed with an effective Maritime Strategy translating to enhanced Acoustic Capability in the future.
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| 2 |
ID:
170886
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| 3 |
ID:
142687
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| Summary/Abstract |
The vastness and diversity of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and its littorals, and difference in the latters’ overall view of regional security, presents a broad spectrum of challenges therein. The maritime capacities of most littoral states are not strong enough to individually address these challenges. However, synergised response strategies, appropriately regulated by one or two collectively mandated apex bodies, would greatly help in managing regional maritime security. The existing maritime cooperative initiatives in IOR, like the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), have shown great promise and potential. Countries like India and Australia, major players in both these constructs, can possibly rally other IOR littorals into leveraging their maritime capacities under these pan-regional fora by mutual agreement. Concurrently, both initiatives could find congruence in their maritime security visions, so as to create a collaborative local environment for collective benefits without dependence on extra-regional players.
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| 4 |
ID:
157999
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| Publication |
Oxon, Routledge, 2017.
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| Description |
x, 114p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9781138205345
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059346 | 320.9182406/DOY 059346 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
181856
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Singapore, Springer Nature, 2021.
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| Description |
vi, 298p.hbk
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| Series |
Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China's Development Path
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| Standard Number |
9789811619816
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 060093 | 330.91824/ZHU 060093 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 6 |
ID:
106705
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
During the past few years, Sri Lanka appears to have forged closer relations with China. Sri Lanka welcomed Chinese investment in building a port in Hambantota, arms from China for use in its civil war, and "dialogue partner" status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Such high-profile moves have unnerved analysts fearing the rise of Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean region. A first-time, systematic analysis of the trends in Sri Lanka's economic, military, and diplomatic relations with China reveals that ties have indeed been strengthening. However, Sri Lanka is neither bandwagoning with nor balancing China, as structural realism predicts. More attention should be devoted to explaining the security thinking of small states that are not following such predictions in response to the emergence of a regional hegemon.
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| 7 |
ID:
128674
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| 8 |
ID:
184897
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| 9 |
ID:
171454
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| Publication |
New Delhi, KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, 2020.
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| Description |
lii, 587p.: tables, figures, mapshbk
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| Standard Number |
9789389137439
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Copies: C:2/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059863 | 327.5/CHI 059863 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
| 059864 | 327.5/CHI 059864 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 10 |
ID:
119073
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article considers the regional order-building challenges that Australia presently confronts in the Indian Ocean region (IOR). The author argues that while regional stability within the IOR constitutes an increasingly important Australian security interest, policy makers will struggle to translate the order-building strategies they have previously pursued in East Asia into an Indian Ocean context. In East Asia, Australia has historically pursued a 'dual track' order-building strategy centred on its participation in a US-dominated 'hub and spokes' alliance system alongside multilateral regional engagement. The absence of an equivalent alliance system or an established tradition of multilateral security diplomacy conversely precludes an extension of this strategy into the IOR. Growing tensions between the USA and China and between China and India, meanwhile, further complicate IOR security dynamics, while underscoring the urgent need for a more coherent approach to regional order-building. With these challenges in mind, the author concludes by proposing a range of bilateral, minilateral and multilateral initiatives that Australia should pursue to stimulate the emergence of a more cooperative IOR security environment.
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| 11 |
ID:
147993
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The term Maritime Silk Road (MSR) was first used by Chinese President, Xi Jinping at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit held in Bali in 2013. Ever since then the MSR has become a major proposal of the new leadership in China. During Chinese Premier’s visit to Brunei, he announced the establishment of the China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund with USD 48 million allocated by China for sponsoring ASEAN-maritime cooperation projects. Further, to take this initiative forward China has set up a ten billion fund for this proposal.
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| 12 |
ID:
179391
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| Summary/Abstract |
Over the past decade, China has established a permanent and escalating military presence in the Indian Ocean region. The littoral states, islands, and waters of the Indian Ocean—defined here by the choke points of the Cape of Good Hope, Bab el-Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz, the Malacca Strait, and the Torres Strait—are part of the wider Indo-Pacific region, but they constitute a distinct strategic landscape. The United States’ strategic competition with China does extend to the Indian Ocean region, but it does not take the same form as the heavily militarized territorial disputes of the western rim of the Pacific Ocean or the South China Sea, which attract the lion’s share of attention from US policymakers and military planners. The Indian Ocean faces a particular set of strategic risks and a particular constellation of likeminded partners—an effective strategy must account for those particularities.
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| 13 |
ID:
125982
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| 14 |
ID:
135808
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| Summary/Abstract |
India should play an active role in seeking to address the challenges to the creation of a new and acceptable Indo-Pacific security architecture. Over the years, the aspirations and ambitions of India have grown. it has been acknowledged as a predominant power in south Asia, and an emerging power in the whole of Asia. Its desire to be a leading power in the Indian Ocean Rim cannot be questioned. However, India cannot shy away from assuming responsibilities and playing a more proactive and positive role, especially if it desire to an influential player in Asian and world affairs. India’s strategic orientations need to be adjusted to go beyond the Indian Ocean region to the Pacific Rim.
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| 15 |
ID:
106175
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| 16 |
ID:
074454
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| 17 |
ID:
173502
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Indian Ocean is the world’s third largest ocean after Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. It is the richest ocean in the world because of its geostrategic location. It connects the major regions of the world like-African cost, South West Asia, East Asia and North Asia. It also connects the seven different water ways that are called as “seven chokepoints of the Indian Ocean and linked with the thirty eight states of the world.
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| 18 |
ID:
070630
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| 19 |
ID:
138865
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| Summary/Abstract |
China has been experiencing major transformation in its naval strategy and capacity. Starting off in the late 1980s with rapid naval modernisation, China’s naval operation gradually shifts from the overwhelming ‘near seas’ to the more challenging ‘far seas’. This task is not an easy one. Whilst in the ‘near seas’ China has been enjoying relatively naval superiority, naval operations in the ‘far seas’ is more demanding. Assessing China’s naval capability in three areas of naval forces, naval activities and presence, and overseas naval bases throws a light on the discrepancy between actual capability and intention. Three reasons lend explanation for the hurdles China faces in implementing the ‘far-seas operations’. First, China is preoccupied with the geopolitical struggle in the ‘near seas’, namely, Taiwan, Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute in East China Sea, and the South China Sea dispute. Second, China is confronted with the ‘Malacca dilemma’ that shoves it to rethink its naval ambition. Third, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) already has two major players, the United States and India, with which China has to struggle to pursue its interests. The three reasons combined with lack of naval capability to accommodate an effective ‘far-seas operations’ are accountable for China’s confined strategy in the IOR.
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| 20 |
ID:
142726
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| Summary/Abstract |
Elevation of China-Iran nuclear cooperation is a factor which pushed both countries’ willingness to improve strategic and military cooperation. Iran’s nuclear programme can be traced to the Shah’s rule, in the initial years of the Islamic Republic. At this time Iran had made significant advances in nuclear technology. Eventually Iran focussed on nuclear technology and this caused Iran to seek help from China. In fact, Iraq was also trying to develop nuclear weapons at that time. Hence Iran had sought help from nuclear advanced countries along with India for building a research reactor, while this was utilised effectively by China and provided other assistance in nuclear research. The Iran-Iraq conflict was one of the reasons behind Iran’s ambition to become a nuclear power and to be independent in enriching uranium. China helped Iran’s nuclear programme in return for benefits relating to access to Iran’s energy resources. China had, along with Russia, assisted Iran’s nuclear programme for peaceful use of nuclear energy and also provided it with material and training support. However dual use technology transferred from China to Iran may have been used for nuclear weapons technology.
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